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ARTICLES
COMPELLED STATEMENTS
FROM POLICE OFFICERS
AND GARRITY MMUNITY
STIEVEN D. CLYMER*
In this Article; Professor Steven Clyner describes the problem created when police
departments require officers suspected of misconduct to answer internal affairs in-
vestigators' questions or face job ternination. Relying on the Supreme Courts ide-
cision in Garrity v. New Jersey, courts treat such compelled statements as
immunized testimony. That treatment not only renders such a statement inadnissi-
ble in a criminal prosecution of the suspect police officer, it also may require tile
prosecution to shoulder the daunting and sometimes insurmountable burden of
demonstrating that its physical evidence, witness testimony, and strategic decision-
making are untainted by the statement Because police internal affairs investigators
decide whether to take and disseminate compelled statements from police officers,
prosecutors are powerless to prevent the problen Yet, as Professor Clymer shows,
the Garrity doctrinhe as applied by lower courts, has an uncertain foundation. The
Supreme Court never has addressed the full range of protections that courts often
bestow on compelled statements, such as prohibitions on nonevidentiary and indi-
rect evidentiary use Furthermore; these stringent use restrictions are difficult to
square with the less robust protection that courts afford coerced confessions and
with the need to address police criminality effectively. While rejecting tie proposi-
tion that the Court should overrule Garrity, Clymer argues that courts should relax
prohibitions on collateral uses of compelled statements. Clymer also suggests that
policymakers require police departments to use sanctions less severe than job termi-
nation to prompt police officers to answer questions during administrative investi-
gations. Threats of lesser sanctions often will be sufficient to encourage police
officers to answer and will do so without triggering Garrity immunity This ap-
proach fairly balances the competing interests of police departments, police officers,
and prosecutors in cases of alleged police criminality.
INTRODUCION
In recent years, several weU-publicized events have rekindled
public concern about police corruption and the use of excessive force.
In New York City, police officers shot and killed Amadou Diallo1 and
* Associate Professor, Cornell Law School; Special Assistant United States Attorney,
Northern District of New York. B.A., 1980, Cornell University-, J.D., 1983, Cornell Law
School. The author, not the Department of Justice, is responsible for the opinions ex-
pressed in this article. I thank Forrest G. Alogna, Stephen P. Garvey, Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Barry F. Kowalski, Laurie L. Levenson, Brenda K. Sannes, Gary J. Simson, David A.
Sklansky, Effie Toshav, and John S. Wiley for their assistance.
1 See, e.g., Michael Cooper, Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, and an Unarmed Man Is
Killed, N.Y. Tmes, Feb. 5, 1999, at Al. The officers involved were acquitted in a state
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Patrick Dorismond,2 neither of whom were armed or involved in crim-
inal activity, and tortured Abner Louima.3 In Los Angeles, a scandal
involving the Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) Rampart Di-
vision generated allegations of police involvement in drug dealing,
fabrication of evidence, perjury, beatings, thefts, and attempted mur-
der.4 In Cincinnati, a police officer fatally shot an unarmed black
teenager who was wanted for misdemeanor violations, igniting several
days of civil unrest.5 In Philadelphia, police officers beat a suspect
while a television news crew filmed the action. 6
court trial. See, e.g., Jane Fritsch, 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are Acquitted of All
Charges, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 2000, at Al. The United States Department of Justice deter-
mined that it would not seek federal charges against the suspect officers. See, e.g., Susan
Sachs, U.S. Decides Not to Prosecute 4 Officers Who Killed Diallo, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2,
2001, at Bi.
2 See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum, Undercover Police in Manhattan Kill an Unarmed
Man in a Scuffle, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 2000, at Al. A state grand jury declined charges
against the officer involved. See, e.g., C.J. Chivers, Grand Jury Clears Detective in Killing
of Unarmed Guard, N.Y. Times, July 28, 2000, at Al.
3 See, e.g., Dan Barry, Leaders of Precinct Are Swept Out in Torture Inquiry, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 15, 1997, at Al. Justin Volpe, the officer who tortured Louima, pled guilty and
received a thirty-year sentence; another involved officer was convicted at trial and sen-
tenced to fifteen years, eight months. Four other officers who participated in a cover-up
and lied to investigators about the incident also were convicted. See, e.g., Alan Feuer, 3
Ex-Officers Are Sentenced for Roles in Louima Torture, N.Y. Times, June 28, 2000, at B3;
Alan Feuer, Officer Convicted of Lying, In Last of the Louima Cases, N.Y. Times, June 22,
2000, at B3.
4 See, e.g., Terry McDermott, Perez's Bitter Saga of Lies, Regrets and Harm, L.A.
Times, Dec. 31, 2000, at Al. For articles about the scandal, see generally The LAPD Cor-
ruption Scandal, http://www.streetgangs.com/topics/rampart (last visited Sept. 19, 2001).
5 See, e.g., Tom Jackman, Cincinnati Mourners Urged Not to Resort to Violence,
Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 2001, at A3.
6 See, e.g., Paul Farhi, New on Video: Another Controversy, Wash. Post, July 15, 2000,
at A3. Similar events elsewhere also have received attention. See, e.g., S.K. Bardwell,
Police Shot Man 12 Times in Raid, Houston Chron., July 21, 1998, at 1 (describing shooting
inside apartment during warrantless drug raid); Josh Kovner, Family, Police Want Answers,
Hartford Courant, Apr. 14, 1999, at Al, available at 1999 WL 6359549 (describing police
shooting of unarmed and fleeing fourteen-year-old mugging suspect), Evelyn Nieves, Po-
lice Corruption Charges Reopen Wounds in Oakland, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 2000, at A18
(reporting criminal indictment of Oakland police officers for conspiracy to obstruct justice,
kidnapping, assault, filing false reports, and making false arrests); Fauve Yandel, Public
Outcry Follows Shooting Death, Atlanta J. & Const., Aug. 18, 2000, § D, at 6, available at
2000 WL 5471620 (reporting police shooting). There also has been attention focused on
police use of authority to commit sexual assaults. See, e.g., Al Baker, Sex and Power vs.
Law and Order, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 2001, at 21.
Urban minority communities often bear the brunt of criminal conduct by police of-
ficers. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Shielded From Justice: Police Brutality and Ac-
countability in the United States 39-43 (1998) ("Race continues to play a central role in
police brutality in the United States."); Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The
Need for an Effective Federal Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1453, 1471-72 (1993) (describing abusive police conduct in minority communi-
ties in Los Angeles).
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Such incidents often generate demands for more vigorous admin-
istrative oversight, harsh discipline, and criminal prosecution of in-
volved police officers. 7 Those responses-administrative penalties
and criminal prosecution-are the principal means of punishing police
officers who commit crimes.8 There is, however, a troubling conflict
There is no consensus on the frequency with which police engage in corruption or use
excessive force. On corruption, see, for example, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/
GGD-98-111, Law Enforcement: Information on Drug-Related Police Corruption 3,10-14
(1998) which notes that because of the absence of federally collected "data specifically on
drug-related police corruption... it was not possible to estimate the overall extent of the
problem," and Comm'n to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Cor-
ruption Procedures of the Police Dep't, City of New York, Commission Report 10 (1994)
[hereinafter Mollen Comm'n Rep.], which notes the difficulty in gauging the extent of po-
lice corruption in New York City.
On use of excessive force, compare Kenneth Adams, What We Know About Police
Use of Force, in Nat'l Institute of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Use of Force by Police 3-6
(NCJ 176330, Oct. 1999) ("Whether measured by use-of-force reports, citizen complaints,
victim surveys, or observational methods, the data consistently indicate that only a small
percentage of police-public interactions involve the use of force."), with John V. Jacobi,
Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 Wis. L Rev. 789,802 ("Evidence from both individual
incidents and systematic study reports strongly suggests widespread police violence entirely
unjustified by the requirements of public safety."), and Human Rights Watch, supra, at 25-
26 (finding that "police brutality is persistent" in New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago,
Boston, District of Columbia, Atlanta, Detroit, and other large American cities). See also
U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Police Practices and Civil Rights in New York City, ch. 4
(2000), http:lwww.usccr.govlnypolprc (describing "differing perspectives of the actual level
of police misconduct in New York City"); Fox Butterfield, When the Police Shoot, Who's
Counting, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29,2001, § 4, at 5 ("[S]tatistics on police shootings and use of
nondeadly force continue to be piecemeal products of spotty collection."). A recent survey
of 80,543 persons revealed that in 1999, police used or threatened to use force against
approximately one percent of persons with whom they had face-to-face contact. See
Patrick A. Langan et aL, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Contacts Between Police and the Public:
Findings From the 1999 National Survey 6 (NCJ 184957, Feb. 2001). Approximately three-
quarters of persons reporting a threat or use of force stated their belief that the threat or
force used was excessive. Id. at 26. There is evidence that police corruption and use of
excessive force are related problems. See Paul Chevigny, The Edge of the Knife: Police
Violence in the Americas 78-79 (1995) ("[Tlhe police who talked to the [Mollen] commis-
sion thought of their corrupt as well as their brutal acts as aspects of vigilante justice.");
Mollen Comm'n Rep., supra, at 45-46 (noting that, based on testimonial and empirical
sources, "corruption seemingly has a relationship with a penchant for brutality").
7 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, supra note 6, at 10-24 (recommending measures to
address "obstacles to justice, problems of investigation and discipline, and public accounta-
bility and transparency"). Those making proposals sometimes question whether police de-
partments and local prosecutors will conduct unbiased investigations and often suggest
involvement by independent monitors or federal prosecutors. See, e.g., Erwin
Chemerinsky, Perspective on the LAPD Scandal, L.A. Times, Feb. 15,2000, at B7 (recom-
mending "an external watchdog... charged by law with the task of investigating police
wrongdoing and bringing disciplinary actions and criminal prosecutions where appropri-
ate"). For a discussion of the differences between local and federal prosecution of police,
see generally Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecu-
tions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L Rev. 509 (1994).
8 Another sanction is revocation of the suspect officer's state certification. For a dis-
cussion of this option, see generally Roger L Goldman & Steven Puro, Revocation of
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between them. Departmental misconduct probes can and often do
impair or even foreclose otherwise viable criminal investigations and
prosecutions. Indeed, an independent panel formed in the wake of
the Rampart scandal recently concluded that LAPD's administrative
investigations "seriously compromise[] criminal investigations of of-
ficer-involved shootings and major use of force incidents .... "
How does this happen? In many police departments, as part of
administrative inquiries into alleged misconduct, internal affairs inves-
tigators take statements from the police officers who were involved
either as participants or witnesses. Statutes, regulations, or depart-
mental policies often impose penalties, including job termination,
against officers who refuse to answer questions during such inquiries.
When police officers faced with sanctions answer questions, many
courts, relying on the Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Garrity v. New
Jersey,'° treat officers' "compelled statements" as the equivalent of
formally immunized testimony. Although such "Garrity immunity"
does not bar later prosecution of a police officer who has given a com-
pelled statement, it does impose on the prosecution the substantial
burden of demonstrating that it has not made direct or indirect use of
the defendant officer's statement. If investigators, prosecutors, or wit-
nesses have learned the contents of a compelled statement, that bur-
den can create difficult or even insurmountable impediments to
criminal prosecution.
Prosecutors have near-complete discretion to determine whether
and when a witness who also is a potential defendant will receive
Police Officer Certification: A Viable Remedy for Police Misconduct?, 45 St. Louis U. L.J.
541 (2001).
Although there are other legal responses to police criminality, such as the exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence from criminal trials, civil lawsuits, and federal "pattern or prac-
tice" lawsuits under the Police Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1994), they do not
sanction the suspect police officer. Even if a civil lawsuit naming an individual police of-
ficer is successful, the officer's department usually will indemnify him. See, e.g., Mary M.
Cheh, Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Brutality?, in Police Violence 247, 268 (William
A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996) ("[lIt is a rare case where an officer personally feels the
financial sting of a judgment.... As far as individual officers are concerned, monetary
awards to plaintiffs generally imply no real punishment .... ."). For a discussion of § 14141,
which permits the Department of Justice to seek injunctive relief against police depart-
ments, see 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b) (1994), and has led to consent decrees in Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania; Steubenville, Ohio; New Jersey; and Los Angeles, California; see generally Debra
Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2
Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 815 (1999), which examines the provisions of the Pittsburgh and Steu-
benville consent decrees, and Marshall Miller, Note, Police Brutality, 17 Yale L. & Pol'y
Rev. 149 (1998), which describes the Department of Justice's strategy in implementing
§ 14141.
9 Report of the Rampart Independent Review Panel 110 (Nov. 16, 2000).
10 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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court-ordered immunity. Cognizant of the danger of tainting a later
prosecution, they exercise that discretion with considerable care. In
contrast, prosecutors do not control decisions to take or to dissemi-
nate compelled statements. Internal affairs investigators make those
decisions, and thus inadvertently or intentionally can jeopardize crimi-
nal prosecutions of police officers. In addition, police witnesses, who
may be reluctant to testify against colleagues, can avoid having to do
so by claiming to be tainted by a defendant officer's compelled state-
ment. Although prosecutors can, and often do, employ prophylactic
measures to guard against some of the difficulties that Garrity immu-
nity creates, those safeguards are not entirely effective and can be
costly to criminal investigations.
The legal protection that police officers' compelled statements re-
ceive is extraordinary when considered in isolation. When compared
to the protection that courts afford to coerced confessions, police im-
munity borders on absurd. Simply put, courts place more stringent
restrictions on prosecutors' use of compelled statements that internal
affairs investigators take from police officers in noncustodial, nonco-
ercive settings than on their use of confessions that police extract from
in-custody suspects by use of illegal physical force or psychological
coercion.
Police criminality undermines the legitimacy of the nation's jus-
tice system. Effective punishment of officers who commit crimes is
essential if we are to maintain public trust in that system. Garrityimmunity jeopardizes that goal by creating tension between adminis-
trative and criminal investigations and impairing prosecutions of crim-
inal police officers.'1
11 Professor Kate Bloch has addressed some of the hazards of Garrity immunity. Kate
E. Bloch, Police Officers Accused of Crime: Prosecutorial and Fifth Amendment Risks
Posed by Police-Elicited "Use Immunized" Statements, 1992 U. I11. L Rev. 625. I take
issue with her proposed solution in Part M.B.1, infra. Others have examined related is-
sues. See, e.g., Robert M. Myers, Code of Silence: Police Shootings and the Right to
Remain Silent, 26 Golden Gate U. L Rev. 497,523 (1996) (contending that police officers
involved in shootings can be required to provide written account without immunity or face
job loss); Byron L. Warnken, The Law Enforcement Officers' Privilege Against Compelled
Self-Incrimination, 16 U. Balt. L. Rev. 452, 515-16, 525-27 (1987) (proposing comprehen-
sive police officers' "Bill of Rights" to include formal immunity grants or Miranda-type
warnings before police officers can be sanctioned for refusal to answer questious); Andrew
M. Herzig, Note, To Serve and Yet to Be Protected: The Unconstitutional Use of Coerced
Statements in Subsequent Criminal Proceedings Against Law Enforcement Officers, 35
Win. & Mary L. Rev. 401, 404 (1993) (contending that compelled statements should not be
admissible in grand jury proceedings); William W. Senft, Note, Use Immunity Advisements
and the Public Employee's Assertion of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-In-
crimination, 44 Wash. & Lee L Rev. 259, 280-81 (1987) (advocating use immunity advise-
ments for public employees).
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Part I describes prevailing doctrine-the treatment of police of-
ficers' compelled statements as immunized testimony. It explains the
stringent restrictions on prosecutorial use of immunized testimony
and shows how those constraints are particularly troublesome when
applied to police officers' compelled statements. Part I also discusses
federal prosecutors' attempts to limit the damage that Garrity immu-
nity can cause.
Part II explores the origin of the Garrity rule. It notes that the
Garrity Court explained the suppression of compelled statements by
likening them to coerced confessions and characterizing the threat of
sanctions for refusal to answer questions as an "unconstitutional con-
dition." Part II demonstrates that both prongs of this explanation
were flawed and describes how the Court later shifted to a different
approach, treating compelled statements as immunized testimony. It
also shows how this shift produced a more robust and problematic
exclusionary rule.
Part III examines responses to the problems that Garrity immu-
nity creates. First, it addresses the possibility of judicial abolition or
modification of the Garrity doctrine. Next, it discusses statutory and
procedural strategies to control decisions to take and disseminate
compelled statements. Finally, it proposes that states and police de-
partments impose sanctions less severe than job loss when suspect po-
lice officers refuse to cooperate with internal affairs investigators. The
threat of lesser sanctions often will provide ample incentive for police
officers to answer investigators' questions and, at the same time, mini-
mize the risk that courts will prohibit use of the resulting statements in
criminal cases.
I
COMPELLED STATEMENTS AND THE THREAT
TO POLICE PROSECUTIONS
A. Compelled Statements and Garrity Immunity
Police departments routinely conduct noncriminal, administrative
investigations into allegations of police misconduct to determine
whether discipline is warranted. 12 As part of those investigations, in-
vestigators often interview the suspect officer or officers along with
witness officers. 13 In cases in which alleged misconduct may result in
12 See Warnken, supra note 11, at 453-57.
13 See Douglas W. Perez, Common Sense About Police Review 95 (1994) (describing
internal investigation procedures); Levenson, supra note 7, at 536 ("It is standard proce-
dure for internal investigators to require the charged officers to provide a full statement
regarding their actions."); Douglas W. Perez & William Ker Muir, Administrative Review
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
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criminal charges, suspect officers have a valid basis for asserting their
Fifth Amendment privilege and refusing to answer questions on the
ground that their statements may incriminate them.1 4 To promote
thorough investigations, and perhaps to avoid the unseemly spectacle
of officers refusing to cooperate with their own departments, regula-
tions, state statutes, and departmental policies often require that po-
lice officers, whether suspects or witnesses, answer questions that
investigators pose. Refusal to do so can result in discipline, including
job loss.15
In a series of cases decided from 1967 to 1977, the Supreme Court
confronted states' use of economic sanctions-job termination, loss of
pension benefits or political office, disbarment from legal practice,
of Alleged Police Brutality, in Police Violence, supra note 8, at 213, 215 (noting that, in
Oakland Police Department, "[o]fficers charged with misconduct and witness officers are
required to give truthful statements to the [Internal Affairs] section"). Investigation may
be conducted by an internal affairs unit of the police department, a civilian review board,
or both. See, e.g., U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 6, at ch. 4 (describing process
by which Civilian Complaint Review Board in New York City compels statements from
police officers named in citizen complaints). In some systems, police have no obligation to
submit to civilian review board interviews. Perez & Muir, supra, at 217.
14 The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, made applicable to the
states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, for example, Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 10-11 (1964), provides that: "No person... shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. Const. amend. V. The Su-
preme Court has interpreted the privilege as prohibiting the government from compelling
a statement that later could incriminate the declarant in a criminal prosecution. See, e.g.,
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70,77 (1973) ("The Amendment... privileges [the individ-
ual] not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal,
formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceed-
ings."). A person may assert the privilege whenever his statement "would furnish a link in
the chain of evidence needed to prosecute" him. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,
486 (1951).
15 For example, the LAPD Manual provides that:
When police officers acquire knowledge of facts which will tend to incriminate
any person, it is their duty to disclose such facts to their superiors and to testify
freely concerning such facts when called upon to do so, even at the risk of self-
incrimination. It is a violation of duty for police officers to refuse to disclose
pertinent facts within their knowledge, and such neglect of duty can result in
disciplinary action up to and including termination.
1 Los Angeles Police Dep't Manual § 210.47 (2000); see also New York Police Department
Patrol Guide, Procedure 206-13 (Jan. 1, 2000) (warning offiers that "if [they] refuse to
testify or to answer questions relating to the performance of [their] official duties, [they]
will be subject to departmental charges, which could result in [their] dismissal from the
Police Department"); United States v. Corrao, No. CR-91-1343(S-1), 1993 WL 63018, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1,1993) (mem.) (quoting same language in earlier version of NYPD Patrol
Guide, from Procedures 118-9 and 118-10); Perez & Muir, supra note 13, at 215
("[O]fficers who refuse to... cooperate can be disciplined or even fired."); Warnken,
supra note 11, at 457 ("The investigating officer either expressly states or implies, or cus-
tom dictates, that the officer must cooperate during questioning or face possible adverse
personnel action." (footnotes omitted)).
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and ineligibility for state contracts-to compel cooperation in criminal
and noncriminal investigations. 16 In all but one of these "so-called
'penalty' cases,"' 7 public employees and officials, contractors, and
others refused to waive immunity or answer questions and later con-
tested the resulting economic sanctions. Garrity v. New Jersey 8 ar-
rived in the Supreme Court in a different posture. In Garrity, the
employees, most of whom were police officers, answered the ques-
tions, thus avoiding the threatened economic sanctions, and chal-
lenged the state's subsequent use of their answers in criminal
prosecutions. 19 Garrity, unlike the other penalty cases, presented the
question whether compelled statements were admissible in criminal
prosecutions.
Edward Garrity, the Chief of Police for the New Jersey Borough
of Bellmawr, other police officers, and a court clerk were suspected of
fixing traffic tickets.20 The Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered the
state Attorney General to conduct an investigation into the alleged
misconduct and report his findings.2' A deputy attorney general ques-
tioned the suspects. 22 A state statute required that they answer ques-
tions or lose their jobs and pensions.23 Before conducting the
interrogation, the deputy attorney general told each interviewee that
16 See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (preventing state from using state-
ments that police gave under threat of job forfeiture in criminal prosecutions); Spevack v.
Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (plurality opinion) (prohibiting disbarment of attorney who
refused to comply with subpoena duces tecum by asserting Fifth Amendment privilege);
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968) (prohibiting state from firing police officer who
refused to waive Fifth Amendment privilege and testify before grand jury); Uniformed
Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968) (prohibiting state
from firing state employees who refused to waive privilege and answer questions);
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (prohibiting state from terminating contracts for
five years because of contractors' refusal to waive immunity and answer questions);
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 802-04 (1977) (prohibiting state from removing
political party officer from position for five years because of refusal to waive immunity and
answer questions).
17 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984).
18 385 U.S. 493. The Supreme Court consolidated two state cases for review: State v.
Naglee, 207 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1965), and State v. Holroyd, 208 A.2d 146 (N.J. 1965) (per
curiam). In Naglee, Edward Garrity, chief of police for the Borough of Bellmawr, New
Jersey; Edward Virtue, a police officer in that department; and Helen Naglee, a court clerk,
were defendants. Garrity, 207 A.2d at 691. In Holroyd, defendants James Holroyd,
Eugene Elwell, and Donald Murray were police officers in the Borough of Barrington,
New Jersey. Holroyd, 208 A.2d at 147; Garrity, 385 U.S. at 502 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Naglee died before the Supreme Court decided the case. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 502 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
19 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494-95.
20 Id. at 494; id. at 502 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 494.
22 Id. at 502 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 494-95 n.1 (quoting N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:81-17.1 (1953) (repealed 1970)).
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his answers could be used in state criminal proceedings and that "if he
refused to answer he would be subject to removal from office.'" 4 The
interviewees answered the questions posed to them.s Later, local
prosecutors brought criminal charges26 and introduced into evidence
at trial the statements that the defendants had made to the deputy
attorney general.27 After their convictions, the defendants appealed,
claiming that the use of their compelled statements violated their con-
stitutional fights. New Jersey courts rejected those claims.2 But, in a
five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding the admission of the compelled statements unconstitutional2; 9
The Court offered two explanations: The statements were inadmissi-
ble under the Due Process Clause as coerced confessions, and the
state's threat to fire the police officers unless they gave statements was
an unconstitutional condition.30
In a later case, the Court offered a different rationale for the re-
sult in Garrity: The police officers' compelled statements were analo-
gous to immunized testimony and thus inadmissible under the Fifth
Amendment privilege.31 Many lower courts have followed suit,
24 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494. For a full text of the warnings that the deputy attorney
general read to Garrity, see id. at 504 n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 495.
26 The prosecution charged the defendants with the misdemeanor of "conspiracy to
obstruct the due administration of the Motor Vehicle Traffic Laws" in violation of NJ.
Stat. Ann. § 2A98-1 (1952) (repealed 1979). State v. Holroyd, 208 A.2d 146, 147 (NJ.
1965) (per curiam); State v. Naglee, 207 A.2d 689, 691 & n.1 (NJ. 1965).
27 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 495.
28 Holroyd, 208 A.2d at 148; Naglee, 207 A.2d at 693-96.
29 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
30 Id. at 497-98, 500. In contrast, in cases in which states imposed sanctions for refusals
to answer questions or waive immunity, the Court determined that the privilege against
self-incrimination governed. See, e.g., Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Comm'r of
Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280,284-85 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273,278-79 (1963);
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 513-19 (1967).
31 See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82 (1973) ("It seems to us that the State in-
tended to accomplish what Garrity specifically prohibited-to compel testimony that had
not been immunized."). Justice White, the author of that opinion, had first analogized
police officers' compelled statements to immunized testimony in his dissenting opinion in
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), the companion case to Garrity. Noting the Court's
decision in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), which held that a state
grant of transactional immunity prevents federal prosecutors from using the immunized
testimony or its fruits, Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79, he argued that "[a] similar accommodation
should be made" when public officials answer job-related questions under threat of dis-
charge. Spevak, 385 U.S. at 530-32 (White, J., dissenting).
Later Supreme Court opinions also describe Garrity as a case involving the Fifth
Amendment privilege or immunity. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248,270
n.4 (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring) (describing forfeiture statute in Garrity as "allow[ing]
the authorities to compel a public officer, under threat of removal from office, to provide
incriminating testimony in exchange for immunity from use or derivative use of that testi-
mony at a criminal proceeding"); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238,248 (1976) ("Garriy, of
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describing Garrity as a case involving the privilege32 and compelled
statements as "immunized. ' '33
course, involved the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution ...."); Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 475 (1975) (White, J., concurring)
(noting that Garrity involved "immunity from being incriminated by his responses to his
interrogation"). But see Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977) (noting that
statements in Garrity "were made involuntarily"). The Court never has expressly dis-
avowed the rationales it provided in Garrity.
Although one can read Turley to require a formal immunity grant before a state can
compel a statement from an employee, see Turley, 414 U.S. at 70 ("States must offer to the
witness whatever immunity is required to supplant the privilege. .. "), courts have deter-
mined that Garrity immunity attaches automatically when a police officer makes a state-
ment induced by threat of job loss, see infra note 43 and accompanying text.
32 See, e.g., Singer v. Maine, 49 F.3d 837, 845 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that Garrity in-
volves "Fifth Amendment rights of public employees"); Wiley v. Mayor of Baltimore, 48
F.3d 773, 776 (4th Cir. 1995) (characterizing Garrity as "case[ ] involving the Fifth Amend-
ment rights of public employees"); Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated December 7 & 8 v.
United States, 40 F.3d 1096, 1101 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that Garrity "address[es] the
application of the Fifth Amendment privilege to public employees"); United States v.
Devitt, 499 F.2d 135, 142 (7th Cir. 1974) (describing Garrity as case "provid[ing] adequate
protection of the witness's Fifth Amendment rights"); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n,
Inc. v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619, 624 (2d Cir. 1970) (noting Garrity's reasoning
that "the threat of removal constituted the kind of compulsion against which the constitu-
tional privilege was directed and that therefore statements made under such compulsion
could not be used at the criminal trial" and that this proposition "followed from the very
language of the Fifth Amendment"); Carney v. City of Springfield, 532 N.E.2d 631, 634 &
n.5 (Mass. 1988) (holding that statements taken from public employees under threat of job
loss "are inadmissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding because they [are] compelled
testimony under the Fifth Amendment"); see also Charles B. Craver, The Inquisitorial
Process in Private Employment, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 37 n.169 (1977) (describing Garrity
as case involving violation of privilege against self-incrimination).
33 See, e.g., Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated December 7 & 8, 40 F.3d at 1102 ("Garrity's
protection... acts to immunize these compelled statements .... "); United States v. Koon,
34 F.3d 1416, 1433 n.13 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing "immunity [that] attaches in the Garrity
context"), rev'd on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996); In re Federal Grand Jury Proceed-
ings, 975 F.2d 1488, 1490 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) ("[Garrity] provides immunity to
police officers who witness potentially criminal activity and are asked to provide informa-
tion to police internal investigation personnel."); United States v. Friedrick, 842 F.2d 382,
396 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that defendant "enjoyed use immunity conferred upon him
as an FBI employee subject to an administrative investigation"); Benjamin v. City of Mont-
gomery, 785 F.2d 959, 960-61 (11th Cir. 1986) (describing protection of compelled state-
ments as "Garrity-type immunity"); Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1496
(11th Cir. 1985) (relying on Garrity to hold that "the privilege against self-incrimination
affords a form of use immunity which, absent waiver, automatically attaches to compelled
incriminating statements as a matter of law"); Nat'l Acceptance Co. v. Bathalter, 705 F,2d
924, 928 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Statements made under.., threat [of job termination] would be
'immunized' by Garrity."); Weston v. HUD, 724 F.2d 943, 948 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (referring to
grants of "immunity through... Garrity exclusion rule); Carney, 532 N.E.2d at 634 n.5
("Informal 'immunity' under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution can
also arise where public employees are compelled to answer questions .... "); Matt v.
Larocca, 518 N.E.2d 1172, 1174 (N.Y. 1987) (noting that "when a public employee is com-
pelled to answer questions or face removal upon refusing to do so, the responses are
cloaked with immunity automatically," prohibiting use of "the compelled statements [and]
their fruits"); see also Larry J. Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment:
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The compelled statements in Garrity resembled formally immu-
nized testimony. When a witness before a court or a grand jury asserts
the privilege against self-incrimination, the prosecution can compel
her testimony by securing an immunity grant?34 In Kastigar v. United
States,3 5 the Court held that "use and derivative use" immunity36
(often simply called "use immunity") 37 is sufficient to require a wit-
ness to testify despite an assertion of the privilege.38 If an immunized
The Burger Court's Definition, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 383, 388-89 (1977) (describing Garrit,
protection as "informal use immunity").
34 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1994) establish the statutory basis for federal prosecutorial
authority to seek immunity grants. Section 6002 provides that "no testimony or other in-
formation compelled under the [immunity] order (or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise fail-
ing to comply with the order." § 6002. Although 21 U.S.C. contains an analogous immu-
nity provision for drug cases, see 21 U.S.C. § 884 (1994), the Department of Justice relies
exclusively on the provisions in 18 U.S.C. See United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-23.100.
In order to immunize a witness, "a United States Attorney... must obtain approval
by the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General and then request the court to order
the witness to testify." United States v. Harvey, 869 F.2d 1439, 1450 (11th Cir. 19S9)
(Clark, J., dissenting); see also 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1994) (requiring approval from high-
level Department of Justice officials). Courts must issue immunity orders upon receipt of a
proper application from the prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (stating that court "shall
issue" immunity order upon proper request); Pillsbury Co., 459 U.S. at 254 n.11 (discussing
courts' "minor role" in immunity process). Thus, in effect, prosecutors decide whether a
witness receives statutory immunity.
Federal prosecutors sometimes circumvent the above-described requirements by
granting "informal" or "hip pocket" immunity-an agreement between the prosecutor and
the witness that the witness will provide information in exchange for a prosecutorial prom-
ise either to forego prosecution entirely or not to use the witness's testimony. See Haney,
869 F.2d at 1450-51. This practice sometimes leaves the scope of the immunity unclear,
see, for example, United States v. Kilroy, 27 F.3d 679, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (determining
meaning of term "use immunity" in agreement between prosecution and defendant), and
has drawn judicial ire, see, for example, United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324 (D.
Colo. 1984) (holding grant of pocket immunity to have "violated the applicable statutes
and tainted the grand jury indictment with its illegality"). But see United States v.
Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1470 & n.13 (10th Cir. 1987) (reversing district court's decision
to dismiss indictment based in part on taint caused by pocket immunity and noting that
"the use of 'informal immunity'... is entirely proper"), affd in part sub nom Bank of
Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
35 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
36 The phrase "use and derivative use" has been used synonymously with "direct and
indirect use," the terminology in the immunity statute. See Ronald F. Wright, Congres-
sional Use of Immunity Grants After Iran-Contra, 80 Minn. L Rev. 407, 418-19 (1995).
37 See Kilroy, 27 F.3d at 685 (describing "common understanding" of term "use
immunity").
38 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462 (holding that grant of use and derivative use immunity
"suffices to supplant" privilege).
Before Kastigar, a grant of transactional immunity, which precludes the prosecution
from bringing charges for any crime described in immunized testimony, was required to
supplant the privilege. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547,586 (1892) ("In view of
the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immu-
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witness persists in her refusal to testify, she can be held in contempt. 39
The immunized testimony is thus compelled by the contempt threat.
Use immunity does not foreclose later criminal charges against
the witness for matters described in the immunized testimony.
Rather, it prevents the prosecution from making use of the testimony
and any evidence derived therefrom against the witness in a criminal
trial.40 The Kastigar Court reasoned that a grant of such immunity is
coextensive with the Fifth Amendment because it leaves the witness-
turned-defendant "in substantially the same position as if the witness
had claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege" and remained silent.41
The Garrity protection operates in a similar manner-it enables
states to compel statements from public employees by threatening job
termination but bars use of the statements in later criminal prosecu-
tions.42 Accordingly, when the deputy attorney general threatened
Garrity and the others with loss of their jobs, he granted them de facto
use immunity in exchange for their answers.43 Although Garrity and
nity against future prosecution for the offence to which the question relates."). In Murphy
v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), the Court suggested that use and derivative
use immunity might be sufficient to supplant the privilege and later settled the issue in
Kastigar.
Some have criticized the Court for allowing protection short of transactional immunity
to supplant the privilege, see, for example, Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 467-71 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting); others have contended that by barring use of evidence derived from immunized
testimony, rather than just the testimony itself, Kastigar requires too much, see Akhil Reed
Amar & Ren6e B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination
Clause, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 857, 911 (1995) ("The Kastigar rule ...should be trimmed
back .... Compelled testimony should be excluded from a criminal case .. but not
fruits.").
Some states continue to require transactional immunity to overcome the provisions in
their constitutions analogous to the Fifth Amendment privilege. See, e.g., State v.
Gonzalez, 853 P.2d 526, 532-33 (Alaska 1993) (construing state constitution to require
transactional immunity in exchange for compelled testimony); State v. Miyasaki, 614 P.2d
915, 922-23 (Haw. 1980) (same); Attorney Gen. v. Colleton, 444 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Mass.
1982) (same); State v. Soriano, 684 P.2d 1220, 1232 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (same).
39 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 314-16 & 315 n.7 (1975).
40 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 452-53.
41 Id. at 462; see also id. at 457 (holding that witness given use immunity was "in sub-
stantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in the absence of a
state grant of immunity" (quoting Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79)).
42 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 436 n.7 (1984) ("Our cases indicate ...
that a State may validly insist on answers [from public employees and others] to even
incriminating questions... as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be
used in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination.").
43 See, e.g., Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1496 (11th Cir. 1985)
(describing Garrity as requiring "a form of use immunity which, absent waiver, automati-
cally attaches to compelled incriminating statements as a matter of law"). Professor
Warnken takes issue with this interpretation of Garrity. He maintains that Garrity and its
progeny do not provide for a self-executing form of immunity. Warmken, supra note 11, at
486-88. He contends that in order for a police department to compel answers under threat
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the others did not first assert the privilege, an action typically required
to trigger its protection,44 the Court since has concluded that when
assertion itself would be penalized, as was the case in Garrity, the pro-
tection is self-executing.45
B. The Significance of the Immunized Testimony Analogy
1. Restrictions on Prosecutorial Use of Immunized Testimony
Courts' treatment of police officers' compelled statements as "im-
munized" is significant because of the stringent restrictions that courts
impose on prosecutorial use of such testimony. As noted above, the
prosecution cannot introduce immunized testimony or any evidence
derived therefrom in its case-in-chief,46 nor can it use immunized testi-
mony to impeach the person who gave it.47
There are important additional limitations on the use of formallyimmunized testimony. First, relying on Kastigar's command that a
grant of use immunity "prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from
using the compelled testimony in any respect,"48 and its conclusion
that immunity "therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the
infliction of criminal penalties on the witness,"49 a number of courts
prohibit prosecutors from making "nonevidentiary use" of a criminal
of job loss, it must grant formal immunity or, at the minimum, give the officer Miranda-like
warnings, including an assurance that any statements are immunized. Id. at 48248. Al-
though language in both Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 85 (1973), and Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 809 (1977), suggests that a formal immunity grant may be nec-
essary, Warnken concedes that courts have decided otherwise, treating Garrity immunity
as self-executing without warnings. Warnken, supra note 11, at 488.
44 See, e.g., Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429 ("[A] witness confronted with questions that the
government should reasonably expect to elicit incriminating evidence ordinarily must as-
sert the privilege rather than answer if he desires not to incriminate himself."); United
States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 10 (1970) (holding that failure of corporate officer who an-
swered interrogatories "to assert the constitutional privilege leaves him in no position to
complain now that he was compelled to give testimony against himself").
45 See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434-35 (noting that express or implied threat that invocation
of privilege will result in penalty, as was case in Garrity, excuses failure to assert privilege).
46 See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27,38 (2000) (noting that Fifth Amend-
ment protects "against the prosecution's use of incriminating information derived directly
or indirectly from the compelled testimony"); Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 (holding that im-
munity that prohibits "the use of compelled testimony, as well as evidence derived directly
and indirectly therefrom" affords sufficient protection to supplant privilege). If a portion
of a witness's immunized testimony is materially false, both his false testimony and his
truthful testimony are admissible in a perjury prosecution. See United States v. Apfelbam,
445 U.S. 115, 130-32 (1980).
47 See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
48 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
49 Id.
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defendant's previously given immunized testimony.50 There is no
agreed-upon definition of "nonevidentiary uses," 51 but they are
50 See, e.g., United States v. Semkiw, 712 F.2d 891, 893-94 (3d Cir. 1983) (remanding
case to lower court to determine whether prosecutor "made use of [immunized testimony]
in the preparation and conduct of the trial"); United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311
(8th Cir. 1973) ("[Ilf the immunity protection is to be coextensive with the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege then it must forbid all prosecutorial use of the testimony, not merely
that which results in the presentation of evidence before the jury."); United States v.
Harris, 780 F. Supp. 385, 390 (N.D. W. Va. 1991) (holding that "no use whatsoever" can be
made of immunized statements); People v. Gwillim, 274 Cal. Rptr. 415, 426 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) ("The district attorney ... may not use defendant's [compelled] statement to ad-
vance the criminal prosecution in any way." (emphasis added)); State v. Gault, 551 N.W.2d
719, 724-25 (Minn. 1996) (following McDaniel and holding that privilege prohibits nonevi-
dentiary use of compelled statements); State v. Irizarry, 639 A.2d 305, 310 n.1 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1994) (interpreting New Jersey Supreme Court precedent as prohibiting non-
evidentiary uses).
Some courts have rejected the notion that the Fifth Amendment bars nonevidentiary
uses. See, e.g., United States v. Bolton, 977 F.2d 1196, 1199 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that
"tangential" effect of immunized testimony on prosecutor's thought process not prohib-
ited); United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1531 (11th Cir. 1985) ("It is our view that the
privilege against self-incrimination is concerned with direct and indirect evidentiary uses of
compelled testimony, and not with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion."). Other courts
have yet to decide the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Kilroy, 27 F.3d 679, 687 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (assuming, without deciding, that nonevidentiary use is prohibited); United States v.
Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1989) (rejecting notion that "all nonevidentiary use neces-
sarily violates the Fifth Amendment" but leaving open possibility that some such uses may
require dismissal of indictment). There appears to be a difference of opinion among Ninth
Circuit panels about the status of nonevidentiary uses. Compare United States v. Mapelli,
971 F.2d 284, 287 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing McDaniel, 482 F.2d at 311, to support proposition
that prosecutors may not use immunized testimony to plan trial strategy), with United
States v. Montoya, 45 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1995) (assuming that Fifth Amendment bars
some nonevidentiary uses but noting that circuit has not yet decided and concluding that
"[w]e need not decide that general issue in this case").
For a general discussion of nonevidentiary use of immunized testimony, see United
States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam) [hereinafter North I], opinion
partially withdrawn and superseded in part on reh'g by 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) [hereinafter North II], cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991); Gary S. Humble, Nonevi-
dentiary Use of Compelled Testimony: Beyond the Fifth Amendment, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 351
(1987) (contending that federal immunity statute and Fifth Amendment do not preclude
nonevidentiary uses); Kristine Strachan, Self-Incrimination, Immunity, and Watergate, 56
Tex. L. Rev. 791, 806-10 (1978) (contending that courts should bar nonevidentiary uses);
Jefferson Keenan, Note, Nonevidentiary Use of Compelled Testimony and the Increased
Likelihood of Conviction, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 173 (1990) (examining prejudicial effects of
nonevidentiary use of compelled testimony); Douglas A. Turner, Note, Nonevidentiary
Use of Immunized Testimony: Twenty Years After Kastigar and the Jury Is Still Out, 20
Am. J. Crim. L. 105, 132 (1992) (arguing that nonevidentiary use of immunized testimony
is prohibited by Fifth Amendment and federal immunity statute).
51 See North I, 910 F.2d at 857 (noting that precise definition is "elusive"); Humble,
supra note 50, at 353 (defining nonevidentiary uses as "uses that do not furnish a link in the
chain of evidence"); Strachan, supra note 50, at 807 (defining nonevidentiary uses as those
that do not "culminate directly or indirectly in the presentation of evidence against the
immunized person").
Because a prosecutor's strategic use of immunized testimony, such as in the formula-
tion of questions, can alter the evidence presented at trial, the line between evidentiary and
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thought to include "assistance in focusing the investigation, deciding
to initiate prosecution, refusing to plea-bargain, interpreting evidence,
planning cross-examination, and otherwise generally planning trial
strategy."52
Second, in United States v. North,53 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, also relying on the above-quoted language in
Kastigar, held that the privilege bars the prosecution from making "in-
direct evidentiary use" of immunized testimony by calling witnesses
whose testimony has been shaped, altered, or affected by the defen-
dant's earlier immunized testimony.54 In "the most expansive reading
of the Fifth Amendment to date regarding the evidentiary use of im-
munized testimony, 55 North prohibited admission of testimony from
witnesses who had employed a criminal defendant's previously given
immunized testimony "to refresh their memories, or otherwise to fo-
cus their thoughts, organize their testimony, or alter their prior or con-
nonevidentiary uses of immunized testimony can be fuzzy and perhaps is nonexistent. See
Kate E. Bloch, Fifth Amendment Compelled Statements: Modeling the Contours of 'Their
Protected Scope, 72 Wash. U. LQ. 1603, 1605 n.14 (1994) (arguing that line between evi-
dentiary and nonevidentiary uses "remains to be clearly drawn"); Turner, supra note 50, at
130 (concluding that "a nonevidentiary use is really an indirect evidentiary use that is yet
to be proven"). Courts sometimes differ on whether uses are "evidentiary" or "noneviden-
tiary." Compare Semkiw, 712 F.2d at 895 (adopting McDaniel definition of nonevidentiary
use to include "planning cross-examination"), with Byrd, 765 F.2d at 1531 (holding that
prosecutor's use of knowledge of immunized testimony to elicit answers on cross-examina-
tion probably would constitute evidentiary use).
52 McDaniel, 482 F.2d at 311-12; see also North 1, 910 F.2d at 857-58 (explaining that
immunized testimony "may help explicate evidence theretofore unintelligible, and it may
expose as significant facts once thought irrelevant (or vice versa). Compelled testimony
could indicate which witnesses to call, and in what order. Compelled testimony may be
helpful in developing opening and closing arguments").
53 North I, 910 F.2d 843. On the North decisions, see generally Wright, supra note 36,
at 423-29; Michael Gilbert, Note, The Future of Congressional Use Immunity After United
States v. North, 30 Am. Crim. L Rev. 417, 423-30 (1993); Jerome A. Murphy, Comment,
The Aftermath of the Iran-Contra Trials: The Uncertain Status of Derivative Use Immu-
nity, 51 Md. L. Rev. 1011, 1035-45 (1992).
54 North 1, 910 F.2d at 860. In North, former National Security Council staff member
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L North gave nationally televised testimony before Congress
pursuant to a grant of immunity. Id. at 851. Later, an independent prosecutor brought
charges against North and secured convictions. Id. at 851-52. The court of appeals re-
versed in part because the prosecution had called witnesses whose trial testimony may
have been affected by watching the immunized testimony on television. Id. at 852.
55 United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 1991).
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temporaneous statements. ' 56 Several appellate courts have followed
North.57
2. The Prosecution's Burden
Restrictions on the use of immunized testimony do more than
limit the prosecution's arsenal. If a particular use is prohibited, the
prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating that it has not em-
ployed the defendant's previously given immunized testimony in that
manner.5 8 The more uses prohibited, the greater the burden on the
prosecution to demonstrate that its presentation of the case is un-
tainted.5 9 Kastigar describes this "heavy burden" 60 in no uncertain
terms: "This burden of proof, which we reaffirm as appropriate, is not
56 North I, 910 F.2d at 860. Before North, Professor Strachan had suggested that such
use of immunized testimony might run afoul of the Fifth Amendment. See Strachan, supra
note 50, at 817 (noting possibility that witnesses who saw immunized testimony "would
shape their testimony as a result of knowledge of... immunized testimony").
57 See United States v. Schmidgall, 25 F.3d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir. 1994) ("The protection
against self-incrimination is violated whenever the prosecution presents a witness whose
testimony is shaped-directly or indirectly-by immunized testimony ... ."); People v.
Reali, 895 P.2d 161, 166 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (citing North for proposition that "to the
extent that another person has been exposed to the immunized testimony, the testimony of
that other person may be so 'tainted' that it would be a violation of the defendant's rights
to make use of that person's testimony"); State v. Vallejos, 883 P.2d 1269, 1276-78 (N.M.
1994) (applying North to reverse murder conviction when prosecution called witness whose
trial testimony appeared to have been altered by defendant's immunized testimony). The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has rejected North, holding instead that the prose-
cution can call a witness whose testimony may have been affected by a defendant's testi-
mony so long as the witness has a source for the information in his testimony that is
independent of the immunized testimony. See United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1431-
33 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
Some courts have determined that Kastigar also prohibits prosecutors from calling a
witness if the prosecution used the defendant's previously given immunized testimony to
indict the witness and secure his cooperation. See, e.g., United States v. Hampton, 775
F.2d 1479, 1488-89 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that if defendant's immunized testimony or its
fruits contributed directly or indirectly to case against witness, witness's testimony was not
allowed); United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 517-18 (2d Cir. 1976) (remanding for de.
termination of whether immunized testimony was used or relied on in negotiations leading
to witness's cooperation).
58 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460-62 (describing prosecution's burden).
59 Courts have rejected speculative claims of taint involving convoluted theories of cau-
sation. See, e.g., United States v. Kilroy, 27 F.3d 679, 681-82, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (re-
jecting defendant's immunity claim based on allegation that retroactively immunized
statements given in connection with unrelated out-of-state investigation led to brief news-
paper article that may have prompted private audit of pension plan that defendant had
defrauded when audit led to referral of case for prosecution and then to charges that de-
fendant challenged as tainted); Helmsley, 941 F.2d at 76-78 (rejecting defendant's chal-
lenge based on claim that her immunized testimony before state grand jury on unrelated
matter prompted New York 7mes story that caused New York Post reporter to reopen
inquiry that triggered state and federal tax fraud investigations that ultimately led to fed-
eral indictment).
60 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461.
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limited to a negation of taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution the
affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is de-
rived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled
testimony. '61 Mere denials of use of immunized testimony often are
inadequate to satisfy the burden.62 If the prosecution fails to demon-
strate affirmatively that its case is untainted by a defendant's immu-
nized testimony, it may suffer dismissal or suppression of critical
evidence, even if it has not made use of the testimony.63 All that a
witness-turned-defendant need do to benefit from this "very substan-
61 Id. at 460. Despite the Court's description of the burden as "heavy," some courts
require that the prosecution prove by only a "preponderance of the evidence" that its case
is untainted. See, e.g., Schmidgall, 25 F.3d at 1528; United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524,
1529 (11th Cir. 1985). Courts reason that the burden nonetheless remains "heavy" because
the prosecution suffers exclusion of evidence if it fails to meet the burden. See United
States v. Montoya, 45 F.3d 1286,1292 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting North 1, 910 F.2d at 873).
If a hearing is necessary to resolve such a claim, "a trial court may hold ... pre-trial, post-
trial, [or] mid-trial [hearings] (as evidence is offered), or it may employ some combination
of these methods. A pre-trial hearing is the most common choice." North I, 910 F.2d at
854. For a discussion of the types of hearings used and the standard of proof the prosecu-
tion must satisfy, see, for example, Wright, supra note 36, at 419-21; Murphy, supra note 53,
at 1023-27.
62 Hampton, 775 F.2d at 1485.
63 See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 117 (1988) ("Even in cases where
the government does not employ the immunized testimony for any purpose--direct or
derivative-against the witness, the Government's inability to meet the 'heavy burden' it
bears may result in preclusion of crucial evidence that was obtained legitimately.").
The remedies for the prosecution's failure to satisfy Kastigar differ, depending on the
nature of the alleged use. If the prosecution cannot disprove a claim that a defendant's
previously given immunized testimony shaped a witness's testimony or recollection, the
appropriate remedy is the suppression of that witness's testimony at trial. See, e.g., People
v. Reali, 895 P.2d 161, 166 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that prosecution cannot use
testimony of tainted witness); State v. Gault, 551 N.W.2d 719, 724-25 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996) (upholding suppression of tainted witness testimony). Arguably, the same result will
follow if the prosecution cannot disprove that the immunized testimony led it to a witness
or motivated a witness to testify against the defendant. CE United States v. Ceccolini, 435
U.S. 268,278-79 (1978) (assuming that absent attenuation, testimony of witness discovered
by exploitation of illegally seized evidence must be excluded). But see United States v.
Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 514 (2d Cir. 1976) (reviewing lower court's order dismissing indict-
ment based on finding that grand jury witness was motivated to testify by defendant's ear-
lier immunized testimony); People v. Gwillim, 274 Cal. Rptr. 415, 427-28 (Cal. CL. App.
1990) (assuming that if compelled statement motivated essential prosecution witness to
press charges, remedy would be dismissal).
In most jurisdictions, mere exposure to immunized testimony does not disqualify a
prosecutor from working on a case. See, e.g., United States v. Palumbo, 897 F.2d 245,251
(7th Cir. 1990). But, if the prosecutor is unable to prove her ability to make strategic and
tactical decisions free of her knowledge of the immunized testimony, the court may require
disqualification. See, e.g., United States v. Mapelli, 971 F.2d 284,288 (9th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that prosecutor should have been disqualified where "[t]he government offered no evi-
dence whatsoever that it would not use [immunized] information"). Courts are reluctant
to require dismissal when the decision to prosecute may have been influenced by immu-
nized testimony. See Montoya, 45 F.3d at 1295-97 (rejecting as "too remote" defendant's
contention that decision to prosecute him was based on prosecutor's assessment that he
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tial protection" is demonstrate that he has testified under a grant of
immunity about matters related to the prosecution. 64
This robust exclusionary rule creates substantial risks when pros-
ecutors bring charges against previously immunized witnesses.63 The
prosecution can satisfy its burden by showing that witnesses, investiga-
tors, and prosecutors have not been exposed to the immunized testi-
mony, either directly by reading it, or indirectly by otherwise learning
of it.66 But if there has been exposure, the prosecution can prevail
only if it can establish that exposed witnesses, investigators, or prose-
cutors have not been "tainted" by the immunized testimony. 67 This
gave false immunized testimony); Byrd, 765 F.2d at 1530 (declining to inquire into prosecu-
tor's motive to indict).
There is a split in authority whether derivative use of a defendant's immunized testi-
mony before a grand jury requires dismissal of the indictment. Compare United States v.
Rivieccio, 919 F.2d 812, 816 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that derivative use of immunized testi-
mony before grand jury does not require dismissal of indictment; appropriate remedy is
suppression at trial), with North 1, 910 F.2d at 869 (finding that when "the grand jury
process itself is violated and corrupted," then "the indictment becomes indistinguishable
from the constitutional ... transgression"), and North II, 920 F.2d at 947-49 (holding that
indirect evidentiary use of defendant's previously given immunized testimony before grand
jury that returns indictment requires dismissal). Some jurisdictions carve out two "narrow
exceptions" when dismissal is required: (1) "when the defendant testifies under immunity
before the same grand jury returning the indictment or when the immunized testimony is
placed before the indicting grand jury"; and (2) "when the government concedes that the
indictment rests almost exclusively on tainted evidence." Rivieccio, 919 F.2d at 816 n.4,
But see United States v. Zielezinski, 740 F.2d 727, 729 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting view that
indictment returned by grand jury that heard defendant's immunized testimony must be
dismissed).
64 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461-62 ("One raising a claim under this [immunity] statute need
only show that he testified under a grant of immunity in order to shift to the government
the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from
legitimate independent sources.").
65 See, e.g., Braswell, 487 U.S. at 117 n.10 (recognizing that "the burden of proving an
independent source that a grant of immunity places on the Government" could have "a
deleterious effect on law enforcement efforts").
66 See, e.g., Mapelli, 971 F.2d at 287-88 (finding that assignment of case to unexposed
prosecutor defeats Kastigar claim); North 1, 910 F.2d at 872 (holding that prosecution can
meet Kastigar burden by showing "that the witness was never exposed to North's immu-
nized testimony").
67 Most courts have determined that exposure to immunized testimony alone does not
necessarily taint either a prosecutor or a witness. See, e.g., North 11, 920 F.2d at 944
("Some [witnesses] might convincingly testify that their exposure had no effect on their
trial or grand jury testimony."); Palumbo, 897 F.2d at 251 (refusing to disqualify exposed
prosecutor even though "it may be wise for the government to ask another attorney to take
over this case"; prosecution might be able to prove all evidence used in future was derived
from independent sources); United States v. Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1988) (re-
jecting view that prosecutor's exposure to immunized testimony necessarily taints her and
results in nonevidentiary use); United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716, 720 (3d Cir. 1980)
("We do not believe that mere access to immunized grand jury testimony prevents the
government from carrying its burden under Kastigar."); Gwillim, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 425
("[A] witness's knowledge [of immunized testimony] does not necessarily nullify the wit-
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requires a showing that the immunized testimony has not shaped or
affected a witness's testimony or influenced investigative or
prosecutorial decisions in the case.
C. "Garrity Immunity" and Threats to Police Prosecutions
Despite their use of the term "immunized" to describe police of-
ficers' compelled statements, courts need not vest those statements
with the full measure of protection they bestow on formally immu-
nized testimony.68 Nonetheless, appellate courts that have considered
the matter have concluded that the scope of Garrity immunity is com-
mensurate with that of formally immunized testimony, signaling that
the use restrictions applicable to immunized testimony and compelled
statements are the same.69 But circumstances surrounding immunity
ness's testimony."); see also Turner, supra note 50, at 128 ("The courts of appeals agree
that a prosecutor's mere knowledge of immunized testimony does not bar prosecution for
crimes to which the compelled testimony relates."). But see United States v. McDaniel,
482 F.2d 305, 311-12 (8th Cir. 1973) (finding that when prosecutor read immunized testi-
mony in early stages of investigation, was then unaware that testimony had been immu-
nized, and made no efforts to segregate information learned from immunized testimony,
"although [the prosecutor] asserts that he did not use [the immunized] testimony in any
form, we cannot escape the conclusion that the testimony could not be wholly obliterated
from the prosecutor's mind in his preparation and trial of this case"); State v. Gonzalez,
853 P.2d 526,531 (Alaska 1993) (rejecting view that "procedures exist to probe the mind of
a witness" to determine extent to which exposure resulted in taint of testimony).
Even if a witness, investigator, or prosecutor claims that exposure did not prevent him
from giving untainted testimony or making decisions independent of the immunized testi-
mony, a court may find those claims unpersuasive. See United States v. Schmidgall, 25
F.3d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that uncorroborated testimony from agent "would
not generally be sufficient to carry the burden"); United States v. Harris, 790 F. Supp. 385,
391-93 (N.D.W. Va. 1991) (holding that when prosecutor took immunized statement from
witness and had copy of immunized statement in file, his testimony that he had forgotten
interview and was unaware of statement in file was insufficient to satisfy Kastigar).
68 See infra Part III.A.2 (arguing that courts should relax prohibitions on some uses of
police officers' compelled statements); see also Bloch, supra note 11, at 638-39 ("Precisely
what 'exempt from use' meant [in Garrity] or means today is both complex and open to
debate.").
69 See United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1240 n.7 (11th Cir. 1998) ("We can analo-
gize between the scope of the federal use immunity statute.., and Garrity analysis under
the Fifth Amendment because our court has held that a Garrity-protected statement is
tantamount to use immunity."); Kinamon v. United States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings),
45 F.3d 343, 347 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating compelled statement as equivalent of formallyimmunized testimony); United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1431 n.11 (9th Cir. 1994) (not-
ing that despite government concern about applying immunity doctrine to police officers'
compelled statements, "[b]ecause the use of compelled testimony in the Garrity context
also directly implicates the individual's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination,
Kastigar's discussion of the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is directly relevant in the Garrity context"), rev'd on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81
(1996). The Ninth Circuit, however, does not extend formally immunized testimony as
much protection as some other appellate courts. See supra note 57 (describing Koon
court's rejection of North rule).
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grants are very different from those surrounding a police department's
acquisition of compelled statements. Those differences make the use
restrictions considerably more troublesome in prosecutions of police
officers for a number of reasons.
First, Garrity immunity is likely to plague prosecutions of police
officers far more often than analogous immunity issues will surface in
other sorts of prosecutions. Prosecutors seldom grant formal immu-
nity70 and almost never immunize witnesses whom they may later
prosecute.71 In contrast, some police departments routinely compel
statements from both officers suspected of potentially criminal mis-
conduct and police witnesses to alleged misconduct, who later may
become suspects. If sufficient evidence exists to prosecute a police
officer from such a department, the chances are good that internal
affairs investigators have started an administrative investigation and
have compelled a statement.72
70 For example, in 1998, federal prosecutors in the U.S. Attorneys' Offices and the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice requested departmental approval to seek
immunity for only 1616 witnesses. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1999, at 396
tbl.5.1 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 1999). The same year, the Department
prosecuted 69,769 defendants. Id. at 419 tbl.5.21. It is worth noting that it is unclear how
many witnesses actually received immunity from federal prosecutors. On one hand, prose-
cutors may request authorization from the Department but never apply for or use an im-
munity grant. On the other, the number of requests for authorization does not reflect the
use of informal immunity agreements. See supra note 34 (describing hip-pocket
immunity).
71 See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 288 & n.8 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[In almost all cases, an offer of immunity-even of use immunity-means sacrificing the
chance to prosecute the witness for his own role in the criminal enterprise."). Although I
am not aware of any statistics on this point, after a decade of service as an Assistant U.S.
Attorney in the Central District of California and the Northern District of New York,
which included several supervisory positions, I cannot recall a case in which a previously
immunized witness was prosecuted for matters described in his testimony. The Depart-
ment of Justice imposes a stringent approval requirement for such prosecutions. See U.S.
Attorneys' Manual § 9-23.400 (requiring Attorney General to approve prosecution after
compulsion).
72 See, e.g., Indep. Comm'n on the L.A. Police Dep't, Report of the Independent Com-
mission on the Los Angeles Police Department 161-62 (1991) [hereinafter Christopher
Comm'n Report] (describing routine LAPD practice of taking compelled statements in
police shooting investigations despite adverse impact on criminal prosecutions); Perez &
Muir, supra note 13, at 215 (describing routine practice of taking compelled statements in
Oakland); id. at 217 (noting that civilian police review commission in Berkeley takes com-
pelled statements); Warnken, supra note 11, at 456-57 (describing routine practice of com-
pelled questioning of police officers suspected of misconduct). But see L.A. County
Sheriff's Dep't, Report by Special Counsel James G. Kolts & Staff 149 (1992) [hereinafter
Kolts Comm'n Report] (noting that Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department does not
interview police officers involved in shootings "[i]n order not to compromise a possible
criminal prosecution"); Report of the Rampart Independent Review Panel, supra note 9,
at 111 (describing practice of some police departments of conducting criminal investigation
before administrative investigation).
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Second, prosecutors can better avoid problems arising from im-
munized testimony than from compelled statements. Prosecutors usu-
ally control whether a court will grant formal inununity.73 As a result,
they can refrain from seeking immunity if later prosecution of the wit-
ness is a possibility. In contrast, prosecutors are powerless to prevent
internal affairs investigators from "immunizing" suspect officers.
Third, even when an immunity grant is unavoidable, prosecutors
have greater ability to minimize potential hazards than when police
investigators compel statements. If it is necessary to immunize a wit-
ness who likely will be prosecuted, prosecutors may be able to post-
pone the immunity grant until after prosecution, eliminating Kastigar
73 Other governmental actors, such as prosecutors from other jurisdictions and legisla-
tive bodies, can secure judicially ordered grants of immunity without a prosecutor's con-
sent. See, e.g., United States v. Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1989) (involving defendant
immunized by Puerto Rican House of Representatives and later prosecuted by federal
government); United States v. First W. State Bank of Minot, 491 F2d 780, 782 (8th Cir.
1974) (involving state grant of immunity and federal prosecution); see also North 1, 910
F.2d at 851 (involving federal prosecution following congressional grant of immunity pur-
suant to 18 U.S.C. § 6005 (1988)). One federal court has held that, in some circumstances,
a trial court can immunize a witness without a request from the prosecution. See Virgin
Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[Iln cases where the government can
present no strong countervailing interest, a court has inherent authority to immunize a
witness .... "). But see United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 771-78 (2d Cir. 1980)
(criticizing doctrine of "judicial immunity" and noting widespread rejection of doctrine by
courts, despite academic endorsement). Although immunity that other actors confer can
impair a prosecutor's efforts to later prosecute the immunized witness, that threat is less
troubling than Garrity immunity for several reasons.
First, it is uncommon for either prosecutors or other investigative bodies to grant im-
munity. For example, in fiscal year 1992, Congress sought immunity for only one itness,
and federal agencies sought immunity for only 198 witnesses. See Wright, supra note 36, at
427 n.91. It is unlikely that more than a small fraction of those witnesses, if any, were later
prosecuted for matters described in their testimony.
Second, because prosecutors' offices share the common objective of effective law en-
forcement, they likely will exercise caution before immunizing witnesses subject to possible
prosecution elsewhere. For example, federal prosecutors must inform the Department of
Justice of any opposition by state or local prosecutors when seeking authorization to re-
quest that a court order immunity. See U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 9-23.130; U.S. Attor-
neys' Criminal Resource Manual § 721 (1997), http://hvww.usdoj.gov/usaoleousal
foiajreading-roomusam/tifte9/rmOO721.htm. Likewise, Congress has exhibited a willing-
ness to forgo immunity grants that may impair criminal investigations. See Wright, supra
note 36, at 429-35 (noting that "Congress has been stingy with grants of immunity over the
last twenty-five years," and that results in North and in United States v. Poindexter, 698 F.
Supp. 300 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1021
(1992), have discouraged congressional use of immunity). Even if a prosecutor or another
entity does grant immunity despite another prosecutor's interest in a later prosecution of
the witness, the immunizing agency can prevent harm by limiting dissemination of the im-
munized testimony.
Third, prosecutors from other jurisdictions and legislators are likely to be more ac-
countable to the electorate for decisions to grant immunity than police internal affairs units
are for their decisions to compel statements and thus confer Garrity immunity.
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problems.74 If it is impracticable to prosecute before granting immu-
nity, the prosecution can delay the immunity grant to provide time to
implement measures to reduce the possibility of taint and marshal evi-
dence to prove at a Kastigar hearing that its evidence is untainted.75
For example, before granting immunity, the prosecution can pre-
serve (or "can") statements from witnesses who may later testify
against the soon-to-be-immunized potential defendant.76 If the prose-
cution later brings charges against the immunized witness, it can rebut
a claim that its evidence has been derived from the witness-turned-
defendant's immunized testimony by demonstrating that it gathered
the evidence before the immunity grant. If the witness-turned-defen-
dant claims that the immunized testimony has affected the testimony
of prosecution witnesses, comparison of preimmunity canned state-
ments to postimmunity challenged testimony can disprove that
claim. 7 7
74 See United States Attorney's Manual § 9-23.212 ("It is preferable as a matter of
policy to punish offenders for their criminal conduct prior to compelling them to testify.").
Preimmunity prosecution solves immunity-related problems in two ways. First, it enables
prosecutors to secure a taint-free conviction before granting immunity. Second, a final
conviction and sentence, or an acquittal, extinguishes the defendant-witness's Fifth
Amendment rights with respect to the charges that are the subject of the disposition. See,
e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 315 (1999) (holding that privilege survives
until sentencing); Ibarra v. Martin, 143 F.3d 286, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding no privi-
lege after acquittal).
75 See Keenan, supra note 50, at 187 ("[I]n all but the most exceptional cases, the gov-
ernment is, prior to granting immunity, in a unique position to evaluate any possible [Kasti-
gar] proof problems and take the necessary prophylactic measures to insure that its burden
can be met.").
76 "Canning" is the process by which the prosecutor seals and files or otherwise docu-
ments and preserves preimmunity testimony and other evidence. See North I, 910 F.2d at
871 (describing "canning" as sealing and filing evidence and prosecution theories); U.S.
Attorneys' Criminal Resource Manual, § 726 (1997), http:llwww.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foiajreading-room/usam/title/crm00726.htm (recommending steps to avoid taint); Turner,
supra note 50, at 114 (describing "canning"). A common method of "canning" is to ques-
tion the witness before a grand jury.
77 See, e.g., United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1433 n.13 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The pro-
cess of formal grants of immunity .. provides time for the prosecutor to protect the
testimony of potential witnesses by obtaining canned statements and by shielding these
witnesses from exposure to the immunized testimony." (citation omitted)), rev'd on other
grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996); see also North I, 910 F.2d at 872-73 (holding that prosecution
can meet burden by establishing "that the allegedly tainted testimony contains no evidence
not 'canned' by the prosecution before such exposure occurred"); North H, 920 F.2d 940,
943 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("[I]f such steps are not taken, it may well be extremely difficult for
the prosecutor to sustain its burden of proof that a witness exposed to immunized testi-
mony has not shaped his or her testimony in light of the exposure .... ).
Canning witness testimony does not guarantee that the witnesses will escape later ex-
posure to, or be untainted by, immunized testimony. It merely creates a record of what the
witness knew and remembered before exposure. If the witness gives substantially identical
testimony after exposure, it should satisfy the prosecution's burden of proving that the
immunized testimony did not shape the witness testimony. See North 1, 910 F.2d at 872-73.
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In contrast, prosecutors are unable to dictate the timing of police
officers' compelled statements. Internal affairs investigators decide
when to take compelled statements and may do so without consider-
ing the potential fallout from Garrity immunity. Indeed, they often
compel statements at the outset of an investigation, foreclosing oppor-
tunities for preimmunity prosecution or evidence gathering.78
Fourth, prosecutors are more likely to be forewarned of previ-
ously immunized testimony by a potential defendant than of a com-
pelled statement by a police officer. Advance notice provides an
opportunity to minimize exposure. In many cases, the prosecutor's
office that is considering charges against a defendant will have been
involved in, and thus will be aware of, an earlier decision to grant
immunity. Even if a different prosecutor's office or another govern-
mental entity granted immunity,79 the formal process surrounding im-
munity grants80 may give the charging prosecutor adequate notice.81
Alerted to a possible Kastigar challenge, prosecutors can take precau-
tionary measures. For example, if a transcript of a potential defen-
dant's testimony from an earlier proceeding exists, the prosecutor's
office can ensure that the prosecutors and investigators assigned to
the case do not read it, enhancing the chances of later proving that the
If a witness whose testimony has been canned changes his testimony after exposure, can-
ning may be insufficient to satisfy the Kastigar burden in a jurisdiction that follows the
North rule prohibiting witness testimony shaped by immunized testimony.
Although it may be possible to prove that testimony from a witness who was exposed
to a compelled statement is untainted even in the absence of canned testimony, see North
11, 920 F.2d at 944 (suggesting that witnesses "might convincingly testify that their expo-
sure had no effect on their trial or grand jury testimony"), that method of satisfying
Kastigar is of little use if the witness is uncooperative. See infra notes 97-101 and accompa-
nying text (describing police officers' reluctance to testify against fellow officers).
78 See Koon, 34 F.3d at 1433 n.13 (
[T]he individuals who question the employee are concerned about potential
misconduct, and their goal is generally to learn the facts of a situation as
quickly as possible. They do not necessarily act with the care and precision of
a prosecutor weighing the benefits of compelling testimony against the risks to
future prosecutions; indeed, they may not even have the prospect of prosecu-
tion and the requirements of the Fifth Amendment in mind.).
Internal investigators may take a statement before the local district attorney is aware of
potential criminal conduct. Some police departments postpone efforts to take a compelled
statement until after completion of any criminal investigation. Supra note 72 (describing
policy in some police departments of postponing compelled statements).
79 See supra note 73 (describing immunity grants by government actors other than
prosecutor's office that brings charges).
8o See supra note 34 (describing formal process).
81 Sometimes formal immunity catches prosecutors unaware. See, e.g., United States v.
McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 307 (8th Cir. 1973) (involving case where both local and federal
prosecutors were unaware of state statute conferring transactional immunity on all wit-
nesses who testify before state grand jury).
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prosecution team has not derived evidence from the immunized testi-
mony or made nonevidentiary use of it.82
Garrity immunity is more likely to operate as a trap for an un-
wary prosecutor. It may not be apparent that a police officer's oral or
written statement is "compelled" within the meaning of Garrity. Un-
like formal immunity grants, it is not always clear whether or when
Garrity immunity has attached. In Garrity, there was both a state stat-
ute requiring job termination for failure to answer questions and an
express threat of that result.83 Although some early decisions sug-
gested that both were necessary to trigger Garrity protection,84 courts
more recently have found statements to be "compelled" if a suspect
officer believes that refusal to answer questions will cause him to lose
his job and if there is an objective basis for that belief rooted in offi-
cial action.8 5 Application of this test expands the universe of police
officers' statements that a court may deem "compelled," possibly in-
cluding statements other than those made to internal affairs investiga-
tors, such as arrest reports, use-of-force reports, or postincident oral
statements to supervisors. 86 It also leaves the status of a police of-
ficer's statement uncertain until there has been litigation to determine
whether the subjective and objective prongs of the test have been sat-
isfied. Without a clear warning, prosecutors and investigators may
overlook the possibility that Garrity immunity has attached and thus
neglect to avoid exposure or take other precautions.
82 See, e.g., United States v. Semkiw, 712 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[Tlhe govern-
ment might easily have removed any cloud from the trial by assigning it to another attor-
ney who did not and would not review the immunized testimony.").
83 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
84 See, e.g., United States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711, 716 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that
explicit threat of discharge and state statute or ordinance mandating discharge was re-
quired to trigger Garrity immunity); People v. Sapp, 934 P.2d 1367, 1370-71 (Colo. 1997)
(discussing Indorato rule).
85 See, e.g., United States v. Friedrick, 842 F.2d 382, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding ob-
jectively reasonable belief sufficient to trigger Garrity protection); United States v.
Camacho, 739 F. Supp. 1504,1515 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (adopting Friedrick test); Sapp, 934 P.2d
at 1372-73 (adopting Friedrick test over Indorato test).
86 See, e.g., Camacho, 739 F. Supp. at 1511-12 (holding that informal statements to
investigators who were at defendant's home to recover clothing were compelled). Courts
have not been receptive to claims that the threat of discipline for insubordination alone
renders police reports or oral statements "compelled." See, e.g., Sapp, 934 P.2d at 1373-74
(holding that subjective fear of discipline for insubordination without reasonable basis for
fear of termination is insufficient); People v. Bynum, 512 N.E.2d 826, 827 (111. App. Ct.
1987) (holding accident report not compelled despite possibility of discipline for refusal to
complete); Commonwealth v. Harvey, 491 N.E.2d 607, 609-11 (Mass. 1986) (holding tape-
recorded statements from interviews admissible despite "possibility of adverse conse-
quences from the defendant's failure to cooperate"). Robert Myers has argued that police
reports fall within the "required records" exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege,
rendering the Garrity doctrine inapplicable. Myers, supra note 11, at 539.
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Fifth, prosecutors are better able to limit dissemination of immu-
nized testimony than compelled statements. Prosecutors often elicit
immunized testimony in secret before a grand jury.87 A prosecutor's
office can satisfy its burden of disproving taint at a Kastigar hearing if
it has prevented dissemination to potential witnesses and assigned
unexposed prosecutors and investigators to the case against the per-
son who gave the immunized testimony.88 When police department
investigators take compelled statements, however, the prosecution has
no similar ability to prevent or delay dissemination.8 9 Internal affairs
investigators may show or describe a suspect officer's compelled state-
ments to complainants and witnesses as a routine investigative tech-
nique.90 Indeed, they may have a legal obligation to disclose the
compelled statements to all officers subject to possible disciplinary
proceedings arising from the same incident, including police officers
who were present at the scene of the misconduct and therefore are
potential prosecution witnesses.91 Thus, once an internal affairs inves-
87 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2) (mandating that matters occuring before federal grand
jury remain secret); Wright, supra note 36, at 427-28 (describing prosecutors' ability to
limit dissemination of immunized testimony). If disclosure of immunized grand jury testi-
mony is necessary to comply with the prosecution's discovery obligations, the prosecution
can seek a protective order limiting unnecessary dissemination. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
16(d)(1).
88 See United States v. Bolton, 977 F.2d 1196, 1199 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that assign-
ment of new prosecutors who had only minimal exposure to immunized testimony defeats
claim of nonevidentiary use); North 1, 910 F.2d 843, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that
prosecution can meet Kastigar burden by showing "that the witness was never exposed to
North's immunized testimony"); United States v. First NV. State Bank of Minot, 491 F.2d
780, 785-87 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that proof that prosecutors were unexposed to immu-
nized testimony satisfies prosecution's burden of disproving nonevidentiary use); State v.
Irizarry, 639 A.2d 305, 312 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) ("[S]ubstituting an assistant
prosecutor with no knowledge of the immunized testimony for one who does have knowl-
edge would seemingly be an effective step to bolster the State's position that no taint is
present .... ").
89 See United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1433 n.13 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[Blecause state-
ments [from police officers] may be compelled soon after the event in question, it is far
more likely that these statements will be circulated before there is an opportunity to can
testimony."), rev'd on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
90 See id. (noting that internal affairs investigators may circulate compelled statements
"out of a legitimate desire to ascertain the truth of the matter"); People V. Gillim, 274
Cal. Rptr. 415, 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that victims and witnesses are frequently
exposed to police officers' compelled statements); Perez & Muir, supra note 13, at 219
(describing general practice of civilian review boards to allow complainants access to entire
administrative investigation file); Jim Newton, LAPD Revamping Probes of Shootings by
Officers, L.A. Tunes, Sept. 14, 1994, at Al ("[The LAPD] circulates copies of the com-
pelled statements to investigators and to other officers involved in a shooting who may be
facing discipline.").
91 For example, California law requires such disclosure to all officers who face discipli-
nary proceedings in connection with an incident. Cal. Gov't Code § 3303(g) (West 1995);
see also Skelly v. State Pers. Bd., 539 P.2d 774,782 (Cal. 1975) (en banc) (holding that due
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tigator has taken a police officer's compelled statement, the danger is
great that she will disseminate it in a manner detrimental to later
prosecution.
Compounding these problems is the fact that exposure to a com-
pelled statement need not be direct (such as through reading or hear-
ing the statement itself); it can be indirect. For example, a prosecutor
or investigator may be exposed by interviewing a witness who com-
municates facts derived from her exposure to a compelled state-
ment.92 Similarly, an exposed prosecutor or investigator can taint a
witness. 93 Whether exposure is direct or indirect, the prosecution's
failure to disprove taint can result in loss of the evidence or dismissal
of the charges. 94
In short, the fact that internal affairs investigators control the tak-
ing and dissemination of police officers' compelled statements creates
substantial dangers that are absent when prosecutors immunize wit-
nesses. Police investigators making good-faith efforts to probe allega-
tions of misconduct can derail a criminal case inadvertently.
Moreover, even if committed to the task of properly investigating po-
lice misconduct for purposes of imposing administrative discipline,
some internal affairs investigators, who may know or have worked
with the suspect officer, may disfavor criminal prosecution. 95 If in-
process requires that civil servants facing disciplinary procedures receive "written notice of
the proposed action... [and] all materials relied upon to support the charges").
92 See, e.g., State v. Gault, 551 N.W.2d 719, 725 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that
prosecutor can be "exposed indirectly" by discussing case with person exposed to Garrity
statements).
93 See, e.g., Sex Charge Dismissed Against Brainerd Cop, Star Trib. (Minneapolis-St.
Paul), Sept. 22, 1998, at 2B, 1998 WL 6369045 (describing case where court held that wit-
nesses were tainted when prosecutor informed them of contents of compelled statement).
In addition, even the questions that a prosecutor or investigator poses to a witness may be
tainted by a compelled statement. See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 255 (1983)
(holding that questions based on transcript of immunized testimony were "derived" from
that testimony).
94 See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing sanctions for failure to disprove
taint).
95 See, e.g., Scott Glover & Matt Lait, Prosecutors Say LAPD Hindered Probe, L.A.
Times, Oct. 6, 2000, at B1 (quoting from pleading from Los Angeles County District Attor-
ney's Office filed in connection with prosecution of police officers stating that "[mIany of
these investigators from [the] LAPD have relationships, even friendships, with some of the
individuals under investigation. Accordingly, it is not surprising that there are some
LAPD investigators who have difficulty conducting a thorough and complete investigation
of the police agency to which they belong"); Matt Lait & Scott Glover, Police Cases Sent to
D.A. Drop Sharply, L.A. Tunes, Oct. 23, 2000, at Al (discussing failure of LAPD to notify
district attorney's office of possible police criminality); see also Christopher Comm'n Re-
port, supra note 72, at 161-62 (describing LAPD investigation of shootings by police of-
ficers to include group interviews during which officers involved can "get their stories
straight," unrecorded preinterviews of police witnesses before tape-recorded interviews,
and exclusion of district attorney personnel until completion of LAPD investigation); Kolts
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dined to jeopardize a prosecution, an unscrupulous internal affairs in-
vestigator can compel a statement when not required to do so in order
to "immunize" the target officer. Similarly, such an investigator can
expose potential prosecution witnesses to compelled statements in or-
der to taint and possibly disqualify them from testifying.9 6
Garrity immunity also provides police officers who witness mis-
conduct or otherwise know of incriminating information with a means
of evading their obligation to testify truthfully.97 Police officers often
are reluctant to testify against colleagues. 98 Departmental regulations
Comm'n Report, supra note 72, at 138-42 (describing Los Angeles County Sheriff's De-
partment practices of preinterviewing suspect police officers, shutting off tape recorder
during interviews, and using leading questions to assist officers involved in shootings to
give exculpatory explanations). A recent report prepared at the request of the police
union in Los Angeles found that "Internal Affairs is run by officers steeped in LAPD's
codes of silence and loyalty, aggression, retaliation and image protection." Erwin
Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department's Board of
Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, pt. V.C (Sept. 11, 2000), http'l/wwv.usr.edudept/
law/facultylchemerinsky/rampart-finalrep.html; see generally Human Rights Watch, supra
note 6, at 5 (describing "apparent bias in favor of fellow officers" within internal affairs
divisions).
96 See United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416,1433 n.13 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that taking
and circulating compelled statement may "occur out of a desire to protect one's colleagues.
Thus, in the context of internal affairs investigations, police officers could protect each
other by compelling testimony and disseminating it widely, placing any criminal investiga-
tion at serious risk and possibly barring prosecution altogether"), rev'd on other grounds,
518 U.S. 81 (1996); Bloch, supra note 11, at 677 ("[P]olice officers in many circumstances
can insulate their colleagues inadvertently, and, of course, intentionally, from any conse-
quence in the criminal realm."); Newton, supra note 90 (describing complaints by local
district attorney about police practice of taking compelled statements from police officers
involved in shootings and concern that unit assigned to such shootings "is less of an aggres-
sive investigative unit than a protective shield that buffers officers from prosecution").
Because the Garrity doctrine only prohibits use of compelled statements in criminal prose-
cutions, dissemination wiU not damage the internal affairs investigation.
An internal affairs investigator also may choose to "leak" a compelled statement to
the media. In high-profile cases, which investigations into police criminality often are, such
leaks can result in widely circulated news stories about the statements, thus exposing po-
tential witnesses, investigators, or prosecutors. See, e.g., Richard A. Serrano, 3 in King
Beating Say They Feared for Lives, L.A. imes, May 21, 1991, at Al (summarizing and
quoting from compelled statements of LAPD officers Koon, Powell, and Wind in Rodney
King beating case).
97 For a discussion of police perjury, see, for example, Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells,
The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to
Police Perjury, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 233, 255 (1998) (considering problem of police lying to
"conceal police abuses or corruption in various forms"); see also Donald A. Dripps, Police,
Plus Peijury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. Crim. L & Criminology 693, 694-98 (1996) (describ-
ing police perjury in suppression hearings); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Per-
jury and What to Do About It, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1037, 1040.48 (1996) (discussing police
"lying to convict the innocent and lying to convict the guilty").
98 See, e.g., Jerome H. Skolnick & James J. Fyfe, Above the Law- Police and the Exces-
sive Use of Force 108-12, 122 (1993) (discussing operation of "code of silence" among
police officers); Chin & Wells, supra note 97, at 236-40 & nn.15-22 (citing authorities);
Wayne A. Kerstetter, Toward Justice for A&l Procedural Justice and the Review of Citizen
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nonetheless may require that officers truthfully report misconduct.99
That obligation, coupled with the threat of administrative discipline or
prosecution for false statements or perjury, may prompt some officers
to provide truthful information against fellow officers. In order to
avoid the difficult choice between providing truthful testimony against
a fellow officer or risking administrative sanction or prosecution for
nondisclosure or false statements, unscrupulous officers falsely may
claim to be tainted by a compelled statement. Even if the prosecution
can demonstrate that such a claim of taint is not credible, that alone
may be insufficient to satisfy the prosecution's heavy burden of
presenting affirmative proof that the witness's testimony is un-
tainted. 100 If the prosecution is unable to meet the Kastigar-imposed
burden, Garrity's progeny require suppression of the testimony.10' At
the same time, it will be difficult to bring a perjury prosecution, which
would require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the witness of-
ficer's claim of taint was false.
Complaints, in Police Violence, supra note 8, at 234, 240 (noting "unwillingness of officers
to testify against other officers"). Commissions in New York City and Los Angeles found
that the police "code of silence" is a pervasive impediment to investigations into police
criminality. See Mollen Comm'n Rep., supra note 6, at 53-58 ("Officers who report mis-
conduct are ostracized and harassed; become targets of complaints and even physical
threats; and are made to fear that they will be left alone on the streets in a time of crisis.");
Christopher Comm'n Report, supra note 72, at 168-71 ("Perhaps the greatest single barrier
to the effective investigation and adjudication of complaints is the officers' unwritten 'code
of silence'... [which] consists of one simple rule: an officer does not provide adverse
information against a fellow officer.").
99 See, e.g., 3 L.A. Police Dep't Manual § 815.05 (2000) ("When any employee who is
not a supervisor becomes aware of possible misconduct by another member of this Depart-
ment, the employee shall immediately notify a supervisor.").
100 See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (
[E]ven if North's assertion [that, when called as a prosecution witness against
Poindexter, he was unable to segregate his personal knowledge of events sur-
rounding the Iran-Contra scandal from what he heard from Poindexter's tele-
vised immunized testimony] were to be given no weight, the [independent
counsel] would still have failed to meet his burden, which is to demonstrate
that the immunized testimony did not influence the witness.).
The prosecutor could prevail in such a situation only if she could demonstrate that the
allegedly tainted witness had not been directly or indirectly exposed to the compelled
statement.
101 Claims of taint also enable witness officers to avoid speaking to criminal investiga-
tors or prosecutors. If an officer maintains that he is tainted by a compelled statement,
investigators or prosecutors likely will refrain from interviewing him to avoid a claim that,
through information received from him, they have been exposed to the content of the
compelled statement. See State v. Gault, 551 N.W.2d 719,725 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (not-
ing that prosecutor can be "exposed indirectly" by discussing case with person exposed to
Garrity statements).
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Unfortunately, the danger of a witness engaging in such conduct
is not fanciful. 102 In the California state prosecution of the police of-
ficers who used excessive force when arresting Rodney King, a crucial
witness successfully made such a claim. The prosecution planned to
call Sergeant Fred Nichols to testify that the defendants' conduct vio-
lated LAPD use-of-force policy.' 0 3 Nichols, a nationally known use-
of-force expert, was a compelling witness, having served as "officer-in-
charge" of the LAPD physical training and self-defense unit 3 4 He
already had appeared before the state grand jury that returned the
indictment in the case, testifying that the defendants' conduct violated
LAPD use-of-force policy.105 The LAPD later demoted Nichols, 0 6
who took a stress-related leave of absence. 0 7 When the prosecution
102 The dissenting judge in North I and North H1 suggested that witnesses against North
may have watched North's immunized testimony in order to undermine the criminal prose-
cution, North I, 910 F.2d at 920 n.7 (Wald, CJ., dissenting) (asserting that Justice Depart-
ment officials from same Administration as North, "presumably aware of... Kastigar...
soaked themselves in the immunized testimony"); and that similar sabotage could occur in
the future, North II, 920 F.2d at 953 (Wald, CJ., dissenting) ("[Tlhe majority provides an
easy out for conflicted government officials; they can immunize their colleagues from pros-
ecution by exposing themselves to immunized testimony."). The majority did not deny that
such a scenario could occur. Rather, it concluded that proof of such conduct would not
matter when assessing whether use of the immunized testimony violated the Fifth
Amendment:
The more important point, however, is that such a conspiracy-even if it ex-
isted-would be entirely irrelevant to the issue before us, which is whether or
not North's Fifth Amendment right was violated. The Department of Justice
could have held evening classes in "The Parsing and Deconstruction of Kasti-
gar" for the very purpose of "derailing" the [Independent Counsel's] prosecu-
tion, and such a curriculum would have been simply irrelevant to the question
of whether or not the prosecution's case made use of North's compelled
testimony.
North 1, 910 F.2d at 865.
103 Reporter's Daily Transcript of Proceedings, Vol. 71, Apr. 14, 1992, at 12,603-9, Peo-
ple v. Powell, No. BA035498 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1991) [hereinafter Powell Transcript] (proffer
by Deputy District Attorney Alan Yochelson based on Nichols's grand jury testimony) (on
file with the New York University Law Review). Expert testimony about the proper use of
force by police officers played an important role in both the federal and state cases. See,
e.g., George P. Fletcher, With Justice for Some: Victims' Rights in Criminal Trials 46-47,
57-61 (1995). Professor Fletcher concludes that courts should not admit such testimony in
police brutality cases. Id. at 255-56. For a response to Fletcher, see Robert P. Mosteller,
Popular Justice, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 487, 506 n.71 (1995) (reviewing Fletcher, supra, and
contending that Fletcher proposal would improperly deny prosecutors method of proving
that police defendants acted with requisite mental state).
104 Richard A. Serrano, LAPD Reassigns Training Expert, LA. Times, Sept. 21,1994, at
B1.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Linda Deutsch, King Trial Judge Excuses Officer Who Didn't Want to Testify, Or-
ange County Reg. (Cal.), Apr. 15, 1992, at A3, 1992 WL 6346645.
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called him as a witness at trial, Nichols was unwilling to testify.108 At
a Kastigar hearing, he claimed that he had been exposed to the defen-
dant officers' compelled statements and that he could not distinguish
between the statements and other sources of information when form-
ing his opinion.10 9 Even though Nichols had never before claimed
that the self-serving and exculpatory compelled statements o influ-
enced his opinion,111 the state court determined that the prosecution
had failed to meet its burden under Kastigar and disqualified
Nichols."12 As a result, in the middle of trial, the state prosecutors
found themselves without a crucial witness. 1 3 They were forced to
rely on the testimony of a less-impressive expert witness who had little
"experience on the street."' 4 Trial observers concluded that the con-
trast between that unimpressive prosecution testimony and the con-
trary opinion of the more experienced and qualified defense expert
witness was a major factor in the acquittals." 5
D. Measures to Address Garrity Hazards
It is difficult to measure the full impact of Garrity immunity. Re-
ported appellate decisions demonstrate that Garrity immunity can,
and does, result in dismissals, lost convictions, and suppression of criti-
108 Id.
109 Powell Transcript, supra note 103, at 12,625-30.
110 See Serrano, supra note 96 (describing self-exculpating compelled statements of
LAPD officers Koon, Powell, and Wind).
111 See Deutsch, supra note 107.
112 See Powell Transcript, supra note 103, at 12,723-27. The court recognized that
Nichols was reluctant to testify and that his claim that his testimony was affected by the
compelled statements may have been false, but noted that the prosecution had not met its
burden of proof under Kastigar. Id. A federal court had reached a similar conclusion
when Oliver North, when called as a prosecution witness against his former boss, John
Poindexter, in a prosecution arising out of the Iran-Contra scandal, claimed that
Poindexter's immunized testimony had affected his memory of events. United States v.
Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that, even if North's claim that he
was immersed in and tainted by Poindexter's immunized testimony was likely false, prose-
cution did not meet "heavy burden" of demonstrating that North's testimony was not
influenced).
113 The prosecution had difficulty finding an expert who was willing to testify against the
defendants. See Powell Transcript, supra note 103, at 12,610.
114 Fletcher, supra note 103, at 47; see also Roger Parloff, Maybe the Jury Was Right,
Am. Law., June 1992, at 7, 79 ("The prosecution expert, Commander Michael Bostic, who
had not served in the field for many years, arrived at his own conclusion about when the
officers should have stopped hitting King by repeatedly watching the tape in the tranquility
of his office or home.").
115 See Fletcher, supra note 103, at 46-47, 51; John Riley, What the Jury Heard That the
Public Didn't, Newsday (New York) (Nassau Ed.), May 13, 1992, at 5 (comparing defense
expert, "whom several observers described as the trial's single most riveting and effective
witness" with only expert whom prosecution used, "a white-collar cop who hadn't been on
the street in more than a decade").
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cal evidence. 116 Courts also suppress evidence or dismiss charges
without published decisions.117 Perhaps more significantly, Garrity
may cause prosecutors to refrain from bringing charges or calling wit-
nesses at trial.1 8 When investigating cases and determining whether
to seek charges, prosecutors have little choice but to assume (absent
clear authority to the contrary) that the full panoply of use restrictions
applies to compelled statements. Although some courts have not yet
determined whether to adopt restrictions on nonevidentiary and indi-
rect evidentiary uses of compelled statements or to equate the scope
of Garrity immunity with that of formal immunity, it would be fool-
hardy to bring a case against police officers built on potentially tainted
evidence or strategy, particularly in light of possible judicial sympathy
for such defendants. 119
One indication of the severity of the problem is that the Depart-
ment of Justice has developed an elaborate approach to evidence
116 See, e.g., Kinamon v. United States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 45 F.3d 343,347-
48 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that use of compelled statement before grand jury may require
dismissal); United States v. Friedrick, 842 F.2d 382, 400-02 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (suppressing
compelled statement of FBI agent); United States v. Camacho, 739 F. Supp. 1504, 1512
(S.D. Fla. 1990) (suppressing statements that followed formally compelled statements);
State v. Gault, 551 N.W.2d 719, 724-25 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding trial court's sup-
pression of witness testimony because of prosecution's failure to disprove direct and indi-
rect exposure to compelled statements and dismissal of indictment for failure to disprove
nonevidentiary use); cf. Holloway v. State, 339 A.2d 319 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (hold-
ing admission of compelled statement erroneous but harmless).
117 See, e.g., Sex Charge Dismissed Against Brainerd Cop, supra note 93 (describing
dismissal of sexual misconduct case because witnesses were informed of contents of com-
pelled statements); Stalking Charges Against Policeman Dropped, Star Trib. (Minneapolis-
St. Paul), July 19, 1996, at 3B, 1996 WL 6921117 (describing dismissal of stalking charges
against police officer resulting from prosecutor's access to compelled statement).
118 See, e.g., Newton, supra note 90 (describing complaints from prosecutors that com-
pelled statements served as obstacles to prosecution); cf. Wright, supra note 36, at 436 &
n.117 (suggesting that congressional immunity grants, although far less common, may have
same effect).
A recent, and bizarre, manifestation of the Garrity immunity problem occurred in
connection with efforts to investigate the LAPD Rampart Division scandal. Apparently
concerned that the local district attorney was not willing or able to avoid taint from com-
pelled statements, LAPD officials refused to share evidence with the district attorney until
federal prosecutors had first screened it. The district attorney accused the police chief of
withholding evidence, and the police chief called the district attorney a liar. See Jim
Newton & T'ma Daunt, Police Panel Forced to Sit Out Feud, LA. Times, Mar. 17, 2000, at
Al.
119 See, e.g., Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention of Just
Sentencing for Police Brutality, 47 Hastings L.J. 677, 727 (1996) (describing federal prose-
cutors' beliefs that judges exercise discretion to sentence police defendants more leniently
than civilians who commit analogous offenses); id. at 741 ("[M]ost of the prosecutors inter-
viewed think that the elimination of judicial discretion in [police brutality] cases is a change
for the better because courts tended to sympathize with police and excuse their criminal
behavior."); cf. Levenson, supra note 7, at 564-67 (noting law enforcement backgrounds of
many federal and state court judges).
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gathering and review in investigations of police criminality.120 The ap-
proach is designed to minimize potential damage by identifying com-
pelled statements, determining whether witnesses or evidence are
tainted, ascertaining whether there are independent sources for possi-
bly tainted evidence, and ensuring that the prosecutors and investiga-
tors assigned to the case are not exposed to tainted evidence.
In order to accomplish those objectives, one team of investigators
and prosecutors-the "Garrity team" or "dirty team"-is assigned to
review all of the evidence in the criminal investigation of a law en-
forcement officer.12' A separate team of investigators and prosecu-
tors-the "trial team" or "clean team"-is responsible for presenting
the case to a grand jury, and, if appropriate, trying the case. 22 The
trial team cannot interview any witnesses or review any documents
until the Garrity team has given its approval.1l'
The Garrity team first determines whether the target of the inves-
tigation made statements. As noted above, courts apply a test with
subjective and objective elements that requires consideration of the
circumstances under which a police officer made a statement in order
to determine whether it is "compelled.' 1 24 The Garrity team can re-
lease to the trial team any documents generated before the target
made statements, confident that they are untainted. If the Garrity
team concludes that a target police officer has made one or more pos-
sibly compelled statements, it screens all witnesses and documents to
determine whether they have been tainted. For witnesses, this re-
quires that the Garrity team interview them to ascertain whether they
have been exposed, either directly or indirectly, to the contents of a
compelled statement, and if so, whether they have an independent
source for the information they possess and whether exposure to the
120 See Declaration of Karla Dobinski, filed in support of Government's Consolidated
Response to Defense Motions for Kastigar Hearing and to Exclude Defendant Powell's
Compelled IAD Statements, at 1-2, United States v. Powell, CR No. 92-686-JGD, slip op.
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Dobinski Declaration] (on file with the New York
University Law Review) (describing "standard practice" that Criminal Section of Depart-
ment of Justice's Civil Rights Division uses "to ensure that no administratively compelled
statements ... are used against [the officer who gave the statement] in a federal criminal
prosecution").
The author is familiar with these procedures by virtue of his participation as one of the
trial attorneys in United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769 (C.D. Cal. 1993), the federal
prosecution arising from the use of force against Rodney King, and in several Garrity
workshops for federal prosecutors conducted by the Civil Rights Division and the Office of
Legal Education of the Department of Justice.
121 See id. at 2.
122 See, e.g., Scott Glover & Matt Lait, Parks Excludes Garcetti From Rampart Inquiry
Scandal, L.A. Times, Mar. 15, 2000, at Al (describing clean team/dirty team approach).
123 See Dobinski Declaration, supra note 120, at 2.
124 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (describing test).
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compelled statement has affected their recollection of events.125 Un-
less the Garrity team is satisfied that it can meet its Kastigar burden of
disproving taint with respect to a witness, it will deny the trial team
access to that witness.126
This process places considerable constraints on a criminal investi-
gation. First, it requires that the investigating agency and the prosecu-
tor's office assign a full team of investigators and prosecutors to
screen witnesses and documents and to litigate KastigarlGarrity is-
sues.-27 Although the Department of Justice is able to muster suffi-
cient resources to accomplish this, state and local prosecutors' offices
with small staffs may be unable to do so. They instead may be faced
with a choice of conducting an investigation that may prove fruitless
because investigators and prosecutors become tainted, or foregoing
prosecution of police officers who have made compelled statements.
Second, it makes the investigative process cumbersome and inef-
ficient. The trial team receives evidence only as it trickles through the
Garrity team filter. This generally slows an investigation, and can de-
lay the availability of specific pieces of evidence that the trial team
needs to investigate the case properly. As a result, the trial team may
be forced to conduct interviews of some witnesses without having
done a complete preliminary investigation-such as reviewing perti-
nent documents or interviewing other witnesses-because needed
documents or witnesses are not yet screened.
Nor does this process eliminate the possibility of lost evidence. If
the Garrity team identifies witnesses or documents that are tainted,
that evidence remains unavailable to the trial team. At best, the pro-
cess prevents damage from further direct or indirect exposure to com-
pelled statements.
Tim GARPrTy DocrRnm's UNCERTAIN FOUNDATION
When the Supreme Court decided Garrity and Kastigar, it did not
anticipate the robust protection that lower courts later would give to
police officers' compelled statements. Nor did it foresee the resulting
125 See Dobinski Declaration, supra note 120, at 2. In the Ninth Circuit, the existence of
an independent source is enough to satisfy the Fifth Amendment without consideration of
the effect the compelled statement may have had on witnesses. See supra note 57 (describ-
ing Ninth Circuit rule).
126 See Dobinski Declaration, supra note 120, at 2-3. The Garrity team uses a similar
process to screen documents. If a document or portions thereof contain information either
derived from a compelled statement or created by a tainted witness, the Garrity team de-
nies the trial team access to the tainted portions. Id.
127 See North 1, 910 F.2d at 861 ("[A] Kastigar proceeding could consume substantial
amounts of time, personnel, and money .... ).
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problems described above. Indeed, the Garrity majority made no
mention of the immunity analogy.128 Instead, it determined that the
due process protection for coerced confessions (and, to a lesser extent,
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine) required suppression. 129
Even had the Garrity Court equated compelled statements with im-
munized testimony, however, it likely would not have contemplated
the extraordinary protection that compelled statements now receive.
When the Court decided Kastigar five years after Garrity, it assumed
that restrictions on use of immunized testimony were the same as
those applied to coerced confessions. 30 Only later would lower
courts interpret Kastigar and the privilege to impose prohibitions on
nonevidentiary and indirect evidentiary use of immunized testi-
mony,131 restrictions that courts never have applied to coerced
confessions. 132
Although the Garrity and Kastigar Courts did not foresee either
the shift to the immunity analogy as an explanation for suppression of
compelled statements or the rigorous prohibitions that lower courts
have imposed on use of immunized testimony, both developments are
understandable. First, as described below, the immunity analogy bet-
ter explains the suppression of compelled statements than the ratio-
nales that the Garrity Court offered. 133 Second, the imposition of
more stringent restrictions on prosecutorial use of immunized testi-
mony, and, by analogy, police officer's compelled statements, is con-
sistent with differences between the Court's reasons for suppressing
immunized testimony and coerced confessions. 34
A. The Garrity Court's Analysis
1. Compelled Statements as Coerced Confessions
The Garrity majority relied primarily on the due process protec-
tion against coerced confessions to justify suppression of the com-
128 At the outset of its opinion, the Court noted that "[n]o immunity was granted [to
Garrity and the others who were questioned], as there is no immunity statute applicable in
these circumstances." Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 495 (1967). The Court made
only passing reference to the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 497 & n.5, 499-500. Only
Justice White, in dissent in the companion case of Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967),
acknowledged the similarity between police officers' compelled statements and immunized
testimony. Id. at 532 (White, J., dissenting).
129 See infra notes 135-36, 163-64 and accompanying text. The Court later embraced the
view that the Fifth Amendment privilege itself mandates the suppression of police officers'
compelled statements as "immunized." See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
130 See infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
132 See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
133 See infra Parts II.A and II.B.
134 See infra Part II.C.
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pelled statements. The Court framed the issue as whether "the
statements [were] products of coercion in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment" 35 and held that "the protection of the individual under
the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced statements prohibits use
in subsequent criminal proceedings of statements obtained under
threat of removal from office .... ,,26
However, even a cursory examination of the due process volunta-
riness test reveals that the Garrity Court's conclusion is problematic.
The Court has described the due process test as follows:
The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly es-
tablished test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the
test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially
free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed
to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has
been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically im-
paired, the use of his confession offends due process. 137
The Court uses a fact-specific approach when entertaining allega-
tions that a confession was coerced. "In determining whether a defen-
dant's will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed
the totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both the character-
istics of the accused and the details of the interrogation." 13s Indeed,
"a detailed account... is unavoidable." 139
The inquiry into whether a person's decision to answer questions
is "involuntary," "coerced,"' 14 or the result of an "overborne will" is
hardly an exact science.14' In practice, two concerns that are only
135 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496 (1967).
136 Id. at 500.
137 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961); see also Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 432-34 (2000) (describing voluntariness test).
138 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); see also Withrow v. Williams,
507 U.S. 680, 689 (1993) (noting Court's use of totality of circumstances test); Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503,513 (1963) ("[W]hether the confession was obtained by coercion
or improper inducement can be determined by an examination of all of the attendant
circumstances.").
139 Culombe, 367 U.S. at 606.
140 The Court treats the terms "coerced confession" and "involuntary confession" as
synonyms. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 n.3 (1991).
141 See Joseph D. Grano, Confessions, Truth, and the Law 60 (1993) ("[Tlhe issue of
voluntariness [of confessions], in all its component parts, requires normative rather than
empirical judgments."); Albert A. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective:
The Right to Remain Silent, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2625, 2626 n.6 (1996) ("Efforts to define
compulsion and related words like coercion, duress, and involuntariness in terms of a sub-
jective sense of constraint are unproductive."); cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1428 (1989) ("[A]Ithough the Court frequently treats
coercion as a matter of mere description or measurement... such an empirical account of
coercion is unsustainable.... [A]ny useful conception of coercion is irreducibly norma-
tive."). There are two simple approaches to the voluntariness inquiry that avoid normative
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somewhat related to the defendant's exercise of free will have guided
the Court142-fear of unreliable confessions resulting from coercive
interrogation techniques143 and condemnation of improper police
methods of extracting confessions. 44 Although some older decisions
suggest that confessions that are not the result of free will should be
suppressed regardless of the methods police used to obtain them,1 45
the Court repudiated that view in Colorado v. Connelly.146 There, the
Court held that police misconduct is a prerequisite for finding that a
confession violates due process. 147 The Connelly majority also con-
cluded that concern about the reliability of a confession "is a matter to
judgments, but neither is satisfactory. One defines "voluntary" as the result of a conscious
effort by the actor. Under this view, even the confession of a defendant who is tortured is
voluntary because he consciously chooses to confess rather than endure additional torture.
The other approach defines as involuntary any choice that the actor would not have made
but for official action. Even the mildest forms of official pressure could render confessions
coerced under this approach. For a discussion of these issues, see Grano, supra, at 59-83.
142 See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985) (describing "the Court's consistently
held view that the admissibility of a confession turns as much on whether the techniques
for extracting the statements, as applied to this suspect, are compatible with a system that
presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial
means as on whether the defendant's will was in fact overborne").
143 See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 282 (1936) (
"[T]hey were likewise made by the said deputy definitively to understand that
the whipping would be continued unless and until they confessed, and not only
confessed, but confessed in every matter of detail as demanded by those pre-
sent; and in this manner the defendants confessed the crime, and as the whip-
pings progressed and were repeated, they changed or adjusted their confession
in all particulars of detail so as to conform to the demands of their torturers."
(quoting Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 470 (Miss. 1935) (Griffith, J., dissenting))).
144 See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (explaining that all cases in
which Supreme Court has found confessions to be involuntary "contained a substantial
element of coercive police conduct"); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963)
(finding confession to be involuntary in case where police used "oppressive and unfair
methods").
145 See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 308 (1963) (stating that if drugs that police
physician administered to alleviate defendant's heroin withdrawal symptoms had effect of
"truth serum" promoting confession to robbery and murder, "[a]ny questioning by police
officers which produces [such] a confession ... renders that confession inadmissible" even
if police did not intend that effect); 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 6.2(b)
(1999) (noting that voluntariness test once barred admission of confessions "obtained
under circumstances in which the defendant's free choice was significantly impaired, even
if the police did not resort to offensive practices").
146 479 U.S. 157.
147 See id. at 167. In Connelly, the Court stated that its due process cases all shared "the
crucial element of police overreaching," id. at 163, and held "that coercive police activity is
a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," id. at 167; see also LaFave et
al., supra note 145, § 6.2(b) (analyzing Connelly). But see Connelly, 479 U.S. at 177-81
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending that Court has suppressed confessions as involuntary
absent police coercion).
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be governed by the [state's] evidentiary laws," not federal constitu-
tional doctrine.148
It is difficult to explain Garrity given the Court's coerced confes-
sion jurisprudence either before or after Connelly. First, the interro-
gation method did not threaten to produce an unreliable confession.
The warning that the deputy attorney general gave to Garrity and the
others made clear that they could avoid job loss simply by answering
questions. Thus, unlike some coerced confession cases, there was no
pressure likely to induce the interviewees to give false incriminating
statements. 14
9
Second, there was no improper conduct. The deputy attorney
general's warning of job termination in Garrity was perfectly legal.150
Had Garrity chosen to remain silent, it is likely that the Court would
have found that both the imposition of the economic sanction and the
warning thereof were constitutional. 151 The following Term, at least
eight Justices agreed that "[iff... a policeman [refuses] to answer
questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the perform-
ance of his official duties ... the privilege against self-incrimination [is
not] a bar to his dismissal,"15 2 a view that the Court later would reiter-
148 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167. For a discussion of the development of confession law,
see, for example, Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confes-
sions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 Mich. L Rev. 929, 936-46 (1995), which traces the
changes in the treatment of confessions' reliability as a rationale for their exclusion.
149 Although the interviewees may have feared a prosecution for perjury or false state-
ments if they falsely exonerated themselves or others, they made no claim that they were
coerced into wrongly confessing to the suspected offenses or that compulsion was likely to
lead to that result. See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 503 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The defense did
not contend that the statements were the result of physical or mental coercion, or that the
wills of the... petitioners were overborne.").
150 The defendants challenged the constitutionality of the job forfeiture statute. How-
ever, the Supreme Court, like the New Jersey courts, did not consider that issue, instead
focusing on the voluntariness of the statements. Id. at 496.
151 In Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), decided the same day as Garrity, five Jus-
tices suggested as much. In Spevack, the Court considered whether a state could disbar an
attorney for asserting the privilege rather than complying with a subpoena related to a
judicial inquiry. A four-member plurality held that "[tlhe threat of disbarment and the loss
of professional standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of
compulsion" and concluded that a disbarment in response to a valid assertion of the privi-
lege violated the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 516. But Justice Fortas, who provided the deci-
sive fifth vote, noted that "[t]his Court has never held .. that a policeman may not be
discharged for refusal in disciplinary proceedings to testify as to his conduct as a police
officer" and made clear that he "would distinguish between a lawyer's right to remain
silent and that of a public employee who is asked questions specifically, directly, and nar-
rowly relating to the performance of his official duties .... " Id. at 519 (Fortas, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). The four Spevack dissenters also would have allowed the
termination of an uncooperative police officer, id. at 528 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 531
(White, J., dissenting).
152 Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 (1968) (footnote and citation omitted). Al-
though Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred in the result only, they considered it a "wel-
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ate.153 If it is constitutional to dismiss a police officer who refuses to
answer questions related to a disciplinary matter, it could not have
been improper for the deputy attorney general to provide Garrity and
the others notice of that consequence. 154 Unlike interrogators in
other coerced confession cases, the questioner in Garrity did nothing
wrong. 55
Third, in Garrity, the Court departed from the methodology that
it uses elsewhere to decide whether a confession is "coerced." Rather
than examine all of the available evidence to determine whether the
statements were voluntary, the majority ignored significant facts that
undercut a finding of coercion. Garrity and the others were not in
custody when questioned. 56 They made the statements during sworn
depositions recorded by a stenographer, rather than in the secrecy of a
police interrogation room. 57 Garrity himself had selected the room
where he was to be questioned. 58 Three of the officers had counsel
present. 59 When they sought suppression of the statements before
trial, the defendants presented no evidence of coercion other than the
threat of job forfeiture. 60 Not surprisingly, both the trial courts and
the Supreme Court of New Jersey determined that the statements
were voluntary.' 61 Of course, the threatened loss of their employment
come breakthrough" that the Court had made clear that "public officials may now be
discharged.., for refusing to divulge to appropriate authority information pertinent to the
faithful performance of their offices." Id. at 285 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Black
concurred without writing or joining an opinion. Id. at 279.
153 See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977) ("Public employees may
constitutionally be discharged for refusing to answer potentially incriminating questions
concerning their official duties if they have not been required to surrender their constitu-
tional immunity."); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 80-82 (1973) (noting that public offi-
cials may be discharged for failing to answer questions regarding official duties).
154 See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 506-07 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("If the consequence is consti-
tutionally permissible, there can surely be no objection if the state cautions the witness that
it may follow if he remains silent.").
155 The deputy attorney general's additional admonition that any statements would be
admissible in a later criminal prosecution ultimately proved to be incorrect, but that warn-
ing could not have induced the interviewees to give a statement. If anything, it would have
dissuaded them from answering questions.
156 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 503.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Garrity told the deputy attorney general who was
to question him that he had arranged for counsel but did not think it was necessary to have
his attorney present for questioning. Id. at 503.
160 Id. at 504.
161 See State v. Naglee, 207 A.2d 689, 695 (N.J. 1965) ("Here there is no physical coer-
cion, no overbearing tactics of psychological persuasion, no lengthy incommunicado deten-
tion, or efforts to humiliate or ridicule the defendants. The overt circumstances show that
the interrogation was conducted with a high degree of civility and restraint."); State v.
Holroyd, 208 A.2d 146, 149 (N.J. 1965) (per curiam) ("Indeed, the circumstances of the
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and pensions was relevant to a determination of voluntariness. But
rather than weigh that fact against others which suggested that the
statements were voluntary, the Garrity majority neglected to consider
countervailing facts, an approach at odds with its established
practice. 162
2. Compelled Statements as the Product
of an Unconstitutional Condition
Perhaps cognizant of deficiencies in its due process explanation,
the Garrity majority also suggested in a single sentence that the choice
that New Jersey presented to the police officers-of making poten-
tially self-incriminating statements or losing their jobs-was an uncon-
stitutional condition.163 Although the majority did not elaborate on
that suggestion, the dissenting Justices contended that "the majority
believe[d] that the possibility that these policemen might have been
discharged had they refused to provide information pertinent to their
public responsibilities [was] an impermissible 'condition' imposed by
New Jersey upon petitioners' privilege against self-incrimination."1' 64
giving of the defendants' statements in the present case are even more persuasive of volun-
tariness than in Naglee. For here the defendants gave their statements ... in the presence
of their lawyer.").
162 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,226 (1973) ("The significant fact about
all of these [coerced confession] decisions is that none of them turned on the presence or
absence of a single controlling criterion; each reflected a careful scrutiny of all the sur-
rounding circumstances.").
163 See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500 ("There are rights of constitutional stature whose exer-
cise a State may not condition by the exaction of a price."). Justice Douglas (the author of
Garrity) and commentators have characterized Garrity as a case that turned on application
of the "unconstitutional conditions doctrine." See Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 397 U.S. 31,
34 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Garrity for proposition that "a government, state
or federal, may not grant a benefit or privilege on conditions requiring the recipient to
relinquish his constitutional rights"); Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
of Papers, 71 Va. L. Rev. 869, 927 n318 (1985) (citing Garrity as case demonstrating that
"[the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions applies to conditions on the exercise of fifth
amendment rights"); Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 Harv. L Rev.
1611, 1746 (1984) (citing Garrity as case in which Court relied on doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions).
164 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Court's apparent reliance on
both the coerced confessions and unconstitutional conditions doctrines prompted the dis-
senters to accuse the majority of "employ[ing] a curious mixture of doctrines to invalidate
these convictions" and "apparently engag[ing] in the delicate task of riding two unruly
horses at once .... " Id.
The late Judge Friendly, a student and critic of the Fifth Amendment privilege and the
Garrity doctrine, see Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for
Constitutional Change, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 671 (1968), recognized that "it is not clear
whether Garrity rests on violation of the privilege or on the basis that the statements 'were
involuntary as a matter of fact', or on both." United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 867
(2d Cir. 1975) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Garrity, 385 U.S. at 501). Friendly con-
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In hindsight, the majority's decision not to embrace the doctrine more
openly was sensible, as it is neither sufficient nor necessary to explain
the outcome in Garrity.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits governments
from conditioning government-sponsored benefits on recipients' will-
ingness to engage in or abstain from activity that the Constitution
shields from direct government interference.1 65 Because the Fifth
Amendment privilege prevents governments from compelling incrimi-
nating statements directly, the doctrine casts doubt on New Jersey's
attempt to accomplish the same result by threatening to terminate a
benefit-state-sponsored employment. Arguably, the remedy for citi-
zens like Garrity, who succumb to the condition, is to deny to the state
what the Constitution prevents it from obtaining directly-here, the
ability to use the statement in a criminal prosecution.
By prohibiting governments from firing employees for exercising
their constitutional rights, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine re-
futes Holmes's oft-quoted observation that "the petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
cluded that the Court opted for the Fifth Amendment interpretation of Garrity in Lefko-
witz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973). See Solomon, 509 F.2d at 867 n.6.
165 See generally Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Thcory of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1185, 1193-94 (1990) ("In its classical for-
mulation, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits conditions on allocations in
which the government indirectly impinges on a protected activity or choice in a way that
would be unconstitutional if the same result had been achieved through a direct govern-
mental command."); Sullivan, supra note 141, at 1421-22 ("Unconstitutional conditions
problems arise when government offers a benefit on condition that the recipient perform
or forego an activity that a preferred constitutional right normally protects from govern-
ment interference."). For a summary of the literature on the doctrine, see William J.
Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 Stan. L.
Rev. 553, 567 n.52 (1992).
Courts often apply the doctrine to conditions imposed on the exercise of constitutional
rights other than the Fifth Amendment privilege. See, e.g., O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City
of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 714-15 (1996) (termination of government contract in retalia-
tion for refusing to respond to requests for political support); Bd. of County Comm'rs v.
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1996) (termination of government contract in response to
exercise of First Amendment rights); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377, 391 (1994)
(grant of building permit conditioned on relinquishment of property rights); cf. id. at 407
n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[M]odern decisions invoking the doctrine have most frc-
quently involved First Amendment liberties." (citations omitted)).
Arguably, the Court employed the doctrine to invalidate conditions imposed on the
Fifth Amendment privilege in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). When determin-
ing that a law permitting prosecutorial comment on a defendant's failure to testify at trial
was unconstitutional, the Griffin Court condemned such comment as "a penalty imposed
by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making
its assertion costly." Id. at 614. But see infra note 183 (describing view that Griffin is best
explained as application of Fifth Amendment privilege).
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to be a policeman.' 66 Given this, it is remarkable that the Garrity
Court did not more explicitly embrace the doctrine in response to the
similar contention that Justice Harlan made in dissent: that Garrity
and the others "had a constitutional right to refuse to answer... [but]
they had no constitutional right to remain police officers." 167 Justice
Harlan's point has some appeal. Noting that the state constitutionally
could fire a police officer who refused to answer questions related to
the performance of his duties,168 a proposition that the Court later
would embrace, 169 Harlan reasoned that "[i]f the consequence is con-
stitutionally permissible, there can surely be no objection if the State
cautions the witness that it may follow if he remains silent."170
However, Justice Harlan's position does not answer the critical
question in Garrity: whether, having obtained a condition-induced
statement, the government may introduce it in a criminal proceeding.
For, although the Court now permits the termination of a police of-
ficer or other public employee who refuses to answer job-related
questions, it does not allow the government to demand a waiver of
immunity under pain of job loss as well.171 In other words, the Court
permits the government to put an employee to the choice of either
giving a statement that will not be admissible in a criminal proceeding
or losing his job. It does not, however, permit the government to use
the threat of job termination to obtain both a statement and the em-
166 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). As Professor
David Cole has noted, because of the Court's application of the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions, "[t]oday, police officers and other public officials have the right to talk
politics and retain their jobs ...." David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions:
Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L Rev. 675,676
(1992) (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987)); see also Perry v. Sinderman, 403
U.S. 593, 598 (1972) (stating that nonrenewal of public school teacher's contract due to his
exercise of First Amendment rights would be impermissible). But see Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138,154 (1983) (holding that public employee could be fired for challenging inter-
nal office policies since this did not offend employee's First Amendment right to speech
"upon issues of public concern").
167 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 509, n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92, 106 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., concurring and dissenting)
(quoting Christal v. Police Comm'n of S.F., 92 P.2d 416,419 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939))). Not
surprisingly, the Christal Court cited Justice Holmes's opinion in McAuliffe, see supra note
166 and accompanying text, as authority. Christal, 92 P.2d at 419.
168 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 507-09 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
169 See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
170 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 506-07.
171 See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977) (permitting discharge
of public employees for refusal to answer questions only if they have not been required to
waive immunity); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S.
280, 284-85 (1968) (reversing dismissal of public employees who were required to testify
and to waive immunity); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968) (invalidating provision
of New York City Charter permitting termination of employment because of employee's
refusal to waive immunity).
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ployee's waiver of immunity, allowing later use of the statement
against the employee in a criminal prosecution. 172 In Garrity, the dep-
uty attorney general told the interviewees that their statements would
be admissible in criminal prosecutions.173 They had no reason to dis-
believe that assertion. As a result, he presented them with the
equivalent of the government-induced choice that the Court has since
condemned: giving a statement without immunity or being fired.174
In short, suppression of the statements in Garrity was necessary to
prevent the state from carrying out what the Court later determined
to be an unconstitutional threat.
But this does not explain why it was unconstitutional to confront
the Garrity defendants with these options. Given the importance of
the government interest in the administrative and criminal investiga-
tion and prosecution of police criminality, it is not immediately obvi-
ous that the Constitution should preclude the government from
compelling a police officer's statement and later using it in a criminal
proceeding. 75 At times, the Court does not bar the government from
conditioning benefits on recipients' willingness to forego constitu-
172 The Court has not decided whether an express immunity waiver, if obtained, would
be valid. See, e.g., Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278-79 (refusing to decide whether Garrity would
"nullify" waiver made under threat of job loss).
173 See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494.
174 When the Court first decided Garrity and the companion case of Spevack v. Klein,
385 U.S. 511 (1967), it appeared that it may have been prohibiting both sanctions for refus-
als to answer questions and the use of statements in criminal cases. In Spevack, a plurality
of the Court prohibited imposition of sanctions-disbarment-following an attorney's as-
sertion of the privilege in response to a subpoena duces tecum. Id. Because Garrity would
have prevented use of any self-incriminating statements compelled by a threat of disbar-
ment, Justice White criticized the apparently contradictory double prohibition. Id. at 531
(White, J., dissenting).
Later, however, the Court made clear that states can impose economic sanctions for
refusals to answer so long as the interviewees retain their right to exclude their answers in
criminal proceedings. It explained its refusal to enforce economic sanctions in cases like
Spevack by noting that before the Garrity decision, it was uncertain whether compelled
statements would be admissible. See Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 283-84. Without assur-
ance of exclusion, the subject of the compulsion could assert the privilege and escape sanc-
tion. Justice Harlan, who had dissented in both Garrity and Spevack, found some
consolation in the conclusion that economic sanctions were still available so long as there
was no required waiver of immunity. He concurred in Gardner and Sanitation Men, which
permitted that outcome,
with a good deal less reluctance than would otherwise have been the case be-
cause ... I find in these opinions a procedural formula whereby, for example,
public officials may now be discharged... for refusing to divulge to appropri-
ate authority information pertinent to the faithful performance of their offices.
I add only that this is a welcome breakthrough in what Spevack and Garrity
might otherwise have been thought to portend.
Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 285 (Harlan, J., concurring).
175 For a discussion of criticism of the Garrity rule, see infra notes 235-39 and accompa-
nying text.
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tional protections. 176 Indeed, as students of the unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine have noted, it is difficult to predict how cases will
come out when the Court applies it.177 In short, reliance on the doc-
trine alone is insufficient to explain the outcome in Garrity.
In addition, resort to the doctrine may be unnecessary. Cass
Sunstein has argued that "[w]hether a condition is permissible is a
function of the particular constitutional provision at issue" and cannot
be answered by "anything so general as an unconstitutional conditions
doctrine."178 He recommends discarding the doctrine in favor of a
more detailed assessment of the specific constitutional right to deter-
mine whether the government's exercise of economic or regulatory
authority violates the right. 79 Whatever the merit of Sunstein's posi-
tion generally, the doctrine seems particularly redundant when the
Fifth Amendment privilege is at issue, as the following discussion
illustrates.8 0
176 See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 324 (1971) (holding that government can
condition receipt of public assistance on permission to allow caseworker to enter home,
even though warrantless entry by state actor without consent would otherwise violate
Fourth Amendment).
177 See Baker, supra note 165, at 1187 ("The unconstitutional conditions doctrine itself
remains murky. The Court has provided no coherent explication of when and how it will
apply the doctrine in [the public assistance benefits area), and commentators' attempts to
make sense of these cases have produced only expressions of despair and normative pro-
posals."); Sullivan, supra note 141, at 1415-16 ("[R]ecent Supreme Court decisions on chal-
lenges to unconstitutional conditions seem a minefield to be traversed gingerly. Just when
the doctrine appears secure, new decisions arise to explode it.... As applied ... the
doctrine ... is riven with inconsistencies."); see also Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,407 n.12
(1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Although it has had a long history, the 'unconstitutional
conditions' doctrine has for just as long suffered from notoriously inconsistent applica-
tion .... " (internal citation omitted)).
178 Cass R. Sunstein, Is There an Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 San Diego
L. Rev. 337, 338 (1989); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine Is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abor-
tion), 70 B.U. L. Rev. 593, 595 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Anachronism] (arguing that
"[i]nstead of a general unconstitutional conditions doctrine... what is necessary is... an
approach that asks whether, under the provision at issue, the government has constitution-
ally sufficient justifications for affecting constitutionally protected interests"). Justice
Stevens, in an opinion that Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg joined, endorsed a similar
view. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 407 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (-[The 'unconstitutional
conditions' doctrine... has never been an overarching principle of constitutional law that
operates with equal force regardless of the nature of the rights and powers in question.").
179 Sunstein, Anachronism, supra note 178, at 595 (arguing that doctrine should be
"abandoned" in favor of "constitutionally-centered model of reasons").
is0 For similar reasons, viewing Garrity as a case in which the state impermissibly forced
the police officers to waive the privilege against self-incrimination, rendering the waiver
invalid, is unsatisfactory. Rather, "the proper inquiry .. concerns the scope of the right
itself." George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis,
55 Tex. L Rev. 193, 249 (1977); see also id. at 246-47 (arguing that reliance on waiver
approach to explain outcome in Garrity is "grossly simplistic" and "devoid of reasoned
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One way of explaining the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is
to focus on the coercion that the government-induced condition brings
to bear on the rightholder.181 Arguably, at some point, the level of
coercion renders the condition unconstitutional. But the Fifth
Amendment privilege itself is triggered by "compulsion" exerted by
the government to induce self-incrimination. 182 Because both inquir-
ies focus on compulsion, it seems unnecessary, and unduly confusing,
to resort to the doctrine and ask whether a government-induced
choice is sufficiently coercive to constitute an unconstitutional condi-
tion on the exercise of the privilege. A more direct approach is to
determine simply whether the government has compelled self-
incrimination. 183
B. Compelled Statements as Immunized Testimony
Resort to the Fifth Amendment privilege and the related immu-
nity analogy avoids the shortcomings of efforts to explain Garrity by
use of the coerced confessions and unconstitutional conditions doc-
trines. First, the immunity analogy better explains what occurred in
Garrity, as well as what typically happens when investigators take
compelled statements from police officers. The deputy attorney gen-
eral questioned Garrity and the others as part of a noncriminal judi-
cial inquiry, not an effort to further their prosecution,18 4 just as
analysis that permits the drawing of careful lines between permissible and impermissible
burdens").
181 See Sullivan, supra note 141, at 1428 ("Directly and through metaphors of duress or
penalty, the Court has repeatedly suggested that the problem with unconstitutional condi-
tions is their coercive effect.").
182 See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977) (stating that compul-
sion is "touchstone" of Fifth Amendment privilege); Amar & Lettow, supra note 38, at 865
("The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit all self-incrimination but only compelled self-
incrimination.").
183 Professor Albert Alschuler has made a similar contention about Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609 (1965), in which the Supreme Court determined that prosecutorial comment
on a defendant's silence at trial is unconstitutional. Alschuler, supra note 141, at 2628 n.11
(contending that resort to unconstitutional conditions doctrine was unnecessary as "the
Fifth Amendment [privilege], pure and simple" explains the outcome in Griffin); see also
Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 285-86 (1998) (finding it unnecessary
to address lower court's unconstitutional conditions analysis because challenged state
clemency procedures "do not under any view violate the Fifth Amendment privilege").
184 The deputy attorney general questioned Garrity and the others pursuant to orders
from the Supreme Court of New Jersey directing the Attorney General or a deputy attor-
ney general to conduct an investigation into "alleged irregularities in the handling of cases
in the Municipal Court" in the boroughs of Bellmawr and Barrington. Brief for Appellants
app. B at 3a-4a, 6a-7a, Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (No. 66-13). Initially, the
Attorney General or deputy attorney general was to investigate the irregularities and pre-
sent the evidence in an in camera hearing before a Master who was to prepare a report for
the Supreme Court. Id. at 4a, 7a. The court later amended its orders to allow the Attorney
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prosecutors seek immunity orders in the hope of using the resulting
testimony for purposes other than prosecution of the immunized wit-
ness.185 Similarly, as a general matter, when internal affairs investiga-
tors compel statements from police officers, they do so to further
noncriminal disciplinary investigations, not to gather evidence for
prosecutions. 186
Second, reliance on the immunity analogy avoids the above-de-
scribed problems with the due process approach. Perfectly lawful
pressure, such as the threat of judicial contempt sanctions, can trigger
the protections of the privilege. Thus, although the lawfulness of fir-
ing a police officer who refuses to answer questions undercuts a due
process claim for want of official misconduct,187 it is consistent with
treatment of the officer's answers as immunized. 188
Third, application of the privilege is typically determined based
solely on the nature of the threatened sanction, without assessment of
the surrounding circumstances. 189 As a result, evidence that the state-
General or a deputy to file a report with the court without a hearing. Id. at 5a, 8a. when
questioned at the hearing on the motion to suppress the statements, a deputy attorney
general assigned to the investigation testified that he had no power to arrest the suspects
and was not assigned to prosecute the case, but once he "was fairly certain offenses were in
fact committed... [he] knew that the Prosecutor's office would ultimately have it." Tran-
script of Testimony Vol. 1, at 39-40, Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (No. 66-13).
185 Because the immunity grant bars use and derivative use of the immunized testimony,
it would be senseless for a prosecutor to immunize in order to develop a case against that
witness. Indeed, the immunity grant would impose potential obstacles to prosecution. See
supra Part I.B.2. Not surprisingly, the Department of Justice requires that a federal prose-
cutor seeking to prosecute a previously immunized person for "offenses first disclosed in,
or closely related to," immunized testimony first receive written approval from the Attor-
ney General U.S. Attorney's Manual § 9-23.400. A request for approval to bring such a
prosecution must establish that the evidence to be used in the prosecution meets the re-
quirements of Kastigar. Id.
186 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing internal police investigation
procedures).
187 See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
188 Similarly, the privilege against self-incrimination is not driven by fear of unreliable
statements. See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406,415 (1966) ("[Tlhe basic
purposes that lie behind the privilege against self-incrimination do not relate to protecting
the innocent from conviction...."). But see Amar & Lettow, supra note 38, at 859, 898-
901, 924-25 (contending that, properly construed, Fifth Amendment privilege should em-
body this concern). Thus, the fact that there is little danger of a police officer falsely in-
criminating himself when compelled to answer an investigator's questions does not
undermine application of the privilege as a rationale for suppression.
189 See Donald Dripps, Is the Miranda Caselaw Really Inconsistent? A Proposed Fifth
Amendment Synthesis, 17 Const. Comment. 19, 25 (2000) ("Fifth Amendment law gener-
ally, however, defines compulsion according to general categories rather than on a case-by-
case, totality-of-the-circumstances approach."). For example, the threat of a contempt
sanction for failure to comply with a subpoena is sufficient compulsion to trigger the privi-
lege without consideration of the penalty to be imposed for the contempt. See Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. ChLi. L Rev. 435,443 (1987) (noting that threat
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ments in Garrity were voluntary-such as the suspects' control over
the location of interrogation and representation by counsel-play no
role in the Fifth Amendment calculus. 90
Finally, by focusing on the Fifth Amendment privilege itself, ask-
ing whether the government has compelled statements that would in-
criminate the speaker, the immunity analogy is more persuasive and
straightforward than the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 191
If the Fifth Amendment privilege better explains the outcome in
Garrity than due process or the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
why didn't the Garrity Court rely on it? Before deciding Garrity, the
Court had determined that the privilege was applicable to the
states,192 required suppression of statements resulting from "compul-
sion,"193 and could be triggered by compulsion imposed outside of for-
mal legal or administrative proceedings.194 It would have been
consistent with these developments to conclude that the deputy attor-
ney general's threat of job termination was sufficient compulsion to
trigger the privilege and render the resulting statements immunized.
The Court may have avoided relying on the Fifth Amendment
because it was unwilling to confer on the police officers the protection
that the privilege, as then construed, seemed to require. When the
Court decided Garrity, the prevailing rule of Counselman v.
Hitchcock195 required a grant of transactional immunity to supplant
the privilege.' 96 It was one thing to tell states, as the Court did, that
they could not both compel police officers' statements and introduce
them at trial. It would have been quite another to permit states to
conduct administrative questioning only if they were willing to forego
the possibility of subsequent prosecutions altogether. Significantly, a
majority of the Court first characterized the statements in Garrity as
"immunized"'197 the term after it decided Kastigar v. United States,198
of $100 fine is sufficient to trigger Fifth Amendment privilege even if such penalty would
not render statement involuntary under due process approach).
190 "Our decisions make clear that the threat alone is sufficient to render all subsequent
testimony 'compelled."' Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 445-46 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
191 See supra notes 176-83 and accompanying text (arguing that unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine is neither sufficient nor necessary to explain Garrity).
192 MaIloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
193 See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 57 n.6 (1964) ("[The Government
may not permit the use in a criminal trial of self-incriminating statements elicited by
compulsion.").
194 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 457 (1966) (holding that Fifth Amend-
ment privilege applies to police interrogation inside station house).
195 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
196 See supra note 38 (describing Counselman rule).
197 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82 (1973).
198 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
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which overruled Counselman and embraced use and derivative use
immunity as a constitutionally adequate replacement for the
privilege.1 99
C. Suppression of Immunized Testimony and Coerced Confessions
The Court never has acknowledged that it supplanted the coerced
confession approach with the immunized testimony analogy as the
means of explaining the suppression of compelled statements. Nor
has it recognized that the shift has significant consequences for judi-
cial treatment of compelled statements. Indeed, in Kastigar, the
Court assumed that immunized testimony and coerced confessions re-
ceive the same amount of protection200 There is some merit to that
assumption. Courts bar use of both coerced confessions and immu-
nized testimony in the government's case-in-chief, prevent use of both
to impeach defendants, and exclude evidence that police discover by
exploiting both.20l But while many lower courts interpret Kastigar to
prohibit nonevidentiary and indirect evidentiary use of immunized
testimony as well,20 no court has imposed similar restrictions on use
of coerced confessions.20 3
199 Id. at 453.
200 Id. at 461-62; see also Humble, supra note 50, at 363 & n.72 (noting that Kastigar
Court likened immunized testimony to coerced confession and excluded both as compelled
incrimination).
Congress made the same assumption when it enacted the use immunity statute. See
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248,276-78 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (reviewing statutory history and intent of use immunity statute). The assumption
has been the subject of considerable criticism. See, e.g., Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 470-71
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that this assumption "turns reason on its head");
Strachan, supra note 50, at 823-32 (contrasting policies behind use immunity and immunity
from coerced confessions and arguing for different treatment of them); Murphy, supra note
53, at 1032 n.180 (citing authorities).
201 On the rules regarding coerced confessions, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,402
(1978) (holding coerced confession not admissible in case-in-chief or to impeach). Al-
though the Supreme Court has never held that evidence derived from a coerced confession
should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree," it likely would do so. See, e.g.,
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 470 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing need to suppress "the fruits
of the illegal search or interrogation"); Kamisar, supra note 148, at 990-1004 (contending
that "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine applies to evidence derived from coerced con-
fessions). But see Amar & Lettow, supra note 38, at 880-89 (arguing that evidence derived
from coerced confessions is admissible).
On the rules regarding immunized testimony, see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying
text.
202 See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text (discussing courts' prohibition of pros-
ecution's nonevidentiary use of immunized testimony).
203 See United States v. Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[N]o case involving a
coerced confession has prohibited the nonevidentiary use of an involuntary statement.");
Johnson v. United States, 609 A.2d 1112,1118 n.7 (D.C. 1992) (refusing to apply North rule
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The Kastigar Court's assumption of equivalent protection makes
clear that it did not anticipate that lower courts would afford greater
protection to immunized testimony than to coerced confessions. But
although the Court did not address it, there is some justification for
the differential treatment. Significantly, both the Supreme Court and
lower courts use dissimilar rationales to justify suppression of immu-
nized testimony and coerced confessions. The differences between
the rationales can explain why immunized testimony receives more
robust protection.2°4
Courts prohibit use of immunized testimony because the privilege
against self-incrimination, which itself is an exclusionary rule, ex-
pressly requires that result.20 5 Consequently, judicial interpretation of
the scope of the privilege dictates the reach of the exclusionary rule,
such as whether it precludes nonevidentiary or indirect evidentiary
uses.20 6 Because Kastigar interpreted the privilege generously in the
context of formally immunized testimony, the resulting exclusionary
rule is a robust one. The language in Kastigar describing the scope of
the privilege to require that the immunized witness be left "in substan-
tially the same position as if [he] had claimed the Fifth Amendment
privilege"20 7 is the basis for the stringent restrictions on noneviden-
tiary and indirect evidentiary uses.208
to coerced confession); Humble, supra note 50, at 375 n.154 ("Outside of the immunity
context, no court has prohibited nonevidentiary uses of an involuntary statement.").
20 For a discussion of the development of the divergent approaches to immunized testi-
mony and coerced confessions, see Bloch, supra note 51, at 1608-48.
205 The privilege is an exclusionary rule, one that is violated when compelled testimony
is used at trial. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 686 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("All the Fifth Amendment [privilege] forbids is the introduction of coerced
statements at trial."); United States v. Hampton, 775 F.2d 1479, 1486 n.35 (11th Cir. 1985)
(noting that Fifth Amendment privilege is "an exclusionary rule of a very broad scope");
United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511,516 (2d Cir. 1976) ("The Fifth Amendment... is by
its terms an exclusionary rule .... "); Alan M. Dershowitz & John H. Ely, Harris v. New
York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Ma-
jority, 80 Yale L.J. 1198, 1214 (1971) ("[The Fifth Amendment] is an exclusionary rule-
and a constitutionally created one."); Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the
Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitution-
ally Used Evidence, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 907, 926 (1989) ("[T]he [F]ifth [A]mendment does
not contain an exclusionary rule; it is itself an exclusionary rule.").
206 See Amar & Lettow, supra note 38, at 910-11 (recognizing that question of "what the
scope of immunity should be" is same as question of how Fifth Amendment privilege
should be interpreted).
-707 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462.
208 In fact, debate over the scope of the privilege can turn on interpretation of the lan-
guage that Kastigar used to describe the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Humble, supra note
50, at 362-63 (focusing on Kastigar Court's use of term "evidence" when describing exclu-
sionary rule and contending that rule does not require prohibition on nonevidentiary uses);
Strachan, supra note 50, at 806-07 (focusing on Kastigar Court's comment that immunity
bars use of compelled testimony "'in any respect"' and reference to "'a sweeping proscrip-
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In contrast, courts exclude confessions in order to deter police
from using improper coercion when questioning suspects.20 9 Al-
though this deterrence rationale supports suppression of both coerced
confessions and evidence that police and prosecutors derive by ex-
ploiting them as "fruit of the poisonous tree, '210 deterrence-based ex-
clusionary sanctions are limited. When applying the analogous Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule, the Court has reasoned that if there is
only a tenuous causal connection between illegal police conduct and
derivative evidence, suppression of such "attenuated" evidence serves
little deterrent function and thus is unnecessary.211 When derivative
evidence involves an individual exercise of free will, such as witness
testimony or a defendant's statement to police, rather than physical
evidence, the Court is more prone to find attenuation.212 Because the
Court's treatment of coerced confessions appears to resemble its ap-
tion of any use"' to argue that nonevidentiary use is prohibited (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S.
at 453, 460)).
209 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) ("The purpose of excluding evi-
dence seized in violation of the Constitution [such as a coerced confession] is to substan-
tially deter future violations of the Constitution."). The focus on police misconduct as the
rationale for the suppression of coerced confessions is a recent development. See, e.g.,
Kamisar, supra note 148, at 936-41 (describing how in recent decades courts have "down-
played the unreliability of a coerced or 'involuntary' confession" and instead focused on
"condemnation and deterrence of offensive police interrogation methods" as "a principal
reason for barring the resulting confessions" (emphasis omitted)).
Because it is legal to grant immunity to a witness, the deterrence rationale plays no
role in suppression of immunized testimony. See Bloch, supra note 51, at 1641-42 (noting
that "a formal grant of immunity exemplifies the legally authorized means of compelling
testimony" and that deterrence rationale should therefore not apply "since there is no
constitutional violation from which the government should be deterred").
210 See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984) ("The core rationale consist-
ently advanced by this Court for extending the exclusionary rule to evidence that is the
fruit of unlawful police conduct has been that this admittedly drastic and socially costly
course is needed to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory protec-
tions."); see also supra note 201 and accompanying text (addressing question whether
"fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis applies to coerced confessions).
211 See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268,280 (1978) (rejecting application of
exclusionary rule to attenuated evidence where it "could not have the slightest deterrent
effect on the behavior of an officer"); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)
("As a matter of good sense, however, such connection [between unconstitutional govern-
ment conduct and acquisition of evidence] may have become so attenuated as to dissipate
the taint."); 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment
§ 11.4(a), at 235-36 (1996) (summarizing development of attenuation jurisprudence);
Bloch, supra note 51, at 1638 ("At some point, the chain linking the illegality to the suspect
evidence is so convoluted and strained, suppression is unlikely to deter the police
misconduct.").
212 See Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276-77 (finding that degree of exercise of free .ill by
witness is relevant factor); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106-10 (1980) (find-
ing that "petitioner's statements were acts of free will unaffected by any illegality in the
initial detention" where statements were aplarently made spontaneously in response to
police discovery of drugs in petitioner's companion's possession).
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proach to Fourth Amendment violations,2 13 this aspect of attenuation
doctrine likely applies to evidence derived from coerced
confessions. 214
Thus, although courts interpret the privilege to require exclusion
of all evidence derived from immunized testimony, no matter how at-
tenuated,215 when applying the deterrence-based "fruit of the poison-
ous tree" doctrine, they permit the introduction of derivative evidence
if it is sufficiently removed from the underlying illegality.216 Similarly,
courts do not consider whether the prosecution has made noneviden-
tiary use of a coerced confession or whether witness testimony has
been shaped or altered by it.217 Indeed, it is routine for police officers,
investigators, and prosecutors to elicit, listen to, or read suspects' con-
fessions. Even if a court later suppresses a confession as involuntary,
the prosecutor apparently remains free to make nonevidentiary use of
it and present witness testimony that may have been shaped by it.
213 Like Fourth Amendment cases, the Court now deems police misconduct a prerequi-
site for suppression of a coerced confession, see supra note 209 and accompanying text,
and views "[ihe purpose of excluding evidence" as an attempt "to substantially deter fu-
ture violations of the Constitution." Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166. Indeed, in Connelly, the
Court cited Fourth Amendment cases when discussing the rationale for suppressing co-
erced confessions. See id. Yale Kamisar also has likened the Court's treatment of coerced
confessions to the suppression of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
See Kamisar, supra note 148, at 940 (arguing that "due process exclusionary rule for con-
fessions (in much the same way as the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule for physical
evidence) is... intended to deter improper police conduct" (quoting 1 Wayne R. LaFave
& Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.2, at 443 (1984))).
214 See, e.g., Mapys v. United States, 409 F.2d 964, 966 (10th Cir. 1969) (concluding that
attenuation doctrine could apply to statements given after illegal confession); United
States v. Matthews, 488 F. Supp. 374, 379-80 n.2 (D. Neb. 1980) (suggesting that statement
that is fruit of illegal confession may be admissible if "any causal connection had become
so attenuated that the taint was dissipated").
215 In United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1976), the court rejected the appli-
cation of the attenuation doctrine to evidence derived from immunized testimony because:
The Fifth Amendment... is by its terms an exclusionary rule, and as imple-
mented in the immunity statute it is a very broad one, prohibiting the use not
only of evidence, but of "information," "directly or indirectly derived" from
the immunized testimony. The statute requires not merely that the evidence
be excluded when such exclusion would deter wrongful police or prosecution
conduct, but that the witness be left "in substantially the same position as if
[he] had claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege."
Kurzer, 534 F.2d at 516; see also North 11, 920 F.2d at 946 n.7 ("The fruit of the poisonous
tree metaphor is actually backwards as applied to a Kastigar problem. The 'tree'-the
immunized testimony-is not poisonous; it is perfectly legal and only turns poisonous when
used against the defendant."); Bloch, supra note 51, at 1639-41 (rejecting as "improbable"
interpretation of dicta in Nix, 467 U.S. 431, to apply attenuation doctrine to immunized
testimony).
216 See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text (noting that exclusionary rule is inap-
plicable to attenuated evidence).
217 See supra note 203.
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Such derivative uses, which involve investigators, prosecutors, and
witnesses exercising free will, apparently are too attenuated to war-
rant suppression as fruit of the coerced confession.218
D. The Need for Reform
Although the above-described steps in the development of the
Garrity rule-the shift to the immunity analogy and the increased pro-
tection that immunized testimony receives-are consistent with Fifth
218 Although these differences between treatment of immunized testimony and coerced
confessions are firmly entrenched in governing doctrine, there is reason to question them.
The Supreme Court has determined that, like due process, the privilege prohibits the use of
involuntary confessions. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000) ("Over
time, our cases recognized two constitutional bases for the requirement that a confession
be voluntary to be admitted into evidence: the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimi-
nation and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 6-11 (1964) (determining that Fifth Amendment privilege governs admissibility
of confessions in state criminal proceedings); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43
(1897) (holding that privilege governs admissibility of confessions in federal court);
Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compul-
sory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part I), 53 Ohio St. LJ. 497,
529-50 (1992) (arguing that Fifth Amendment privilege prohibits use of involuntary confes-
sions). If so, coerced confessions merit no less legal protection than immunized testimony.
See Bloch, supra note 51, at 1619 ("If both [immunized testimony and coerced confessions]
receive their primary protection from the Self-Incrimination Clause, what justification pro-
vides for the disparate treatment of the two types of compelled utterances?"). But in
Connelly, without explicit consideration of these issues, the Court maintained that, despite
the availability of the privilege, it "has retained [a] due process focus" to address coerced
confessions. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163; see also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985)
("[E]ven after holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimi-
nation applies in the context of custodial interrogations, and is binding on the States, the
Court has continued to measure confessions against the requirements of due process." (in-
ternal citations omitted)). Although the import of those passages from Connelly and
Miller is not clear, they can be read to mandate that due process (which apparently permits
use of evidence derived from coerced confessions if sufficiently attenuated), not the privi-
lege (which does not exempt attenuated evidence), dictates the admissibility of allegedly
coerced confessions and their fruits, at least outside the special privilege-based rules set
forth in Miranda and its progeny. See Herman, supra, at 521-28 (discussing Connelly's
implication that due process may determine admissibility of coerced confessions). Indeed,
when assessing the admissibility of confessions, lower courts routinely rely on due process,
not the privilege. See, e.g., United States v. McCurdy, 40 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir. 1994)
(holding that admissibility of statement taken in compliance with Miranda should be deter-
mined by application of due process voluntariness test); Weaver v. Brenner, 40 F.3d 527,
536 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[T]he Supreme Court continues to analyze coercive interrogation
techniques under the Due Process Clause."); United States v. Swint, 15 F.3d 286, 289 (3d
Cir. 1994) (discussing application of due process test); People v. Sexton, 601 N.W.2d 399,
405 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (applying due process test), rev'd on other grounds, 609 N.W.2d
822 (Mich. 2000); State v. Bittick, 806 S.WV.2d 652,658 (Mo. 1991) (same); Passama v. State,
735 P.2d 321, 323 (Nev. 1987) ("The [C]ourt has retained this due process focus even after
developing extensive law on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
applying it to the states."). But see United States v. Braxton, 112 F.3d 777, 780 (4th Cir.
1997) (citing to both privilege and Due Process Clause as bases for suppressing coerced
confessions).
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Amendment doctrine, the result-rigid restrictions on prosecutorial
use of police officers' compelled statements-is neither fair nor sensi-
ble. Garrity immunity saddles prosecutors with the obligation to
disprove any use of compelled statements, often including noneviden-
tiary and indirect evidentiary use.219 Even when police internal affairs
investigators act in good faith, Garrity immunity can create difficult,
sometimes insurmountable, impediments to investigations and prose-
cutions of police criminality.2 20 It also provides opportunities for sab-
otage by unscrupulous police investigators and witnesses.221 Unable
to prevent the taking and dissemination of compelled statements,
prosecutors are powerless to do more than attempt to minimize the
adverse consequences of Garrity immunity and prepare to satisfy their
burden at a Kastigar hearing. These responses, which are only par-
tially effective, require the expenditure of considerable resources to
identify and isolate tainted witnesses and evidence. 222
Police prosecutions face unique and formidable challenges: the
"code of silence,"223 citizens' reluctance to make complaints against
police,224 prosecutors' aversion to bringing charges against members
of police departments with which theyr must maintain working rela-
tionships,225 the prevalence of one-on-one "swearing contests" be-
tween single complainants and police officers,2 2 6 the questionable
credibility of many complainants and witnesses, the difficulty in deter-
219 The use restrictions unique to immunized testimony and, by analogy, to police of-
ficers' compelled statements-the prohibitions on nonevidentiary and indirect evidentiary
uses-are the most problematic. The proscription on nonevidentiary use requires that an
exposed prosecutor refrain from decisionmaking influenced by compelled statements. Be-
cause strategic and tactical decisions are likely the result of all information available to a
prosecutor, it may be difficult or impossible for a prosecutor to determine whether, and to
what extent, her exposure to a compelled statement tainted that process. This is particu-
larly true when the exposure occurs early in the investigation. The ban on indirect eviden-
tiary use makes avoidance of exposure and taint contingent on witnesses whose conduct
and thought processes are beyond the prosecution's control.
220 See supra notes 68-94 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
222 See supra Part I.D.
223 See supra note 98.
224 Cf. Christopher Comm'n Report, supra note 72, at 158 (describing ways in which
LAPD discourages citizen complaints).
5 See, e.g., Kolts Comm'n Report, supra note 72, at 110-11 (describing "apparent disin-
clination on the part of the [Los Angeles County] D.A.'s Office to prosecute excessive
force cases"); Cheh, supra note 8, at 252 ("[An] explanation for the low number of criminal
prosecutions is the reluctance of local and even state authorities to proceed against local
officers."); Scott Glover & Matt Lait, LAPD Misconduct Cases Rarely Resulted in
Charges, L.A. Times, Oct. 22, 2000, at Al (reporting that Los Angeles County district
attorneys prosecute small fraction of potential criminal cases against police officers).
226 See Cheh, supra note 8, at 253 ("In many cases the only witnesses will be the victim
and the police, and medical data may be inconclusive."); Kerstetter, supra note 98, at 234
(noting prevalence of cases with no corroborating testimony or witnesses).
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mining when police use of force becomes criminalP 7 and the fact that
jurors and judges are often sympathetic to police defendants.= s Ad-
ding Garrity immunity makes a difficult situation worse and may
cause prosecutors either to forego or lose othenvise meritorious cases
against police officers who commit crimes.229 Because it enables po-
lice investigators to grant the functional equivalent of formal immu-
nity to other officers, the Garrity doctrine is difficult to square with
judicial efforts to limit the availability of immunity in other contexts.
Most notably, absent a request from the prosecution, courts stead-
fastly have refused to grant immunity for witnesses who, if immu-
nized, would provide exculpatory testimony for criminal
defendants?3 o
The contrast between the protection that courts provide for co-
erced confessions and compelled statements also is troubling.P1 In
the former situation, police bent on solving a crime use illegal physical
or psychological pressure to coerce a possibly unreliable confession
from an uncounseled in-custody suspect in the secrecy of an interroga-
tion room. In the latter, internal affairs investigators conduct a civil,
administrative interview of a suspect police officer, affording him a
host of procedural protections, including representation by counsel or
227 See, e.g., Carl B. Klockars, A Theory of Excessive Force and Its Control, in Police
Violence, supra note 8, at 1, 2 ("The enormous range of the legitimate authority of the
police to use force is at the heart of the problem of defining and controlling its excessive
use.").
M8 See id. at 3 (describing public reluctance to punish police officers "with penalties
normally reserved for criminals"); supra note 119 (citing authority describing judicial atti-
tudes in police prosecutions).
229 See supra Part II.C.
230 See, e.g., Amar & Lettow, supra note 38, at 862-64, 863 n.15 (noting that courts have
refused to grant immunity to witnesses who, if immunized, would give self-incriminating
testimony that would exculpate criminal defendants); Peter W. Tague, The Fifth Amend-
ment If an Aid to the Guilty Defendant, an Impediment to the Innocent One, 78 Geo.
LJ. 1, 1 (1989) (noting that privilege can "shackle the innocent defendant from attempting
to prove that another person committed the crime"); see also Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459
U.S. 248,261 (1983) (noting in context of civil deposition that "[nlo court has authority to
immunize a witness. That responsibility... is peculiarly an executive one").
231 See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text (discussing differences). Several
scholars have noted the apparent anomaly that coerced confessions receive less protection
than immunized testimony. See Herman, supra note 218, at 525 n.661 (discussing
"irony... that a counselled [and immunized] witness at a televised legislative hearing into
matters of national significance [i.e., Oliver North] was given more protection than a sus-
pect isolated with an interrogator at the police station"); Strachan, supra note 50, at 823-30
("The so-called 'immunity' inadvertently conferred by an unconstitutional interrogation
cannot properly be compared with statutory immunity."). Courts also have commented on
the differences. See, e.g., United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 515-17 (2d Cir. 1976)
(distinguishing Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, which focuses on deterring unlawful
police conduct, from Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule, which confers broad prohibition
on use of immunized testimony against witness).
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a union official and a tape-recorded interview. 32 Prevailing doctrine
gives prosecutors free rein to use coerced confessions, but not com-
pelled statements, to determine trial strategy and shape witness
testimony.Z33
As one observer has noted, the Garrity "status quo... is contrary
to fundamental tenets of our system of justice" and conflicts with "the
need to hold those who wear the public trust accountable in the same
system of criminal justice that they enforce and to which the rest of us
subscribe. ' '234 Although the desire for more effective criminal prose-
cution of police officers alone cannot justify diminution of their con-
stitutional rights, these problems make clear that the constitutional
and legislative framework supporting Garrity immunity is ripe for
reconsideration.
III
RESPONSES TO GARRITY IMMUNITY PROBLEMS
A. Judicial Responses
1. Rethinking Garrity
One approach to reform is to reassess Garrity. Should official
threats of job loss made to a government employee as a sanction for
silence trigger the privilege against self-incrimination? Building on
the claim that "[n]othing in the historical development of the privilege
suggests that threatened loss of employment was the kind of compul-
sion against which the [Fifth] amendment aimed to protect, '' 235 some
232 See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 3303 (West 1995) (describing procedural rights of police
officers during administrative questioning to include receiving compensation if questioned
while off-duty, questioning by no more than two interrogators, receiving copy of transcript
and recording of interview if one is made, retaining ability to make own recording of the
interview, receiving advance notice of nature of investigation, and retaining representa-
tion); see also Lisa Petrillo, Woman Is Dead; Police-Shootings Debate Lives On, S.D.
Union-Trib., Aug. 10, 1993, at B1, 1993 WL 7503947 (describing ability of police officers
suspected of improper shootings to confer with attorneys before questioning).
233 See supra note 203 and accompanying text (noting that courts do not apply restric-
tions on nonevidentiary and indirect evidentiary uses in cases involving coerced
confessions).
Of course, one response to this disparity in treatment is to increase the protection that
coerced confessions receive. Indeed, some reasons offered for the greater protection for
immunized testimony are unpersuasive. See infra note 258 (responding to policy argu-
ments that immunized testimony merits more protection than coerced confessions). But
see supra Part II.C (describing differences between rationales for suppression of coerced
confessions and immunized testimony). Whatever the merits of that position, a topic be-
yond the scope of this Article, there is no evidence that courts are inclined to prohibit
nonevidentiary and indirect evidentiary uses of coerced confessions.
234 Bloch, supra note 11, at 680.
235 Friendly, supra note 164, at 707.
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scholars have called for Garrity to be overruled.P 6 Noting that Gar-
rity has no application when private employers use similar threats to
investigate employee misconduct,2 7 they conclude that Garrity im-
pairs the government's ability to function like a responsible em-
ployer238 and bestows on government employees rights not shared by
those in the private sector.239 Thus, the critics reason, Garrity sets the
"compulsion" threshold too low: Threats of job termination should
not trigger the privilege, and police officers' resulting answers should
be admissible.24°
The Court should be hesitant to adopt this view. First, it over-
states both the impediments to the government as an employer and
the advantages that government employees enjoy. Garrity and its
progeny leave the government as free as private employers to demand
answers to job-related questions from employees on pain of job termi-
nation.241 Although Garrity may foreclose the government from using
statements that it compels from its employees in a criminal prosecu-
tion, private employers are under no obligation to notify police or
prosecutors about similar statements that they compel from employ-
ees. Without such notice, government employees and private employ-
ees stand in roughly the same position-both can be required to make
statements that either cannot be (in the case of government employ-
ees) or likely will not be (in the case of private employees) used in
criminal prosecutions. 242
236 See, e.g., Amar & Lettow, supra note 38, at 868-69, 905-06 (proposing that gover-
ment should be able to fire employees "without detriment to its law enforcement func-
tion"); Friendly, supra note 164, at 706-08 (arguing that public employees' answers should
be admissible even if compelled by threat of job loss).
237 See Amar & Lettow, supra note 38, at 868-69 (noting that unlike "[a] responsible
private employer [who] may draw sensible inferences from silence and fire [employees]
who refuse[ ] to respond to accusations," government can do so only if it confers immunity
and risks loss of evidence of criminal wrongdoing); Friendly, supra note 164, at 707 (com-
paring Garrity to situation in which private employer makes similar inquiry into
misconduct).
238 See Amar & Lettow, supra note 38, at 905 (noting that government is currently
forced to choose between "act[ing] sensibly as an employer" and "act[ing] efficiently in its
sovereign capacity as a law enforcer").
239 See Friendly, supra note 164, at 707 ("It thus seems morally wrong that if [public
employees] opt for answering questions in order to protect their jobs, their answers should
enjoy greater protection than those of an employee responding to a similar inquiry by a
private employer.").
240 Id. at 708 n.158 ("I propose a return to the pre-Garrity... world, in which the nation
lived quite happily without giving... public officials... a super first-class citizenship.").
241 See supra notes 151-53, 167-70 and accompanying text (discussing ability of govern-
ment to demand answers to job-related questions from public employees and fire them if
they refuse).
242 There are two significant Garrity-generated differences between treatment of pri-
vate- and public-sector employees. First, if the government learns of a private-sector em-
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Second, absent the Garrity doctrine or something like it, the gov-
ernment, which investigates and prosecutes as well as employs, can
impose unique obligations on its employees. Without Garrity, crimi-
nal investigators and prosecutors could use the threat of job loss to
compel statements from government employees suspected of job-re-
lated crimes, not to impose workplace discipline, but for the purpose
of criminal investigation and prosecution.2 43 Police and prosecutors
cannot exercise the same leverage over private-sector employees sus-
pected of crimes. Thus, abolition of Garrity would impose unique re-
strictions on public employees' ability to exercise their Fifth
Amendment rights.
The Court could address this disparity by permitting prosecutors
to introduce only those compelled statements elicited during noncrim-
inal investigations. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to interpret the
privilege against self-incrimination to support such a rule. The gov-
ernment's threat of job loss seems to be equally "compelling" whether
it comes during an administrative or a criminal investigation.2, 14 In-
deed, when compared to the kind of judicial compulsion clearly suffi-
ployee's compelled statement, it can introduce it in a criminal case. Garrity would bar use
of an analogous statement from a government employee. Second, dissemination of a pri-
vate employee's compelled statement does not pose the risk of tainting a prosecution as
does dissemination of a government employee's compelled statement. There are, however,
less drastic means of eliminating or minimizing these differences than abolition of the
Garrity rule. See infra Parts III.A.2 and III.B (suggesting alternatives).
243 Indeed, this happened in Garrity. After the deputy attorney general interviewed
Garrity and the other suspects, an assistant county prosecutor, whose office later brought
and prosecuted the criminal charges, also interviewed them. State v. Naglee, 207 A.2d 689,
692 (N.J. 1965). The state forfeiture statute required Garrity and the others to answer the
prosecutor's questions. At trial, the defendants' statements to both the deputy attorney
general and the district attorney were admitted into evidence. Id. at 692, 696-97.
244 Although the Court has carved out exceptions to the privilege in noncriminal, regu-
latory contexts, those decisions do not support a rule permitting introduction of statements
compelled during administrative investigations of police conduct and excluding statements
compelled during criminal investigations. First, "[t]he Court has on several occasions rec-
ognized that the Fifth Amendment privilege may not be invoked to resist compliance with
a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State's public purposes unrelated to the en-
forcement of its criminal laws." Balt. City Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549,
556 (1990). But in doing so, the Court addressed only the ability of the state to compel
statements, not whether the prosecution can later use the statements in a criminal case.
See id. at 561 (suggesting that person who complies with regulatory requirement by giving
testimonial evidence may be entitled to "limitations on the direct and indirect use of that
testimony").
Second, the Court has refused to apply the privilege altogether-thus permitting both
governmental compulsion to obtain statements and later use in a prosecution-when the
information is necessary for the operation of a noncriminal regulatory scheme, and there is
little chance that the required disclosures, taken as a whole, will result in criminal prosecu-
tion. See, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that state statute requiring
automobile driver involved in accident to stop and self-identify did not trigger privilege).
Because there is a fair possibility that police officers' statements regarding alleged miscon-
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cient to trigger the privilege-the possibility of a contempt sanction
for refusal to answer questions-the threat used in Garrity can be
considerably more daunting.245 Many employees would prefer a con-
tempt conviction, a fine, and a short jail sentence to the loss of their
chosen employment and perhaps their pension and career.2 46 If the
threat of a contempt sanction is enough to activate the privilege, it
seems that the threat in Garrity is sufficient as well, whether made
during an administrative or criminal investigation.
In addition, if the government were able to terminate a police
officer's employment for his assertion of the right to avoid self-incrim-
ination, in effect forcing a waiver of the privilege, it may be able to
condition other government-sponsored economic benefits, such as
housing subsidies and health care funding, on similar waivers. To
some, the public interest may demand that police officers, who are
vested with the responsibility of upholding the law and given the legal
right to use force, be held to answer for alleged misconduct under pain
of losing their jobs and without receiving immunity.247 But if eco-
nomic pressure is a permissible means of compelling waivers of consti-
tutional safeguards in that setting, the government's ability to make
similar demands on others who also are financially dependent on it
may be enhanced. For example, it may be permissible for the govern-
ment to require a waiver of constitutional rights as a condition of resi-
dence in publicly funded housing.248
2. Rethinking the Formal Immunity Analogy
Even if Garrity remains intact, it need not require that courts af-
ford police officers' compelled statements the same stringent protec-
tion that formally immunized testimony receives. Even a modest
duct will expose them to criminal prosecution, Byers likely has no force in the Garrity
context.
245 See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977) (noting that -touch-
stone" of Fifth Amendment privilege is compulsion, and sanctions involving "substantial
economic impact" trigger protections); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511,516 (1967) (describ-
ing "[tjhe threat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing, professional reputa-
tion, and of livelihood" as "powerful forms of compulsion to make a law.yer relinquish the
privilege" and as "powerful an instrument of compulsion" as use of legal process).
246 See Friendly, supra note 164, at 707 (noting "that from a practical standpoint
threatened loss of a government job carrying valuable vested benefits or suspension from a
profession may be a more effective compulsion than a small fine or even a few days in
jail").
247 For a discussion of an approach to cases like Garrity using such a cost-benefit analy-
sis, see Bloch, supra note 51, at 1665-72.
248 See, e.g., Monica L Selter, Comment, Sweeps: An Unwarranted Solution to the
Search for Safety in Public Housing, 44 Am. U. L Rev. 1903, 1938-40 (1995) (describing
tension between Clinton Administration policy of including consent-to-search clauses in
leases of federally subsidized housing and Garrihy decision).
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relaxation of prohibitions on collateral uses of compelled statements
would markedly improve the prospects of prosecutions of police of-
ficers. For example, courts could treat compelled statements as they
do coerced confessions, barring use of the statement itself in the pros-
ecution's case-in-chief and for impeachment and suppressing nonat-
tenuated evidence derived from it, but imposing no prohibition on
nonevidentiary use or indirect evidentiary use through witness testi-
mony.249 This approach, which is consistent with the assumptions un-
derlying the Court's decisions in Garrity and Kastigar,250 would free
prosecutors from the burden of demonstrating that neither they nor
their witnesses had been exposed to or tainted by police officers' com-
pelled statements.25' It also would eliminate the threat of police wit-
nesses' avoiding their obligation to testify by claiming to be tainted.252
Indeed, justifications for the robust protection of immunized tes-
timony do not apply to the compelled statements of police officers.
Professor Kristine Strachan, an advocate of strict limits on
prosecutorial use of immunized testimony,2 53 defended heightened
protection for immunized testimony by comparing the process of
questioning a suspect with that of immunizing a witness. She con-
tended that coerced confessions deserve less protection because they
often result from hasty interrogation decisions made "under pressure,
often inadvertently.., by persons unaware of or not concerned with
legal consequences. ' '12 4 The sanction of preclusion attaches only after
a court later determines that such "constable's blunders" violate due
process.255 In contrast, decisions to immunize witnesses "are made
before interrogation, normally by lawyers, acting with sufficient time
to decide, calmly and rationally, whether it is more valuable to compel
the testimony and suffer the resulting use preclusion or to forego the
testimony and retain the unfettered ability to prosecute. 2 56 Professor
249 See supra notes 201, 203 and accompanying text (discussing treatment of information
obtained through coerced confessions).
250 See supra notes 128-30, 200 and accompanying text (discussing assumptions of
Garrity and Kastigar Courts).
251 If there were no bar on nonevidentiary use of compelled statements, prosecutorial
exposure would not present a problem, unless it led to the discovery of evidence. See
supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. Removal of the prohibition on indirect eviden-
tiary use of compelled statements would eliminate the need to show that witnesses' recol-
lections had not been affected by compelled statements. See supra notes 53-57 and
accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 97-101.
253 Strachan, supra note 50, at 814-20 (advocating restrictions on nonevidentiary use and
witness testimony affected by immunized testimony).
254 Id. at 831.
255 Id.
256 Id.
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Strachan also maintained that, unlike police officers, who only learn
after a suppression ruling that a confession is coerced, prosecutors,
who make the decision to immunize, will know that they must take
steps in advance to ensure that they later will be able to establish that
there was no use of immunized testimony.257 Finally, she noted that
"grants of immunity probably occur much less frequently" than co-
erced confessions.Zs8
These points lose force when applied to police officers' compelled
statements rather than formally immunized testimony. Indeed, all of
the reasons that Strachan gives for affording less protection to coerced
confessions-the possible inadvertence of the conduct triggering sup-
pression of evidence, the concerns for attaching too harsh a conse-
quence to "blunders," the prosecution's inability to prepare in
257 Id.
258 Id. Strachan's effort to distinguish between coerced confessions and immunized tes-
timony is not altogether persuasive. Police officers who seek confessions may be neither
ignorant of, nor apathetic about, the legal consequences of their tactics. See, e.g., Cooper
v. Dupnick, 963 F.2d 1220, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 1992) (describing plan employed by officers
involved in serial rapist investigation to ignore suspect's assertions of rights to silence and
legal counsel in hopes of obtaining statement that could be used to impeach, thereby
preventing suspect from testifying at trial). Indeed, the exclusionary rule presupposes that
police officers make informed decisions about interrogation tactics that can be influenced
by suppression. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (holding that purpose
of suppressing coerced confessions "is to substantially deter future violations of the
Constitution").
Similarly, Strachan's use of the well-known Fourth Amendment term "constable's
blunders" to describe the cause of a coerced confession is misplaced. Although police may
not know exactly how much pressure will prompt a court to find a confession to be invol-
untary, they are aware that at some point coercive tactics will result in suppression. 'Thus,
as they increase the pressure to elicit a statement, they cannot help but be aware that they
tread on thin ice. is stands in marked contrast to police officers who are either unaware
of or baffled by Fourth Amendment doctrine, that "vast jumble of judicial pronounce-
ments that is not merely complex and contradictory, but often perverse." Akhl Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L Rev. 757, 758 (1994). Thus, the
case for allowing collateral uses when police coerce a confession is less compelling than
when they inadvertently run afoul of the intricacies of the Fourth Amendment.
Even if Strachan's characterization of differences between the processes of coercing
confessions and immunizing testimony is accurate, however, it is not self-evident that those
differences should cause courts to apply a less robust exclusionary rule for coerced confes-
sions. If police engage in conduct sufficiently egregious to violate due process, there
should be little judicial sympathy for claims that police often must act hastily or under
pressure, are ignorant of, or apathetic about, the legal consequences of their conduct, or
normally do not take steps to minimize the consequences flowing from a coerced confes-
sion. Indeed, one plausibly could contend that the need to deter police misconduct, espe-
cially misconduct sufficiently flagrant to violate due process, requires use of an
exclusionary rule as robust as the one applied to immunized testimony. The danger that
such misconduct will increase the risk of unreliable confessions, and thus wrongful convic-
tions, lends further support to that contention. By requiring the prosecution to disprove all
use of coerced confessions, including nonevidentiary and indirect evidentiary use, courts
could increase the incentive for police to refrain from use of offensive interrogation tactics.
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advance for the fallout of such blunders, and the greater frequency
with which the prosecution will have to contend with the problem-
apply with equal force to statements compelled from police officers.2 59
Nor does resort to the Fifth Amendment privilege as the reason
for suppression and the related use of the "immunity" label require
that courts treat compelled statements and immunized testimony
identically. As Professor Bloch has demonstrated, the Court employs
a multitiered approach to the Fifth Amendment privilege, affording
different levels of protection in different circumstances.2 60 For exam-
ple, when a defendant testifies at a pretrial suppression hearing to es-
tablish standing, the Court recognizes a limited privilege-based form
of "'use immunity"' 261 that bars admission of the testimony in the
prosecution's case-in-chief at trial, but may permit impeachment and
nonevidentiary use.262 And, although Bloch does not discuss it, the
privilege-based Miranda exclusionary rule,2 63 which requires suppres-
sion of statements taken either without proper warnings or following
police failure to honor a suspect's invocation of rights, but permits
collateral uses that are prohibited of immunized testimony,264 is an-
259 See supra Part I.C (discussing circumstances surrounding internal affairs investiga-
tors' use of compulsion to take statements from suspect police officers).
260 Bloch, supra note 51, at 1646-48. Professor Bloch describes three tiers of Fifth
Amendment protection. Formally immunized testimony (Tier One) receives the most ro-
bust protection, a prohibition on direct and derivative evidentiary use, as well as at least
some nonevidentiary use. Coerced confessions (Tier TWo) enjoy protection from direct
and derivative evidentiary use, but not from nonevidentiary use. Statements made as a
result of the need to choose between constitutional rights-specifically, a criminal defen-
dant's pretrial suppression hearing testimony necessary to establish standing to contest the
legality of a search or seizure (Tier Three)-are excluded only from use in the prosecu-
tion's case-in-chief. Id.; see also Bloch, supra note 11, at 640-64 (surveying spectrum of
protection under rubric of "use immunity"). Bloch argues that the Court has acknowl-
edged, at least implicitly, that the Fifth Amendment privilege provides different levels of
protection in different contexts. See Bloch, supra note 51, at 1645-46.
261 United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 90 (1980).
262 See id. at 93-94 & nn.7-8 (implicitly rejecting prohibition on nonevidentiary use and
leaving intact lower court decisions permitting use of suppression hearing testimony to
impeach defendant at trial); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 393-94 (1968) (hold-
ing that defendant's suppression hearing testimony to establish standing "may not thereaf-
ter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt," thus suggesting it could be used to
impeach or discover other evidence (emphasis added)). For a discussion of the Court's
subsequent interpretation of Simmons, see Bloch, supra note 51, at 1620-23, 1634-35.
263 The Court recently reiterated that the Fifth Amendment serves as the foundation for
the Miranda rule. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434-35 (2000).
264 Prosecutors can use statements taken in violation of Miranda to impeach a defen-
dant, see Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1975) (holding statement obtained follow-
ing failure to honor invocation of right to counsel admissible to impeach); Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 223-26 (1971) (holding statement obtained after defective Miranda
warnings admissible to impeach), and develop leads to other evidence, see, for example,
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 300-06 (1985) (holding that defendant's voluntary state-
ment following Miranda warning was admissible without consideration of possible taint
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other example. Courts can and should show the same flexibility when
determining whether to permit collateral uses of compelled state-
ments, particularly in light of the significant differences between for-
mal grants of immunity and Garrity immunity.265
B. Legislative Responses
For policymakers, the situations in which Garrity immunity at-
taches involve three competing concerns: the suspect officers' Fifth
Amendment rights, the need for effective administrative investigation
from defendant's previous statements made without having received warnings, since "a
procedural Miranda violation differs in significant respects from violations of the Fourth
Amendment, which have... mandated a broad application of the 'fruits' doctrine"); Carol
S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Twro Audiences,
Two Answers, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2466, 2523-24 (1996) (noting that lower courts have read
Elstad "to mean that Miranda violations simply produce no suppressible 'fruits' at all").
265 See supra Part I.C (describing differences). Professor Bloch proposes two models
for determining the appropriate level of protection available for various forms of com-
pelled statements, a "Compulsion Model," Bloch, supra note 51, at 1651-64, and a "Balanc-
ing Model," id. at 1665-72. The former "posits a correlation between the extent of
compulsion and the extent of protection: the greater the compulsion, the greater the pro-
tection." Id. at 1651. The latter "weighs the pertinent governmental interests against the
speaker's privilege...." Id. at 1665. When Bloch applies the models to compelled state-
ments taken from police officers as part of an administrative investigation, she concludes
that they merit less protection than immunized testimony but more protection than co-
erced confessions. Id. at 1693-1700. She concludes that her models would permit at least
some nonevidentiary use of police officers' compelled statements. Id. at 1695, 1698.
Even if reluctant to apply less stringent exclusionary rules to compelled statements,
courts could reallocate the burden of proof regarding some collateral uses. For a discus-
sion of a similar approach in the context of congressional immunity, see Wright, supra note
36, at 445-48. The Kastigar Court's decision to make the prosecution shoulder the burden
of disproving taint makes sense when it is the prosecutor who chooses to immunize a wit-
ness and later to prosecute. In such a situation, the prosecutor can weigh the benefits of
immunity against the costs, employ prophylactic measures such as "canning" testimony
before granting immunity, and take steps to avoid dissemination of the immunized testi-
mony. See supra notes 76-77, 82, 87-88 and accompanying text. As noted above, none of
these things is true of Garrity statements. See supra notes 78,83-86,89-91 and accompany-
ing text.
If the prosecution can demonstrate that it has played no role in the decision to confer
Garrity immunity and disseminate a compelled statement, courts could reallocate the bur-
den by requiring that the defendant prove witness taint, particularly if there is reason to
doubt the sincerity of an allegedly tainted witness. See supra notes 97-112 and accompany-
ing text. Although such a shift would not alleviate all the problems that Garrity immunity
creates, it would reduce the threat of witness sabotage, enabling courts to reject witnesses'
incredible claims of taint, even if the prosecution was unable to affirmatively establish an
absence of taint. It would make sense to continue to allocate to the prosecution the bur-
den of proving that prosecutors, investigators, and physical evidence are free from taint.
Despite the prosecution's inability to control the decisions to take and disseminate a com-
pelled statement, the prosecution team can ensure that its own members remain free from
exposure. The prosecution also has better access to information concerning the prosecu-
tion team's exposure to and taint by compelled statements for purposes of a Kastigar hear-
ing than does the defendant police officer who gave the Garrity statement.
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and discipline of police misconduct, and the need to preserve the op-
tion of criminally prosecuting rogue officers. 266 Generous interpreta-
tion of the privilege in the Garrity context and the practice of taking
compelled statements from police officers before prosecution favor
the first two concerns at the expense of the third.2 67 Although it is
impossible to eliminate the tension between the concerns entirely, leg-
islators or police department policymakers should minimize the threat
to prosecutions without infringing on officers' rights or impairing the
administrative discipline process to the extent that they can do so. At
least three approaches are possible: (1) controlling the decision to
take compelled statements; (2) restricting the dissemination of com-
pelled statements; and (3) using less coercive methods to persuade
suspect officers to cooperate with internal affairs investigations.
1. Controlling the Decision to Take Compelled Statements
Professor Bloch has proposed a "notice and veto" mechanism as
a legislative response to the Garrity predicament-requiring that in-
ternal affairs investigators obtain prosecutorial approval to compel
statements.268 Before taking a compelled statement, the "internal af-
fairs units provide notice to the requisite prosecuting authorities of
their intention to [do so]." ' 2 69 After receipt of that notice,
"[p]rosecuting authorities then would have a limited period in which
to submit an objection to the taking of the statement. T270 An objec-
tion would preclude internal affairs from taking the statement.27 1 Pro-
fessor Bloch acknowledges that this response may impair
administrative investigations by denying investigators a statement
from suspect police officers in cases when prosecutors exercise their
veto, but suggests that this burden is not prohibitive.2 72
266 See Bloch, supra note 11, at 628 ("The tripartite goals of 'use immunity' are to: (1)
protect the accused's Fifth Amendment right, (2) secure information from the accused, and
(3) preserve accountability in the justice system."); see also Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459
U.S. 248, 257-58 (1983) (identifying interests of party seeking to assert Fifth Amendment
privilege; information was sought for purpose other than criminal prosecution).
267 Not all police departments take and disseminate compelled statements before there
has been a criminal investigation. See supra note 72. But the decision to forego adminis-
trative questioning altogether or delay it pending a determination whether there will be
prosecution reduces the efficacy of the internal disciplinary option. See infra notes 274,
280, 282 and accompanying text.
268 Bloch, supra note 11, at 682-84.
269 Id. at 684.
270 Id.
271 Id.; see also Report of the Rampart Independent Review Panel, supra note 9, at 112
(suggesting possibility of conducting criminal investigations before compelled statements
are taken from suspect officers, as is done by some police departments).
272 Bloch, supra note 11, at 684. She notes that police departments can adjudicate mis-
conduct allegations without compelled statements just as trial juries often render verdicts
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For this approach to properly balance the competing needs of in-
ternal affairs investigators for compelled statements and prosecutors
to maintain the possibility of viable prosecutions, prosecutors would
have to be able to assess the probability of future criminal prosecution
accurately when deciding whether to exercise a veto. Ideally, they
would veto compelled statements only when later criminal prosecu-
tion is likely. If they under-vetoed, Garrity immunity still would
plague prosecutions; if they over-vetoed, they would deny administra-
tive investigations important evidence. Unfortunately, practical
problems likely would undermine the predictive accuracy necessary to
make this proposal attractive.
First, internal affairs investigators might provide incomplete no-
tice. At the minimum, they would have to notify at least two or three
different prosecutors-the local district attorney, the state Attorney
General, and the United States Attorney-all of whom may have ju-
risdiction to bring criminal charges that Garrity immunity could jeop-
ardize.273 Otherwise, they may neglect to notify a prosecutor who, if
alerted, would veto the compelled statement.
Second, the content of the notice may be inadequate. Investiga-
tors may want to elicit officers' statements at the outset of an investi-
gation, before suspect officers have an opportunity to "get their
stories straight." Thus, they may seek approval to compel statements
before developing sufficient evidence to enable prosecutors to make
intelligent decisions about whether to exercise a veto. The delay nec-
essary to provide more information may render the statement less val-
uable because of witness collusion. 274 Being forced to make decisions
without full knowledge of the facts may cause prosecutors to author-
ize compelled statements in cases in which they would exercise a veto
had they received a fuller account.
without a pretrial statement or trial testimony from a defendant. Id. For a response to that
view, see infra note 280.
273 Indeed, in the case upon which Bloch relies for her proposal, Daly v. Superior Court,
560 P.2d 1193 (Cal. 1977) (en banc), in which the California Supreme Court employed a
notice-and-veto procedure to determine whether a trial court should grant use immunity to
allow questioning in a civil suit, "the court mandated that the litigants notify the 'district
attorney of the county, the California Attorney General, and the United States Attorney
for the district in which the county is located."' Bloch, supra note 11, at 683 (quoting Daly,
560 P.2d at 1204). Because police criminality may cross local jurisdictional boundaries,
internal affairs investigators sometimes would have to notify prosecutors in several local,
state, and federal jurisdictions.
274 See, e.g., U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 6, ch. 4 (criticizing New York
Police Department rule requiring forty-eight-hour delay before internal affairs investiga-
tors can question suspect police officers because it "creates opportunities for subject of-
ficers to corroborate their versions of the alleged misconduct incident").
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The mixed motives that some internal affairs investigators may
harbor could exacerbate these notice problems. For the same reasons
that police investigators may improperly compel a statement or dis-
seminate a compelled statement,275 they may neglect to notify a con-
cerned prosecutor or provide incomplete or misleading information in
hopes of avoiding a veto, permitting them to confer Garrity immunity
and thwart criminal prosecution.276 Because it would be difficult to
prove that failure to provide complete and accurate notice was done
in bad faith, and because sanctions to deter such conduct would not
salvage a criminal prosecution impaired by the taking of a compelled
statement, these problems make the notice-and-veto solution
unattractive.
Moreover, prosecutors may over-veto, thus impairing the internal
administrative disciplinary process.277 A prosecutor's cost-benefit as-
sessment heavily favors vetoes, even when inappropriate. An unwar-
ranted veto may deny an internal affairs investigator an important
source of evidence, but imposes no direct costs on the prosecutor.278
Prosecutors' suspicions that internal affairs investigators, for whatever
reason, are not providing complete details, will exacerbate this prob-
lem. The safe thing for a prosecutor to do is to veto, particularly if
forced to make a decision quickly. 279 If prosecutors are given time to
275 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
276 See Kolts Comm'n Report, supra note 72, at 144-45 (
The deputy district attorneys [in Los Angeles County] stressed other ways in
which investigations can be manipulated. A deputy district attorney who has
the reputation of being hard on the police may be given the run-around, kept
in the dark about investigative details, or simply be kept waiting interminably
at the scene of the shooting or later when he or she attempts to follow up.
Deputy district attorneys state that passive noncooperation, delays, mix-ups,
unavailability of personnel and other similar tactics by the Sheriff's Depart-
ment can severely prejudice an investigation or prosecution of a deputy for
misconduct);
see also id. at 144 (describing other methods of frustrating criminal investigations of of-
ficer-involved shootings, including denying district attorney personnel ability to interview
involved officers, giving insufficient or untimely notice of shootings, and manipulation of
investigations); Christopher Comm'n Report, supra note 72, at 162 (noting that LAPD
prevents district attorney representatives from interviewing officers involved in shooting
until LAPD internal investigations are complete).
277 Cf. Wright, supra note 36, at 437 (noting that prosecutors are likely to be overinclu-
sive when identifying witnesses who may later be prosecuted and thus should not receive
congressional immunity in exchange for testimony).
278 Although the law enforcement effort in general suffers from less thorough internal
investigations of police officers, because it may both enable officers to escape deserved
discipline and diminish the certainty and deterrent effect of administrative sanctions, those
costs are likely too remote to shape prosecutors' decisions.
279 Bloch proposes that "[p]rosecuting authorities.., would have a limited time period
in which to submit an objection to the taking of the statement." Bloch, supra note 11, at
684. Such a time limit would increase the incentive to over-veto.
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assemble more facts before making their determination, it may be too
late for internal affairs to obtain a useful statement.
Excessive exercise of vetoes could substantially undermine efforts
to address police misconduct by depriving investigators of critical evi-
dence. 80 For all the shortcomings of administrative review and disci-
pline of police misconduct,' 1 it remains the most widely used method
of addressing police misconduct. In addition, if police departments
routinely act on complaints without statements from the suspect of-
28o See, e.g., Newton, supra note 90 (reporting LAPD police chief's contention that
compelled statements "are essential to the department as it conducts its internal review of
shootings and decides whether administrative action is warranted"); cf. Wright, supra note
36, at 436 (arguing that reluctance to use compulsion orders will mean -less-than-complete
congressional investigations").
Professor Bloch's contention that overinclusive use of vetoes would leave police disci-
plinary boards in no worse a position than trial juries resolving guilt or innocence without
the benefit of a defendant's statement or testimony, see supra note 272, is not reassuring.
First, in many cases juries do have a defendant's pretrial statements to police, even if the
defendant chooses to remain silent at trial. Second, because of the importance of criminal
prosecutions, society devotes considerable resources to the investigation of crime. A thor-
ough investigation may partially compensate for evidence unavailable due to a defendant's
silence before and during trial. Because police departments may, and perhaps should,
devote fewer resources to administrative investigations than to criminal investigations,
there is more reason to be troubled by the loss of evidence resulting from an inability to
take statements from suspect police officers. Finally, although juries routinely decide cases
without a defendant's statements and testimony, we accept that state of affairs because the
Constitution compels it. If it were a policy choice, perhaps we would compel defendants to
submit to orderly pretrial interrogation or require that they testify at trial. Indeed, a num-
ber of scholars have argued that operation of the privilege in this context is indefensible.
See, e.g., David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion?, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1063, 1064 (1986) (suggesting that efforts to justify privilege -as
more than a historical relic are uniformly unsatisfactory"); Donald A. Dripps, Supreme
Court Review-Foreword: Against Police Interrogation-and the Privilege Against Self
Incrimination, 78 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 699,723 (19S8) (identifying privilege as "chief
legal obstacle to achieving.., an accomodation" that permits confessions without -need-
less brutality" by pretrial judicial interrogation); Friendly, supra note 164, at 713-15 (en-
dorsing proposal for pretrial judicial interrogation of criminal defendants).
281 Those shortcomings are considerable. See, e.g., Shielded From Justice, supra note 6,
at 5 ("In each city we examined, internal affairs units too often conducted substandard
investigations, sustained few allegations of excessive force, and failed to identify and pun-
ish officers against whom repeated complaints had been filed."). The Mollen Commission
Report paints a particularly troubling portrait of the New York City Police Department
Internal Affairs Division (LAD):
We found that LAD had virtually abandoned its primary functions over the
past years... [a]nd ... no one in the Department seemed to care.... IAD
investigators... told us that the work ethic in LAD was to close cases with as
little effort as possible.... One officer told us they sit around and "eat dough-
nuts and do crossword puzzles"....
Mollen Comm'n Rep., supra note 6, at 85; see also Christopher Comm'n Report, supra
note 72, at 153 ("[l]n cases involving allegations of excessive force, the System is unfairly
skewed against the complainant."); Hoffman, supra note 6, at 1478-82 (discussing abuses
by Los Angeles Sheriff's Department).
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ficers, the disciplinary system may lose legitimacy in the eyes of
officers. 282
Even if the notice-and-veto solution worked, and prosecutors ex-
ercised vetoes in only those cases in which criminal prosecution ap-
peared likely, the results would be undesirable. In cases in which the
prosecutor exercised the veto, the suspect police officer would escape
administrative questioning without cost. In cases in which the prose-
cutor did not exercise a veto, the suspect officer would enjoy the bene-
fits of immunity if evidence discovered later resulted in a prosecution
that was not foreseeable when the prosecutor permitted the com-
pelled statement. If there are constitutional alternatives, we should
not settle for these options.
2. Controlling Dissemination of Compelled Statements
The taking of a compelled statement alone does not create
Garrity immunity problems. The problems arise when investigators
disseminate the compelled statement. If prosecutors, investigators,
and witnesses are never exposed to a compelled statement, it cannot
taint them.283 Thus, an alternative approach would be to restrict dis-
semination of compelled statements. For example, internal affairs in-
vestigators could be required to seal compelled statements and refrain
from using them during investigations.
The cost of such an approach is difficult to gauge. There may be
legitimate reasons for police investigators to expose witnesses and
complainants to the substance of a compelled statement to verify or
contradict the suspect officer's version of events.284 Exposure may be
direct, by having witnesses read the statement, or indirect, such as
when an internal affairs investigator asks questions formulated from
the suspect officer's compelled statement that impart otherwise un-
available information.
If a blanket prohibition on dissemination would impair internal
investigations too greatly, a notice-and-veto procedure governing dis-
semination decisions, similar to the one that Professor Bloch proposes
for the decision to take a compelled statement, might be more feasi-
ble. Such a procedure would give investigators unfettered discretion
to take compelled statements but would require prosecutorial ap-
282 See Perez & Muir, supra note 13, at 217 (describing police view of Berkeley Police
Review Commission as "kangaroo court" because it conducts investigations without inter-
view of suspect police officer).
283 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
284 See People v. Gwillim, 274 Cal. Rptr. 415, 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("[V]ictims and
witnesses participating in administrative proceedings will frequently and necessarily be ex-
posed to [a police officer] defendant's [Garrity] immunized statement.").
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proval to disseminate them, including use in witness interviews. Al-
though a veto might impair an administrative investigation somewhat,
the suspect officer's statement still would be available to adjudicate
the misconduct allegation.
This approach has shortcomings as well. First, it would be diffi-
cult to enforce. Particularly challenging would be any effort to restrict
use of compelled statements to frame questions for witnesses. Even
conscientious investigators might be unable to avoid communicating
something about the contents of a compelled statement inadvertently
during an interview.28 Second, this approach might run afoul of laws
and regulations requiring police departments to give officers involved
in an investigated incident copies of compelled statements from that
investigation.286 Similarly, statutory and constitutional discovery obli-
gations in multidefendant cases, requiring that the prosecution dis-
close all the defendant officers' compelled statements,2s7 would
undermine efforts to limit dissemination. Once a police officer has
obtained a fellow officer's compelled statement, he may have legiti-
mate reasons to show it to potential witnesses, thereby tainting them.
A police officer could challenge testimony from witnesses exposed to
285 An approach by which only internal affairs investigators who were not familiar with
a suspect police officer's compelled statements conducted all follow-up investigation also
would be problematic. One of the principal functions of follow-up investigation is to test
the veracity of the suspect officer's version of events. It would be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for an investigator who was unfamiliar with the officer's statement to perform that
function.
286 See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 3303(g) (West 1995) (requiring that officers who are
interrogated during investigation have access to tape recordings and stenographers' notes
of their interrogation, as well as "any reports or complaints made by investigators or other
persons, except those which are deemed... confidential").
287 Statutory discovery rules may require disclosure of codefendants' compelled state-
ments. See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 240.20 (McKinney 1989) (requiring disclosure of
statements of jointly tried codefendants). But see Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a) (requiring disclo-
sure of certain documents, but not codefendant statements). Even absent a statutory man-
date, it may be prudent for a prosecutor to disclose codefendants' compelled statements to
a defendant police officer. Because sound practice dictates that the trial prosecutor not
read or otherwise be exposed to the contents of the compelled statement, see supra notes
63-67 and accompanying text, she will not know if the compelled statements contain excul-
patory information that must be disclosed under the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), and its progeny. Prosecutors in the office not assigned to the case may be able to
read the statement without fear of tainting the prosecution, but their lack of familiarity
with the case may render them unable to identify exculpatory evidence in the statements.
Because even an inadvertent failure to disclose exculpatory evidence violates Brady, see
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437-38 (1995) (holding that prosecutor has duty to discover
and produce favorable and material evidence), the best course of action might be to dis-
close the codefendants' compelled statements in all cases.
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his compelled statement through actions of a fellow officer, even if the
prosecutor was not responsible for the exposure.288
3. Encouraging Cooperation Without "Compulsion"
An alternative approach would be to permit police departments
to use only sanctions less severe than job termination to encourage
cooperation with internal affairs investigators. For example, if a po-
lice officer suspected of misconduct refused to answer questions, a de-
partment could be permitted to do no more than draw an adverse
inference from his silence when adjudicating the misconduct allega-
tion.289 Two Supreme Court decisions, Baxter v. Palmigiano290 and
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard,29t suggest that statements
made under those circumstances are admissible in criminal cases.29g
Palmigiano was an inmate in a state penitentiary. The institution
accused him of conduct that both violated prison disciplinary rules
and exposed him to possible criminal prosecution.293 When he ap-
peared before the disciplinary board, prison authorities told him that
he had a right to remain silent but that his silence could be held
against him. 294 He remained silent. Although silence alone was insuf-
ficient to justify disciplinary measures, the prison board gave it the
"evidentiary value [that] was warranted by the facts surrounding his
288 See supra note 102 (noting that tainted witness testimony may be inadmissible with-
out regard to whether prosecution was responsible for exposure).
289 Although the Court has prohibited juries from drawing adverse inferences from
criminal defendants' failure to testify at trial, see Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305
(1981) (holding defendant entitled to instruction prohibiting adverse inference from si-
lence); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (prohibiting prosecutorial comment
on defendant's silence), it "has consistently recognized that in proper circumstances silence
in the face of accusation is a relevant fact not barred from evidence by the Due Process
Clause," Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (citations omitted); see also
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If I ask my son
whether he saw a movie I had forbidden him to watch, and he remains silent, the import of
his silence is clear.").
290 425 U.S. 308.
291 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
292 Another decision, Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984), just misses the mark.
Murphy was a probationer subject to a probation condition that he be truthful with his
probation officer. In response to questions from the probation officer, Murphy admitted
involvement in a rape and murder unrelated to the crime for which lie was on probation.
The Court considered whether Murphy's statement fell within Garrity, which would have
required that "the probationer's [statement] ... be deemed compelled and inadmissible in
a criminal prosecution." Id. at 435-36. Because the "precise contours of Murphy's obliga-
tion to respond to questions" were not clear, the Court declined to assume that he would
have been penalized for refusing to answer. Id. at 437-38.
293 Baxter, 425 U.S. at 312. Palmigiano had incited a disturbance and disruption of
prison operations, which might have resulted in a riot. Id.
294 Id. at 312, 316.
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case.' '295 After assessing the evidence against Palmigiano, including
his silence, the board imposed thirty days of punitive segregation and
altered his prison classification status. He sued, contending that use of
his silence violated his constitutional rights.296
The Baxter Court recognized that Garrity and the other "penalty
cases" established the applicable legal framework. 297 It also con-
firmed that the Fifth Amendment requires that "if inmates are com-
pelled in those proceedings to furnish testimonial evidence that might
incriminate them in later criminal proceedings, they must be offered
'whatever immunity is required to supplant the privilege' and may not
be required to 'waive such immunity."298 But, although there had
been no offer or guarantee of immunity, the Court concluded that the
prison properly could draw an adverse inference from Palmigiano's
silence.299
Because Palmigiano had remained silent, the Court had no rea-
son to address directly the issue of concern here: whether, had he
chosen to answer questions rather than suffer the consequences of re-
maining silent, a prosecutor would have been able to use his statement
in a criminal prosecution.300 But there is good reason to believe that
the Court would have permitted such use.
If the Court had concluded the opposite-that threatened eviden-
tiary use of silence gives rise to de facto immunity, as had the
threatened job termination in Garrity-there would have been no rea-
son to distinguish Garrity and the other penalty cases. The Baxter
Court could have resolved Palimigiano's claim simply by applying the
principle from the penalty cases that a state validly can threaten sanc-
295 Id. at 318.
296 Id. at 313, 317.
297 Id. at 316-17.
298 Id. at 316 (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 85 (1973)).
299 Baxter, 425 U.S. at 320 ("[Plermitting an adverse inference to be drawn from an
inmate's silence at his disciplinary proceedings is not, on its face, an invalid practice ....").
300 But see McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 995 (Alaska 1980) ("The [Barter] Court
held [sic], in dictum, however, that use immunity would be required should criminal pro-
ceedings later be instituted against the inmate .... ."). Actually, the Baxter Court stated
that "if inmates are compelled in [prison disciplinary proceedings] to furnish testimonial
evidence that might incriminate them in later criminal proceedings, they must be offered
'whatever immunity is required to supplant the privilege.'" Barter, 425 U.S. at 316 (cita-
tions omitted). But, as that passage makes clear, immunity is required only if inmates are
"compelled." As noted below, see infra notes 301-16 and accompanying text, Baxter is
better read to hold that the threatened evidentiary use of silence was not sufficient "com-
pulsion" to trigger the privilege. Thus, no immunity was required.
The Baxter majority did note that "[n]o criminal proceedings are or were pending
against Palmigiano," Baxter, 425 U.S. at 317, but, as Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent,
the applicability of the privilege is not contingent on whether criminal charges have been
filed, id. at 327-28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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tions for refusal to answer questions pertinent to an administrative
inquiry because any resulting statements are not admissible in crimi-
nal cases. 301 Instead, it distinguished those decisions. They involved
"threats of serious economic reprisal, '' 302 while the warning to
Palmigiano was no more than "advice" and "merely a realistic reflec-
tion of the evidentiary significance of the choice to remain silent." 303
In addition, in the penalty cases, "failure to respond to interrogation
was treated as a final admission of guilt," 304 whereas in Baxter, it was
"undisputed that an inmate's silence in and of itself is insufficient to
support an adverse decision by the Disciplinary Board. ' 30 5 The
Court's approach suggests that it permitted the adverse inference
from Palmigiano's silence not because any resulting statements would
be immunized, but because the threat to draw the inference, unlike
the threat in Garrity, was not sufficient "compulsion" to trigger the
Fifth Amendment privilege.30 6
This interpretation is supported by the Court's conclusion that
the threatened use of Palmigiano's silence as evidence in the discipli-
nary proceeding "does not smack of an invalid attempt by the State to
compel testimony without granting immunity or to penalize the exer-
cise of the privilege. ' 30 7 Although he disagreed with the outcome,
Justice Brennan read the majority opinion in Baxter precisely that
way.30
8
301 See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
302 Baxter, 425 U.S. at 317.
303 Id. at 318.
304 Id.
305 Id. at 317. For a rejection of the Court's reasoning in Baxter and an alternative
explanation for the distinction between the Garrity line of cases and Baxter, see In re
Moses, 792 F. Supp. 529, 535-38 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (noting that in both lines of authority,
there is direct causal link between assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege and sanction,
but that in Baxter, "penalty" is imposed "either to facilitate the proceeding or to make it
more equitable for the non-invoking party," rather than "either to punish the claimant or
to compel testimony, or both").
306 See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 n.5 (1977) (interpreting Baxter to
hold that evidentiary use of silence in civil proceeding was insufficient to trigger protec-
tions of privilege). The Baxter Court's repeated references to Garrity also are significant.
Baxter, 425 U.S. at 316-18. As noted earlier, among the Court's Fifth Amendment cases,
Garrity alone addressed the later use in a criminal case of statements given by a municipal
employee. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. By referring to and distinguish-
ing Garrity rather than only the later cases discussing the constitutionality of the penalty
for silence, the Court may have been indicating its view that any statements would have
been freely admissible in a criminal case.
307 Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added).
308 Noting that the Garrity line of cases made clear that threats of noncriminal penalties
can trigger the privilege, Justice Brennan expressed his disagreement with what he per-
ceived to be the majority position:
The compulsion upon Palmigiano is as obvious as the compulsion upon the
individuals in Garrity-Lefkowitz. He was told that criminal charges might be
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The Court's more recent decision in Ohio Adult Parole Authority
v. Woodard30 9 supports this view of Bater. At issue there was the
constitutionality of a portion of Ohio's clemency process by which a
death row inmate seeking clemency had the option of interviewing
with one or more parole board members, who in turn would make
recommendations to the governor.310 Inmate Woodard claimed that
this procedure violated his Fifth Amendment privilege because his
statements at the interview could incriminate him in other crimes 311
Although the Court assumed that the parole board "[would] draw ad-
verse inferences from [an inmate's] refusal to answer questions, ' 312
relying on Baxter, the Court determined that the threat of an adverse
inference from silence did not constitute compulsion under the
privilege.3'3
Lower courts also have read Baxter to hold that sanctions less
severe than job loss do not constitute "compulsion" sufficient to trig-
ger the privilege314 and have applied it to disciplinary proceedings in-
brought against him. He was also told that anything he said in the disciplinary
hearing could be used against him in a criminal proceeding. Thus, the possibil-
ity of self-incrimination was just as real and the threat of a penalty just as
coercive. Moreover, the Fifth Amendment does not distinguish among types
or degrees of compulsion. It prohibits "inducement of any sort." Brain v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532, 548 (1897).... Palmigiano was forced to choose
between self-incrimination and punitive segregation or some similar penalty.
Since the Court does not overrule the Garrity-Lejkowitz group of decisions,
those precedents compel the conclusion that this constituted impermissible
compulsion.
Id. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
309 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
310 Id. at 276-77.
311 Id. at 285. In its brief in the Supreme Court, the Ohio Adult Parole Authority
agreed that Woodard's statements during the interview were not immunized. Id.
312 Id. at 286. The Court did not make clear whether it was addressing a situation in
which the inmate chose to forgo the interview altogether or one in which the inmate chose
to have an interview and then refused to respond to specific inquiries. The opinion sug-
gests that the analysis is the same in both situations.
313 Id. ("[W]e do not think that respondent's testimony at a clemency interview would
be 'compelled' within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment."); see also id. at 287 ([Ut has
never been suggested that such pressures constitute 'compulsion' for Fifth Amendment
purposes.").
314 See, e.g., Lynott v. Story, 929 F.2d 228,230-32 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that inferences
that flow from silence at probation revocation hearing are not "compulsion"); Ryan v.
Montana, 580 F.2d 988, 990-92 (9th Cir. 1978) (Kennedy, J.) ("As in Barter, Ryan's deci-
sion whether or not to testify [at combined probation revocation and deferred sentencing
hearing] was a strategic choice" and thus, "from a self-incrimination standpoint, noncom-
pulsive"); Roberts v. Taylor, 540 F.2d 540,542-43 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding inmates not enti-
tled to use immunity because, absent conclusive presumption of guilt from silence, there is
no attempt to compel statement).
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volving police and other municipal employees.315 Like Ohio Adult
Parole Authority, the lower courts' reading suggests that if a threat of
evidentiary use of silence in a disciplinary proceeding persuades an
officer suspected of misconduct to answer questions, the privilege
does not bar use of the resulting statements in a criminal
prosecution. 316
If this interpretation of Baxter is correct, it offers an attractive
solution to Garrity immunity problems. State statutes, municipal ordi-
nances, and departmental policies could be rewritten to reduce the
sanction for police officers' refusal to answer internal affairs investiga-
tors' questions. If officers suspected of misconduct chose to remain
silent, that silence would be admissible, not conclusive, in departmen-
tal disciplinary hearings to support an adverse inference.317 Internal
affairs investigators would be permitted to explain that consequence
to suspect police officers. If officers answered questions to avoid evi-
dentiary use of their silence, prosecutors would be free to introduce
the statements in criminal prosecutions and would have no burden of
disproving any use of the statements.
This approach accommodates the competing concerns of adminis-
trative investigators, prosecutors, and suspect officers. In most cases,
suspect officers likely will give statements to internal affairs investiga-
tors rather than permit use of their silence in a disciplinary proceed-
ing. Many misconduct accusations involve one-on-one situations, with
no evidence other than a complainant's claim and the police officer's
315 See, e.g., Hoover v. Knight, 678 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1982) (disciplinary proceeding
against police officer); Book v. Postal Serv., 675 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1982) (disciplinary hear-
ing against postmaster).
316 See, e.g., Diebold v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 611 F.2d 697, 698-99 (8th Cir. 1979) (hold-
ing that civil servant who chooses to testify in administrative hearing regarding alleged
misconduct that is also subject of pending criminal charges waives immunity even if deci-
sion to remain silent would "virtually guarantee the loss of his job"); Ryan, 580 F.2d at 993
(holding that so long as "parole or probation system [is not used] as a subterfuge for a
criminal investigation," parolee's or probationer's "statements made in the course of [a]
probation revocation hearing might possibly be used against him in a subsequent criminal
proceeding"); United States v. Najarian, 915 F. Supp. 1460, 1478-83 & n.25 (D. Minn. 1996)
(holding threat of loss of indemnification for legal fees not sufficient compulsion to require
suppression of resulting statements under Garrity doctrine); see also Asherman v.
Meachum, 957 F.2d 978, 980-81 (2d Cir. 1991) (assuming but not deciding that, had sen-
tenced prisoner answered questions at psychiatric evaluation to avoid threatened termina-
tion of supervised home release, answers would be admissible in later criminal
prosecution).
317 See LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 267-68 (1998) (holding that government
agency was entitled to consider employee's failure to respond to investigative questions
when deciding whether to take adverse action and that this did not violate Fifth Amend-
ment privilege).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 76:1309
HeinOnline -- 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1380 2001
GARRITY IMMUNITY
response.318 In such cases, as well as similar situations in which there
is scant corroborating evidence, the threat of criminal prosecution is
minimal. In contrast, the impact of the officer's silence could prove
significant, leaving the disciplinary board with only a complainant's
uncontested allegation of misconduct and an adverse inference from
the silence. This will provide police officers with a powerful incentive
to make a statement. Internal affairs investigators likely will obtain
statements helpful to their investigation without triggering Garrity
immunity.319
The cases in which police officers are least likely to make state-
ments are those where there is considerable incriminating evidence,
leading suspect officers to believe that there is a realistic possibility of
criminal prosecution. Although silence in such cases will deprive in-
ternal affairs investigators of evidence, other proof will compensate
for that loss. If officers do choose to make statements in such cases, it
will not impair any criminal investigation or prosecution.
This approach should satisfy police officers as well as prosecutors
and internal affairs investigators. It reduces the sanction for officers'
refusal to answer questions from internal affairs investigators, making
their jobs more secure. And, because police are not entitled to Gar-
rity immunity for statements that are not the product of "compul-
sion," they have no legitimate complaint if statements that they make
to internal affairs investigators in order to avoid the adverse inference
from silence are later used in criminal cases.
CONCLUSION
The substantial authority that society vests in police officers
makes their violations of the criminal law especially menacing. Gar-
rity immunity creates conflicts between administrative and criminal
investigations and erects unnecessary impediments to the effective
prosecution of police criminality. It can operate as a trap for investi-
318 See Cheli, supra note 8, at 253 ("In many cases the only witnesses will be the victim
and the police .... ."); Kerstetter, supra note 98, at 234 (noting that there are no indepen-
dent witnesses in most cases of police misconduct); Perez & Muir, supra note 13, at 223
("[T]he system cannot develop evidence independent of the statements of officers and
citizens ....").
319 Even if a person's sole means of defending himself in an administrative proceeding is
to testify, and thus possibly provide self-incriminating information, such testimony is not
immunized even if a failure to testify almost certainly would guarantee an adverse adminis-
trative determination. See Diebold, 611 F.2d at 698-99 (holding that it was -constitution-
ally permissible" to force employee to choose between remaining silent, which would
"virtually guarantee the loss of his job," and waiving Fifth Amendment privilege); cf.
United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1286 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that defendant's in-
criminating testimony given in civil trial was admissible in related criminal proceeding).
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gators and prosecutors who fail either to take steps to minimize expo-
sure to compelled statements or to prepare to disprove taint. It can
serve as a tool for unscrupulous internal affairs investigators who seek
to undermine criminal prosecutions by disseminating compelled state-
ments and treacherous police witnesses who allege that they are
tainted in order to avoid giving prosecution testimony. Even if alert
to those dangers, prosecutors can only minimize, not eliminate, them,
and must expend significant resources to do so.
Although there may be reason for the Supreme Court's determi-
nation that the Fifth Amendment privilege protects police officers'
compelled statements, courts need not employ a robust exclusionary
rule that forces prosecutors to demonstrate that all evidence,
prosecutorial decisionmaking, and witness testimony is wholly unaf-
fected by such statements. Absent judicial limitations on the scope of
Garrity, legislatures and police departments can and should modify
policies and practices surrounding the acquisition and use of com-
pelled statements in internal affairs investigations. Instead of compel-
ling statements by threatening job loss, statutes and departmental
policies should encourage cooperation by notifying suspect police of-
ficers that a refusal to answer questions will have evidentiary signifi-
cance in administrative adjudicatory proceedings. This should permit
prosecutors to make full use of any resulting statements. Alterna-
tively, legislatures and police departments can and should impose con-
straints on dissemination of compelled statements.
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